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Welfare and Employment
Transitions in the 1990s
The last decade has seen extraordinary changes in the programs 
supporting indigent parents and their children in the United States, 
popularly known as welfare. From its inception in the 1930s through 
the 1960s, the federal/state Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program operated on the implicit assumption that a mother’s 
primary “job” should be caring for her children. In recent decades, as 
women entered the labor force in greater numbers and acceptance of 
working mothers grew, public opinion has shifted toward an increased 
emphasis on work as an alternative to welfare, even for mothers with 
young children.
Although efforts to increase employment of aid recipients date back 
at least to the 1960s, the shift to an employment-focused system gained 
serious momentum only in the 1990s. Under federal waivers, many 
states developed programs that modiﬁed the basic structure of AFDC, 
imposing increasingly stringent work and training requirements on aid 
recipients. In addition, legislation as well as policy and administrative 
directives in many states shifted program emphasis away from provi-
sion of aid to families and toward ﬁnding employment alternatives to 
public assistance. The national trend culminated with passage of the 
federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act in 1996 (PRWORA), which replaced AFDC with Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF). The new legislation, which Con-
gress passed with bipartisan support, speciﬁed explicit program par-
ticipation and work requirements for participants as well as limitations 
on the length of time aid could be received. It further expanded state 
autonomy, allowing states to develop and implement aid under a variety 
of program structures.
Reform-oriented policy changes at the national and state levels dur-
ing the 1990s dramatically modiﬁed the welfare service delivery system 
for recipients and administrators alike.1 National patterns of aid receipt 
during the 1990s reﬂect these major changes. After moderate increases 
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through most of the previous two decades, for the most part tracing the 
growth of the United States population, the number of families receiv-
ing aid under AFDC had reached 4.0 million by 1990. In the next four 
years, the caseload reached a peak of 5.0 million and then began a de-
cline, falling to 3.9 million in 1997, the year TANF was implemented in 
most states, and 2.6 million in 1999, a level not seen since 1970.2
While it is clear that increasing numbers of families are success-
fully transitioning from welfare to work, the probability that welfare 
leavers will successfully achieve stable employment and self-sufﬁ-
ciency over the long term remains in question. Many welfare recipients 
face signiﬁcant barriers to employment, including physical disabilities, 
mental health or substance abuse issues, limited English proﬁciency, 
learning disabilities, and domestic violence, as well as poor job skills 
and inadequate work experience. These barriers are substantial in urban 
areas, where most aid recipients live. Those who are able to move into 
employment commonly cycle in and out of work, earn low wages, and 
often continue to rely on government supports such as the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC), Food Stamps, and subsidized child care and 
health care. 
Our study examines changes in welfare participation and labor 
market involvement of female welfare recipients starting in the early 
1990s and extending through 1999. We focus particular attention on the 
dynamics of recipients’ employment activities in light of the welfare-
to-work emphasis of policy reform. Our detailed analysis is based on 
data for the core counties in six major urban areas: Atlanta, Baltimore, 
Chicago, Fort Lauderdale, Houston, and Kansas City. Together, these 
counties accounted for 5.1 percent of the nation’s welfare caseload in 
1991, as well as shares of their own state’s caseloads ranging from 6 
percent in Fort Lauderdale to fully 73 percent in Chicago.3 These sites 
provide considerable range and diversity, including cities from a very 
low-beneﬁt state (Texas), a classic northern urban area (Chicago), two 
cities on the border of the old South (Baltimore and Kansas City), one 
traditional southern city (Atlanta), and three cities with signiﬁcant rep-
resentation of Hispanics, one of the faster-growing populations on wel-
fare. All experienced signiﬁcant declines in their welfare caseloads over 
this period that were broadly consistent with the national trend.
Our analyses are based on administrative data that are unusual in al-
lowing us to examine individual welfare and employment histories for 
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extended periods using parallel methods across distinct sites. Informa-
tion on all welfare recipients beginning as early as 1990 is included in 
the data we obtained from state agencies, so trends over time in ﬂows 
onto and off of welfare are identiﬁed. We matched this individual in-
formation with data collected by states in support of their Unemploy-
ment Insurance programs, providing information on recipients’ detailed 
employment experiences, both during and after the period of welfare 
receipt.4
In the remainder of this chapter, we provide an overview of our key 
ﬁndings. Our focus is on trends and patterns that are common across 
states, and we present both national data and data from our sites to in-
vestigate the welfare caseload and employment for welfare recipients. 
We look at ﬂows onto and off of welfare and consider how these have 
changed in the 1990s. We address issues of what kinds of people are 
most likely to leave welfare and what kinds of jobs they are likely to 
hold. We ask how welfare reform has altered the experiences of recipi-
ents and the processes of securing work and leaving welfare.
The second chapter delves more deeply into the structure of welfare 
reform at each of our sites, recognizing the central role that differences 
across states play in deﬁning the features of reform. By focusing on six 
major cities, we can examine the extent to which differences in state 
and local policy, administrative directives, and local labor market con-
ditions contribute to observed trends. It is widely acknowledged that 
policy and administrative changes designed to move families from the 
rolls have been facilitated by a growing economy, much more so than in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s during implementation of work-oriented 
programs under the Family Support Act of 1988. Other supportive pol-
icy changes—including expansions of EITC, Medicaid, and child care 
subsidies—that might fall within the broad rubric of welfare reform, 
were also occurring during this period. Comparison across cities will 
allow us to begin to understand mechanisms inducing change and the 
interaction between labor market conditions and government action.
Chapter 3 considers the role of demographic characteristics, eco-
nomic factors, and policy regimes in explaining welfare exit and em-
ployment rates of welfare recipients during the 1990s at each of our 
sites. We also examine the reciprocal relationships between recipient 
employment and exit from welfare.
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In Chapter 4, we turn to an analysis of the job stability of welfare 
caretakers. We consider explicitly job stability and earnings in particu-
lar jobs and trends in both over time. We also look at the jobs obtained 
by workers who are not welfare recipients but who are employed con-
temporaneously in the same ﬁrms and at the same earnings levels as 
these welfare recipients. Such analysis has not been attempted before.
Chapter 5 considers the extent to which job stability for welfare 
caretakers is explained by personal characteristics and the kinds of jobs 
they obtain. To conduct this analysis, we look at caretakers’ demograph-
ics as well as key traits of their jobs, such as industry. The analysis also 
considers caretakers who hold multiple jobs and employers who hire 
more than one welfare recipient to separate out effects of employer and 
employee. 
In our ﬁnal chapter, we offer overarching conclusions and discuss 
the policy implications of our ﬁndings.
WELFARE CASELOAD DECLINES
The caseload decline after its peak in the 1990s was both precipi-
tous and almost universal across states.5 Table 1.1 provides information 
on the national welfare caseload at its peak in the early 1990s, extend-
ing through the end of the 1990s.6 From that peak, the caseload had 
declined by just about a third by the end of 1997, and then again by 
another third in the next two years, for an overall decline of 53 percent 
by the end of 1999. Our sites show similar patterns.7 Declines in case- 
load from the peak vary among our sites, but all are substantial, and 
they bracket the national decline, ranging from a low of 44 percent in 
Kansas City to a high of 81 percent in Fort Lauderdale. There is some 
evidence that federal passage of PRWORA in 1996 may have increased 
caseload declines. Nationally, the decline in percentage terms is similar 
before and after 1997, meaning that the annual decline in the more re-
cent period is greater. The trend at our sites is similar, with particularly 
large caseload declines in the last two years.8
Many of the legal and policy changes following welfare reform fo-
cused on the activities of recipients, attempting to create both incen-
tives and opportunities for them to obtain employment and exit welfare, 
as well as an accompanying set of penalties and sanctions if they did 
W
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Maximum Fourth quarter 1997 Fourth quarter 1999
Area
Year:
quarter Caseload Caseload
Change from 
maximum (%) Caseload
Change from 
1997 (%)
Change from 
maximum (%)
United Statesa 1994:1 5,066 3,431 -32 2,361 -31 -53
Atlanta 1994:3 21,765 14,261 -34 9,298 -35 -57
Baltimore 1992:3 37,291 25,186 -32 14,859 -41 -60
Chicago 1995:3 132,345 106,548 -19 63,283 -41 -52
Fort Lauderdale 1994:1 17,038 7,464 -56 3,194 -57 -81
Houston 1992:4 55,468 24,568 -56 12,278 -50 -78
Kansas City 1994:3 14,405 10,732 -25 8,072 -25 -44
a Caseload in thousands.
b This was the ﬁrst quarter for which we have data. See text.
SOURCE: National data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004a,b).
Table 1.1  Welfare Caseload Trends in the United States and Six Areas  
b
b
b
6   King and Mueser
not. Time limits created inducements to leave welfare: Although only 
a small number of recipients could exhaust these limits within the pe-
riod of our study, recipients may well have decided to leave welfare to 
“bank” their remaining eligibility.9 Reforms also included mandatory 
programs designed to aid recipients in obtaining employment, provid-
ing them with job readiness training and job search support, as well as 
basic skills and vocational training. It is clear that such reforms should 
increase rates of departures from the welfare rolls.
The Role of Welfare Exits 
In all of our sites, we see that, in fact, increases in exit rates are sub-
stantial, accounting for large declines in the caseloads. Despite substan-
tial differences across sites in initial departure rates, Table 1.2 shows 
that there were dramatic increases in exit rates at all sites. For four of 
the six sites, quarterly exit rates are less than 10 percent at the peak of 
Table 1.2  Welfare Exit Rates in Six Areas and Impact on Caseload
Exit ratesa
Caseload 
decline due 
to exit rate 
increase (%)cArea
At peak 
caseloadb 1997 1999
Atlanta 0.073 0.119 0.167 −56
Baltimore 0.064 0.121 0.178 −64
Chicago 0.075 0.089 0.140 −46
Fort Lauderdale 0.175 0.337 0.431 −59
Houston 0.142 0.196 0.204 −30
Kansas City 0.096 0.146 0.161 −40
a Quarterly exit rates averaged over four quarters.
b Quarterly exit rate for four quarters preceding peak caseload.  Where prior quarters 
are not available in our data, reported exit rates are based on the ﬁrst four quarters 
for which we have data.
c Calculated decline in the stable caseload that would result from the observed change 
in the exit rate.  The stable caseload can be written as C=E/d, where d is the exit 
rate and E is the ﬂow of entries. A change in the exit rate from d
1 
to d
2 
produces a 
percentage change of −(d
2
 − d
1
)/d
2
 × 100.
Welfare and Employment Transitions in the 1990s   7
the caseload, meaning that fewer than 1 out of 10 recipients in a given 
quarter were off welfare by the following quarter. By 1999, quarterly 
exit rates at these sites were between 14 and 18 percent. In Fort Lauder-
dale and Houston, exit rates were initially higher than in our other sites, 
but both still increased substantially, with Fort Lauderdale’s exit rate 
exceeding 40 percent in the ﬁnal year.
The ﬁnal column of Table 1.2 indicates how much the caseload 
would be expected to decline based on growth in the exit rate alone.10 
At all of our sites, the projected decline is very large, implying that exit 
rates play an important role in the observed decline. In three of the sites, 
the caseload would decline to less than half of its prior level because of 
the growth in exit rates.
Effects on Long-Term Welfare Recipients
Long-term dependence has been a key concern of welfare reformers 
for many years. How much have policy and program changes inﬂu-
enced long-term recipients? Table 1.3 presents statistics on exit rates 
for those who have been on welfare for at least two years. At all our 
sites, the exit rate for this group is much lower than for all recipients, 
but what is notable is that the increases in exit rates are substantial for 
these long-term recipients. In three of our sites, exit rates for long-term 
recipients increased at least two and one-half times. In most sites, sub-
stantial increases in their exit rates continued to occur between 1997 
and 1999. The case of Fort Lauderdale is special, since Florida’s two-
year limit—a “hard” time limit relative to that implemented by most 
states—was forcing individuals to leave welfare by 1999. The exit rate 
for long-term recipients is between two and three times that for our 
other sites. Even if we ignore Fort Lauderdale, the evidence suggests 
that these reforms have been very successful in changing the behavior 
of long-term aid recipients.
Welfare Entry Effects 
Some elements of welfare reform were also designed to reduce en-
try onto welfare. Not only were explicit diversion programs adopted 
by many states, in some cases requiring potential recipients to engage 
in job search prior to submission of a formal welfare application, but 
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many states restructured their application processes as well. Equally 
important, reforms focused on recipients may have also inﬂuenced wel-
fare applicants. Training and employment requirements adopted as part 
of these reforms may have had the effect of making welfare receipt less 
attractive, thus reducing incentives for individuals to enter the program. 
On the other hand, reforms that moved recipients with tenuous employ-
ment off of welfare may have increased the number of individuals re-
turning after disappointing labor market experiences.
In fact, Table 1.4 shows that declines in the number of individu-
als entering welfare each quarter were large at all our sites. The ﬁnal 
column of the table shows that, in the absence of any change in the 
exit rate, the declines in entries would have caused caseload reductions 
of between one-ﬁfth and two-thirds. Declines in the numbers entering 
welfare were particularly important in Fort Lauderdale and Houston, 
suggesting that larger caseload declines in these sites were driven at 
least partly by a fall in the ﬂow of new recipients.
Table 1.3  Welfare Exit Rates for Long-Run Recipients in Six Areas 
Exit ratesa
Area
At peak 
caseloadb 1997 1999
Atlanta 0.051 0.102 0.141
Baltimore 0.047 0.099 0.157
Chicago 0.054 0.070 0.120
Fort Lauderdale 0.125 0.257 0.312
Houston 0.094 0.138 0.132
Kansas City 0.066 0.114 0.124
a Quarterly exit rates averaged over four quarters.  Where prior quarters are not 
available in our data, reported exit rates are based on the ﬁrst four quarters for which 
we have data.
b Quarterly exit rate for four quarters preceding peak caseload.
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EMPLOYMENT OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS
Welfare reform signaled a major change in the emphasis placed on 
employment as an alternative to cash assistance. Prior to the 1990s, 
AFDC rules speciﬁed certain eligibility criteria, and federal courts had 
ruled that those meeting the criteria were categorically eligible to re-
ceive beneﬁts. States therefore had little leverage over recipients, and 
there were minimal efforts to increase their labor force participation. 
In practice, recipients in many states appear to have faced implicit 
pressure not to work while they received AFDC, since working recipi-
ents—and their caseworkers—were saddled with additional reporting 
requirements, a result of efforts to assure that beneﬁts would be ad-
justed to reﬂect earnings variation.11 Following welfare reform, states 
required most recipients to participate in work or training activities, 
applying sanctions—often including removal from the rolls—for those 
who failed to comply. In addition, many states raised the earnings disre-
Table 1.4  Welfare Entry in Six Areas and Impact on Caseload
Number entering welfarea Caseload decline 
due to entry 
decline (%)cArea
At peak 
caseloadb 1997 1999
Atlanta 1,602 906 1,160 −28
Baltimore 2,556 2,451 2,048 −20
Chicago 7,721 7,463 4,403 −43
Fort Lauderdale 2,379 1,850 1,182 −50
Houston 6,962 3,087 2,019 −71
Kansas City 1,534 1,253 1,197 −22
a Quarterly number of entries onto welfare averaged over four quarters.
b Quarterly number of entries for four quarters preceding peak caseload.  Where prior 
quarters are not available in our data, reported numbers are based on the ﬁrst four 
quarters for which we have data.
c Calculated decline in the stable caseload that would result from the observed change 
in the entry ﬂow.  The stable caseload can be written as C=E/d, where d is the exit 
rate and E is the ﬂow of entries. A change in the number of entries from  E
1
 to E
2
 
produces a percentage change of  (E
2
 − E
1
)/E
1
 × 100.
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gard, providing increased pecuniary incentives for individuals to obtain 
and retain employment.12
Table 1.5 provides employment rates for AFDC/TANF recipients 
for the United States and for our six sites. The welfare employment 
rate for the United States is provided for comparison, but it must be 
recognized that it is calculated differently in several respects from our 
site measures. First, the criteria for a case to be counted are slightly dif-
ferent, but this does not have an important impact on computed employ-
ment rates.13 Second, the national statistics are based on employment 
rates submitted by state agencies for their caseloads, which are based on 
reports by caseworkers. In contrast, the employment rates for our sites 
are based on quarterly earnings reports from employers (i.e., unemploy-
ment insurance wage records). Given incentives for caseworkers to un-
derreport employment under AFDC, it is likely that the former measure 
Table 1.5  Employment Rates for Welfare Recipients in the United States   
and Six Areas
Employment rate (%)
Area 1994a 1997b 1999c
United States 8.3 18.2 27.6
Atlanta 26.5 34.4 37.0
Baltimore 20.1 28.4 34.7
Chicago 28.1 31.6 42.5
Fort Lauderdale 36.6 37.1 43.3
Houston 28.2 30.6 31.7
Kansas City 38.5 47.0 45.2
a Averaged over the four quarters of the federal ﬁscal year (October 1993–September 
1994) except for Fort Lauderdale (January–December 1994) and Chicago (July 
1995–June 1996). 
b Averaged over the four quarters of the federal ﬁscal year except for national statistics 
(July–September 1997), and Fort Lauderdale (September 1996–March 1997, July–
September 1997). 
c Averaged over the four quarters of the federal ﬁscal year except for Houston (July–
December 1998).
SOURCE: National data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(2004a,b).
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may miss some employment. Third, since the national welfare employ-
ment ﬁgure is based on data for a single month, individuals employed 
for only one or two months in a quarter are only counted as employed 
in those months, whereas the quarterly measure that we use for our sites 
identiﬁes as employed individuals receiving earnings in any month dur-
ing the quarter. (The appendix contains a detailed description of our 
data sources and deﬁnitions.)
Table 1.5 suggests that, nationally, employment rates for recipients 
in 1994 were less than 10 percent, whereas our sites exhibit employ-
ment rates between 20 and 40 percent. And, the national ﬁgures show 
an increase of about 10 percentage points from 1994 to 1997, whereas 
our sites show more modest increases. A similar pattern occurs for the 
period from 1997 to 1999, the national ﬁgures again showing nearly a 
10-percentage-point growth, and our sites generally displaying more 
modest growth in the rate of employment. Although it is clear that an 
increasing share of recipients is actively engaged in the labor market, 
the ofﬁcial statistics would appear to overstate the growth as we ob-
serve it at our sites. We have much greater conﬁdence in the accuracy 
of UI wage records for documenting recipients’ employment patterns, 
as do most researchers.
EMPLOYMENT OF LEAVERS
Not only did PRWORA specify work requirements for recipients, 
but the federal Welfare-to-Work program enacted as part of the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997 provided additional support for recipients in 
obtaining employment. Those supporting welfare reform often suggest-
ed that reform would facilitate self-sufﬁciency through employment, 
improving the lives of those who would otherwise be dependent on 
government support.
One might expect that the increasing concern with employment would 
have been associated with higher employment levels for those leaving 
welfare. On the other hand, policy changes also may have had the effect 
of discouraging individuals from continuing to receive public assistance 
even when their employment opportunities were very limited. 
States are not required to follow those leaving welfare, so there are 
no comprehensive national statistics identifying the employment ex-
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periences of those who leave welfare. However, states are required to 
identify the reason that an individual left welfare. Although many indi-
viduals do not provide this information, and states have little incentive 
to provide accurate data (a majority of cases are coded as “other”), these 
statistics do give a sense of the trend in movements. The ﬁrst line in 
Table 1.6 shows that, in 1994, 15 percent of welfare leavers were coded 
as leaving because of employment (technically, “increased earnings”). 
The proportion had increased to fully 23 percent by 1999.
The measure of employment we report at our sites indicates the 
proportion of leavers who are employed at some point in the ﬁrst quar-
ter following departure from welfare, again as measured by UI wage 
records.14 It is important to note that not all individuals who are counted 
as employed by this measure are employed at the point they exit wel-
fare, since observed employment may begin at any point in the quarter 
following the welfare exit. The measure is best viewed as an indicator 
of whether a recipient moving off of welfare is able to obtain a job, 
even if she exits without one. The table shows that about half of leavers 
obtain employment in the quarter after leaving. All of the sites display 
Table 1.6  Employment Rates for Welfare Leavers in the United States          
and Six Areas (%)
Area 1994 1997 1999
United Statesa 14.7 17.4 23.0
Atlanta 58.5 64.5 61.2
Baltimore 44.8 54.6 59.7
Chicago 48.6 54.5 56.7
Fort Lauderdale 53.3 53.2 55.4
Houston 43.7 50.4 49.1
Kansas City 57.6 65.2 66.0
NOTE: All measures apply to federal ﬁscal year (October–September) unless 
indicated otherwise.  Site measures are means for four quarters.
a Proportion indicating employment as reason for leaving welfare.
b Fiscal year 1996.
SOURCE: National data from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(2004a,b).
b
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increases over the period of our study, varying from as little as 2 per-
centage points in Fort Lauderdale to 15 percentage points in Baltimore. 
In all sites, almost all of the increase occurred before 1997. 
It is useful to place these results in context. First, it must be recog-
nized that although the overwhelming majority of those working for 
employers in the state are covered in our data, some of those leaving 
welfare obtain employment outside the state, are self-employed, or are 
working in illegal or informal jobs, which are not covered in our state-
speciﬁc UI wage record data. Second, our data do not attempt to capture 
household income. A substantial portion of departures from welfare are 
associated with changes in household structure, and in many cases this 
implies that former recipients are supported by other individuals. It is 
therefore no surprise that more than a third of former recipients are not 
actually earning income.
Nonetheless, the employment of leavers is of particular concern 
because national and state welfare reforms placed increased emphasis 
on this route of exit from welfare. Those supporting the reforms ar-
gued that their implementation would both beneﬁt recipients and re-
lieve the public purse. Training and related programs, in conjunction 
with work requirements, would move welfare families into the world of 
work, providing them with new opportunities for material betterment. 
Critics warned that it was more likely that the reforms would merely 
force those who were ill-prepared to support themselves to seek aid 
from family, private charities, or less restrictive public programs, caus-
ing increased material hardship and ultimately damaging the welfare of 
children in these families.
Our results do not ﬁt either of these extreme views. The moderate 
increases in employment rates for welfare recipients in the face of the 
extraordinary economic growth occurring in this period do not paint 
a picture of unprecedented opportunity provided to those who exited 
welfare. On the other hand, given the dramatic increases in the exit rates 
from welfare, the very fact that employment rates did not decline sug-
gests that the reforms have been at least somewhat successful in achiev-
ing reforms’ employment goals. There is little support for the view that 
the reforms have dumped former recipients into a glutted labor market 
where they face worsening employment prospects. Of course, that judg-
ment is based only on looking at employment rates. One may also ask 
whether the types of jobs welfare leavers obtain have changed and what 
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factors determine employment success. That is the focus of Chapters 3 
through 5, which we now summarize. 
EXPLAINING WELFARE EXITS AND EMPLOYMENT
To what degree are changes in the characteristics of welfare recipi-
ents responsible for the increased exit rates from welfare and for the 
growth in employment for welfare recipients? Prior to welfare reform, 
observers suggested that as individuals left the rolls, the remaining re-
cipients might differ dramatically from the prior caseload. Our data al-
low us to identify the age and race of recipients, as well as the number of 
dependent children on the case and the length of time that the payee or 
case head has received aid. Consistent with other ﬁndings, we observe 
only modest changes in these measures over the period of our study.
Table 1.7 presents data on the contribution of such changes to ob-
served differences in exit rates and employment between 1994–1995 
and 1998–1999.15 The details of this analysis are provided in Chap- 
ter 3.16 In the case of welfare exit rates, we see that changes in charac-
teristics contribute very little to the observed growth. The negative per-
centages in the table indicate that, based only on observed changes in 
recipient characteristics, exit rates would be expected to decline slightly 
rather than increase over this period. We must attribute essentially all 
of the increases in exit rates to changes in either the policies or the en-
vironment.
Similar results hold in the case of employment rates for welfare 
recipients. In four of the sites, we observe substantial increases in em-
ployment rates, and in each case cohort characteristics contribute very 
little to the observed increase. Higher rates of employment for recipi-
ents must be due to changes occurring over time in either the welfare 
program or the local labor market.
Since the goals of welfare reform focus jointly on moving people 
off of welfare and getting them into jobs, it is natural to ask how these 
goals are related. Our analyses show that many factors jointly inﬂuence 
employment and departures from welfare. Minority recipients are more 
likely to be employed but substantially less likely to leave welfare. In 
contrast, other factors tend to induce more welfare exits and higher em-
ployment. Those with more children and those who have received aid 
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Table 1.7  Changes in Exit and Employment Rates for Welfare Recipients: Role of Personal Characteristics and       
                  Regime Change in Five Areas
Probability of exiting welfare Probability of employment
Difference (%) 
in probability 
accounted for by
Difference (%)
in probability  
accounted for by
Variables 1994–95 1998–99
Cohort 
characteristics Regime 1994–95 1998–99
Cohort 
characteristics Regime 
Atlanta 0.072 0.153 -1 101 0.340 0.396 -13 113
Baltimore 0.073 0.191 2 98 0.225 0.333 7 93
Fort Lauderdale 0.177 0.410 -3 103 0.361 0.439 -14 114
Houston 0.141 0.209 -9 109 0.242 0.229 108 -8
Kansas City 0.099 0.165 -0 100 0.413 0.454 13 87
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for longer are both less likely to ﬁnd employment and less likely to 
leave welfare. Unmeasured factors have similar effects on employment 
and welfare exits. Those individuals who are particularly likely to be 
employed are also likely to leave welfare. Of course, in part this re-
ﬂects the fact that when employment yields sufﬁciently high earnings, 
an individual will no longer be eligible for welfare. The details of this 
analysis are provided in Chapter 3.
LOOKING AT RECIPIENTS’ JOBS
A central goal of welfare reform is moving recipients into stable 
jobs. Chapters 4 and 5 use UI wage record data to examine the stability 
and earnings of jobs held by recipients in our six areas over the 1990s, 
before, during, and after the implementation of welfare reform. We are 
not aware of any systematic analysis of the kinds of jobs held by recipi-
ents that would allow this kind of comparison.
It is known that welfare recipients tend to have unstable, short-term 
jobs, with few beneﬁts and low wages. Although we are not able to 
determine beneﬁts, the wage record data allow us to determine how 
long an employee continues to receive earnings from a given employer. 
Table 1.8 is based on an analysis, presented in Chapter 4, that examines 
all new jobs that are begun by welfare recipients in the relevant period. 
We include continued employment with the employer even after an in-
dividual leaves welfare, assuring that we do not omit those jobs that 
lead to self-sufﬁciency. The ﬁrst two columns show that only about 
half of all jobs obtained by welfare recipients last beyond the quarter in 
which they start. Perhaps of most interest, the proportion did not change 
appreciably between 1994–1995 and 1998–1999. The two columns on 
the right show that between 4 and 10 percent of jobs last eight quarters 
or more. This table displays a modest decline in the share of jobs lasting 
at least eight quarters at three of the ﬁve sites where we have data, and 
little or no change at the other two. 
Although these results might suggest a decline in the quality of jobs 
welfare recipients are obtaining, in Chapter 4 we show that similar de-
clines occurred for other low-wage workers as well. We also show that 
even where job stability has declined, earnings have not. We are there-
fore left to conclude that the kinds of jobs welfare recipients obtain 
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have not seriously deteriorated over the 1990s. Nor have there been 
substantial improvements, either in job stability or in earnings.
While the changes over time are modest at best, by any standard 
the jobs these welfare recipients have been able to secure are very poor 
ones. Over the life of the job (up to two years), the average cumulative 
earnings are between $2,000 (for Atlanta) and $5,000 (for Chicago).17 
Few of these jobs lead to economic self-sufﬁciency for mothers with at 
least one and often two or more dependents. Some individuals obtain 
sufﬁcient earnings to move off of welfare and support their families 
when they succeed in cobbling together multiple low-paying jobs into a 
semisteady earnings stream. Others may stumble onto a good job after 
many tries.
FINDING A GOOD JOB
Although opportunities clearly are limited, those recipients who ob-
tain the best jobs have substantial advantages. In all of our areas, the 
standard deviation of total earnings on a job is at least 50 percent great-
er than the mean, implying that some jobs provide reasonably good 
long-term earnings in these urban labor markets. In considering how 
a particular welfare recipient achieves stable employment, it is natural 
to ask how important individual characteristics are in procuring a good 
Table 1.8  Stability of Jobs Held by Welfare Recipients: Six Areas
Probability that job lasts 
more than 1 quarter
Probability that job lasts 
more than 7 quarters
Variables 1994–95 1998–99 1994–95 1998–99
Atlanta 0.472 0.457 0.050 0.050
Baltimore 0.536 0.525 0.089 0.060
Chicago 0.539 0.561 0.100 0.097
Fort Lauderdale 0.517 0.519 0.075 0.068
Houston 0.533 0.527 0.073 n/a
Kansas City 0.441 0.428 0.044 0.032
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job. It may well be that individual characteristics determine who will 
get the best jobs. In this case, there is little beneﬁt in placing individu-
als with certain employers, since the only route to achieving economic 
self-sufﬁciency will be to augment their human capital. In contrast, cer-
tain employers may offer highly desirable jobs, and individuals lucky 
enough to land them will do relatively well over time. 
Chapter 5 looks at the factors determining differences in earnings 
and job stability across jobs. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that demographic 
characteristics play a role in determining these job outcomes, but their 
effects are quite modest. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the industry of the 
employer is of substantial importance. Furthermore, when we exam-
ine those ﬁrms that employ many welfare recipients, we ﬁnd that em-
ployers differ from one another quite dramatically. It appears that some 
employers offer unstable employment and low wages to all their em-
ployees, whereas others offer relative stability and higher wages. Once 
again, getting a “good job”—one with a “good” employer—makes a 
real difference.
Naturally, one may ask whether differences between employers 
may be a result of unmeasured differences between individuals. If 
some employers hire particularly capable individuals, but differences 
between individuals are not readily observable, we may mistakenly as-
sume that they offer desirable jobs. If this were the case, there would be 
no beneﬁt of placing less qualiﬁed workers with such employers, since 
they would be expected to face summary dismissal. Fortunately, we are 
able to examine the importance of unmeasured individual factors, since 
many welfare recipients obtain multiple jobs. As might be expected, 
our analysis conﬁrms that unmeasured differences between individuals 
do play an important role. But we ﬁnd even after controlling for such 
person “ﬁxed effects,” substantial differences between jobs remain. As 
a result, it is possible to say with some conﬁdence that certain types of 
jobs are “good,” and that directing recipients to them will likely provide 
signiﬁcant beneﬁts. This implies a role for more targeted workforce de-
velopment services for welfare recipients, a topic we turn our attention 
to later.
Although many differences between jobs may be difﬁcult to mea-
sure, we do observe that broad industries differ widely in expected 
earnings. Figure 1.1 provides information about the expected earnings 
for jobs in six industries, based on a model that controls for unmea-
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sured individual characteristics.18 Although there are clearly differences 
across our sites, we see that variation in expected earnings across indus-
tries is generally consistent. As might be expected, jobs in temporary 
help services ﬁrms provide the lowest expected total earnings, reﬂect-
ing both shorter duration of employment and lower quarterly earnings. 
Retail trade provides somewhat greater job stability and higher earn-
ings, while restaurant work is only slightly better. Manufacturing jobs 
are appreciably better than jobs in these other industries, often with 
total earnings two or three times those for temporary help jobs. The ﬁg-
ure also includes public administration, which generally provides very 
substantial job stability (except in Fort Lauderdale). Unfortunately, the 
number of welfare recipients who obtain jobs in public administration 
is quite small.
These results support the view that getting a good job is valuable 
for welfare recipients, as well as for others seeking work in urban la-
bor markets. Although we do not see evidence that welfare reform has 
improved the stability of the jobs that recipients obtain, we do not see 
evidence of a deterioration in job quality. This latter observation may be 
taken as an endorsement of welfare reform, since we might well expect 
that, with an increasing proportion of welfare recipients obtaining jobs, 
there would be greater pressure for them to take inferior jobs. After all, 
the mantra of work-ﬁrst programs under TANF and related federal pro-
grams has too often been, “Get a job, any job,” much more so than, “Get 
a job, get a better job, get a career,” as some have advocated.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1990s saw a dramatic shift in the character and focus of welfare 
in the United States. Our analyses document extraordinary changes in 
the patterns of movement onto and off of welfare, as well as important 
changes in the employment of welfare recipients. Nonetheless, patterns 
of movement from welfare to work have changed only in relatively 
subtle ways. 
During the 1990s, the proportion of recipients working increased 
substantially, and among those leaving welfare, employment also was 
more prevalent. However, over this period, the kinds of jobs obtained 
by welfare recipients did not change dramatically. Expected earnings 
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Figure 1.1  Predicted Total Earnings for Jobs in Selected Industries
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and job stability remained low for the average recipient of cash assis-
tance, and few of the jobs they landed could assure economic self-suf-
ﬁciency. 
Despite the poor prospects offered by the average welfare recipi-
ent’s job, we ﬁnd evidence that some jobs do offer greater opportunities. 
Even recipients who have had a string of dead-end or short-lived jobs 
may ultimately be able to obtain a job providing a reasonable chance 
for economic self-sufﬁciency at some point. Federal and state welfare 
reforms of the 1990s have not altered this dynamic in a signiﬁcant way. 
On one hand, this provides an endorsement of these new policies, since 
it suggests that they have succeeded in cutting caseloads and increasing 
labor market involvement of recipients and former recipients without 
causing a signiﬁcant deterioration in their job prospects. On the other 
hand, the ﬁndings underscore the fact that reform has not substantially 
improved economic opportunities for recipients. The goal of reduced 
dependency has been attained in the sense that fewer individuals now 
receive cash aid and more are working, but there is no evidence that 
reform has substantially improved the lives of recipients or former re-
cipients.
Notes
 1.  As explained below, welfare reform encompassed a broad array of policy and 
program changes at all levels and, given state-based actions and the widespread 
use of federal waivers, was implemented over a number of years in the 1990s.
 2.  Families receiving AFDC or TANF, computed as the average monthly level 
(United States Department of Health and Human Services 2004a,b).
 3.  Nationwide caseload information is from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (2004a,b). Broward County data are from the Florida Depart-
ment of Children and Families (2004). Data for other counties are from Allen and 
Kirby (2000).
 4.  The study, and our state and site selection, is an outgrowth of our ongoing re-
search as part of the multistate ADARE project, which has been funded by the 
U.S. Department of Labor since 1998. For more information about this effort, 
visit the ADARE Web site at www.ubalt.edu/jﬁ/adare/.
 5.  Hawaii holds the distinction of being the only state whose welfare caseload did 
not decline during this period.
 6.  The caseload for the United States is the average monthly caseload during the 
speciﬁed quarter. The quarterly caseload in each of our sites is the number of 
female payees receiving any payment during the relevant quarter, who are not in 
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the two-parent program (AFDC-Unemployment Parent or its TANF successor), 
and are at least 18 but less than 65. Caseload estimates at our sites could be as 
much as 10 percent higher if we included all cases. On the other hand, our use of 
quarters rather than months for site tabulations increases estimates of caseload 
by 5 to 10 percent. Further discussion of our data is provided in the appendix.
 7.  In three of our sites, the caseload declines from the initial quarter for which we 
have data. For Chicago, state data suggest that this ﬁrst quarter is about 10 per-
cent below the actual peak. In the other sites, the ﬁrst quarter appears to be close 
to the actual maximum. 
 8.  Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2 provides caseload patterns for each of our sites.
 9.  Only in Fort Lauderdale, where a two-year limit came into effect for receipt 
beginning in 1996, could a substantial number of recipients actually lose welfare 
eligibility due to time limits. In our other sites, almost all recipients were subject 
to the federal ﬁve-year limit (four years in Atlanta), which would not be directly 
binding until after 2000. Details are provided in the following chapter.
 10.  The percentage indicates how the stable caseload level is inﬂuenced by the ob-
served change in exit rate. Details are provided in the notes to Table 1.2.
11.  See Bane and Ellwood (1994) and Nathan and Gais (1999).
12. Other policy changes may also have encouraged work among welfare recipients. 
Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2001) report that increases in the federal EITC in the 
1990s increased employment among welfare recipients in California.
13.  Federal numbers include all cases, whereas those for our sites consider only fe-
male payees who are 18 but less than 65. The omission of males from our site 
analyses has a minor effect on employment rates. In 1996, federal statistics in-
dicate that the employment rate for female adults receiving AFDC was 10.1 per-
cent, whereas the full sample employment rate was 11.3 percent. Other sample 
differences have even smaller impacts.
 14.  This is the ﬁrst quarter that the exiter receives no cash payment.
15.  Chicago is omitted since our data do not extend back far enough to undertake 
analyses there.
16.  Welfare exit rates and employment rates reported in Table 1.7 differ from those 
in Tables 1.2 and 1.5 both because the samples differ and because Table 1.7 
presents means across individuals rather than means across periods of time. See 
Chapters 2 and 3.
17.  In the discussion here, “total” or “cumulative” earnings on a job refers to the sum 
of earnings for as long as the job lasts, up to eight quarters. Fewer than 1 in 10 
jobs last longer than eight quarters. Earnings are adjusted for inﬂation and are 
reported in 1999:4 dollars.
18.  Estimated total earnings on a job reported in Figure 1.1 are based on wage re-
cords from a subset of major industries. Relative earnings for all major industries 
are presented in Table 5.7 in Chapter 5.
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State and City Welfare and 
Employment Policies in the 1990s
Interaction between state and federal initiatives characterized the 
welfare reforms of the 1990s. In one sense, the states were the center 
for reform, since they took on responsibility for designing new welfare 
programs under federal waivers and then for implementing comprehen-
sive federal legislation. Yet, to view each state program in terms of its 
speciﬁc provisions fails to recognize the extent to which they reﬂected 
similar underlying goals and conceptions. Every state program explic-
itly focused efforts on moving recipients into employment, requiring 
training or some form of labor market participation, and providing sup-
port services such as transportation and child care. Cash payments were 
viewed as providing only a temporary and explicitly inferior alternative 
to employment. In each case, the state programs represented substantial 
departures from the structures—the policies, programs, and services—
that had characterized AFDC for nearly six decades.
Of course, the reform structures ultimately adopted by states were 
responsive to federal requirements under PRWORA, which speciﬁed 
caseload reduction and employment goals, as well as clear time limits 
for receiving cash assistance. But this alone cannot explain the simi-
larity in programs, since on most dimensions PRWORA’s constraints 
were not binding. The reformed state programs almost universally re-
ﬂected a belief that a new employment-based approach to providing aid 
to single parents was necessary. The ideas that drove welfare reform 
were in large part developed as part of a discussion that swept across 
the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
We begin by considering welfare reform at the national level, focus-
ing on the growing debate and the role of the Clinton administration in 
setting the agenda. We discuss the principal federal legislative bench-
marks during the 1990s, tracing their effects in state policies. We then 
provide a selective overview of the literature on the impacts of welfare 
reform, considering both studies that trace state policy and those focus-
ing on impacts on individuals and families. 
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We then turn to the six sites that are the focus of our study. We 
examine welfare policies at these sites, showing how states chose dis-
parate paths in attempts to achieve quite similar goals. Next, we turn to 
an examination of program participation and employment data at each 
of the sites, identifying the effects of welfare reform in the patterns we 
observe. Building on the previous chapter, which focused on national 
trends, we provide more detailed analysis of each site, in part under-
scoring the similarities across sites, but also showing how patterns dif-
fer as a function of local reforms.
WELFARE REFORM: SETTING THE AGENDA AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL
When policymakers and others talk of “welfare reform,” they gen-
erally are referring to the much-touted Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act that was signed into law by Pres-
ident Bill Clinton in August 1996. But, PRWORA was not the only 
national action taken in the continuing effort to reform welfare. De-
spite the administration’s failure to effectively package and sell an in-
tegrated welfare reform package to Congress, reform legislation that 
ultimately passed—together with related program expansions in this 
period—largely embodied the four principles that the Clinton admin-
istration had established: 1) make work pay, 2) establish time limits for 
cash assistance, 3) strengthen child support enforcement, and 4) ﬁght 
teen pregnancy (see Ellwood 1996). Federal legislation throughout the 
1990s lent support to the act and its goal of reducing dependence on 
welfare. These actions are highlighted in Table 2.1.
Making Work Pay 
Key steps taken to “make work pay” included an increase in the 
federal minimum wage in 1996, as well as major expansions of Medic-
aid coverage, federal funding for child care, and the federal EITC. Con-
gress enacted an increase in the federal minimum wage from $4.35 to 
$5.15 per hour in no small part to ensure that low-skilled single mothers 
leaving welfare would be able to earn an amount that would put them 
closer to self-sufﬁciency.1 Corbett (2001, p. 3) points out that the real 
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Table 2.1  Decade of Welfare Reforms: A Chronology
1990 States are required to enact JOBS employment training 
programs in response to federal legislation passed in 1988 
(phase-in continues for several years).
Child Care and Development Block Grant created.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act expands Medicaid 
coverage to include pregnant women, infants to age one, and 
children to age six.
1992 Child Support Recovery Act & Ted Weiss Child Support 
Enforcement Act enacted.
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act enacted.
Earned Income Tax Credit expanded.
Low Income Housing Tax Credit program permanently 
extended.
1994 Head Start Act amendments enacted.
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative enacted.
1996 Federal minimum wage increased.
PRWORA enacted.
1997 Balanced Budget Act enacted:
•  Welfare-to-Work program established.
•  SCHIP established.
•  Medicare+Choice established.
1998 U.S. Department of Labor supplements Welfare-To-Work 
funding with $712 million in grants.
Child Support Performance and Incentive Act enacted.
1999 Balanced Budget Reﬁnement Act modiﬁes Medicare, Medicaid, 
and SCHIP.
2000 Beneﬁts Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 further reﬁnes 
Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP.
Consolidated Appropriations Act expands Welfare-to-Work 
eligibility and extends deadlines.
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value of the minimum wage increased by 15 percent in the decade from 
1989 to 1999. 
Congress also expanded Medicaid coverage beginning in 1993, 
greatly expanding the number of working poor families (and their chil-
dren) eligible under this federal/state program. Burke and Abbey (2002) 
report that the share of low-income adults enrolled in Medicaid but not 
receiving any form of cash assistance increased from 44 percent in 1995 
to 71 percent in 2000 (also see Fossett, Gais, and Thompson 2002). 
From 1994 to 1998, combined federal and state Medicaid payments 
rose by some 18.5 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001). Federal 
funding for child care surged from only $933 million in federal ﬁscal 
year (FY) 1996 to fully $2.3 billion in FY 1997 and $3.1 billion in FY 
1998. The real value of the EITC increased dramatically from 1989 
to 1999, in the case of a single parent with two children increasing by 
more than 200 percent, an increase of more than $3,000 relative to a 
family with no children (Corbett 2001).2 Taken together, these steps 
had the effect of making work much more attractive relative to welfare 
than in years past and contributed substantially to the welfare caseload 
decline over the 1990s (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).
In addition, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which contained the Welfare-to-Work 
program, a $3 billion effort designed to fund expanded employment and 
training opportunities for welfare recipients and noncustodial parents 
through the nation’s job training system. Distributed as block grants 
to states and localities, Welfare-to-Work funds allowed administrators 
notable ﬂexibility in how programs were structured. 
Time-Limiting Cash Assistance 
Under the provisions of the federal/state AFDC program, recipi-
ents in most states were able to access welfare beneﬁts repeatedly over 
many years, provided they were otherwise eligible (i.e., low family in-
come and young dependent children). PRWORA changed that situation 
dramatically. The act asserted that welfare would become a “tempo-
rary assistance” program for most recipients, limiting assistance over a 
person’s lifetime to a maximum of ﬁve years. It also required recipients 
to begin looking for work within two years of receiving aid and es-
tablished speciﬁc and increasing work participation requirements for 
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recipients that states would have to meet. States were allowed to ex-
empt single parents from these new work requirements if they had de-
pendents under the age of one, and they were precluded from imposing 
sanctions for nonparticipation if child care was not available. 
Strengthening Child Support Enforcement 
Child support and welfare policies are closely linked due to the 
large number of single-parent families receiving assistance. Numerous 
modiﬁcations to child support law were made during the welfare reform 
era. The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 made it a federal crime to 
intentionally fail to pay a past-due child support obligation for a child 
living in another state. In the same year, the Ted Weiss Child Support 
Enforcement Act modiﬁed the Fair Credit Reporting Act to include child 
support delinquencies on credit reports. In 1993, the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act required that states establish paternity on 75 percent 
of the children in their caseload, and in the following year, several bills 
had child support riders that required states to further strengthen child 
support enforcement. Legislation passed in 1998 provided penalties for 
states that failed to meet data processing requirements, and established 
felony violations for parental willful delinquency.3
Fighting Teen Pregnancy
Since more than three-quarters of unmarried mothers end up on 
welfare, decreasing teen pregnancy was viewed as an important goal 
for reducing child poverty and welfare dependence (Sawhill 1998). The 
Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988 made an early attempt to curb the 
number of teen parents entering the welfare system by implementing an 
educational requirement for teen parents and allowing states to mandate 
that teen parents live with a responsible adult. PRWORA subsequently 
created new incentives for states to reduce teen pregnancy.
State and Local Reforms: The Role of Federal Waivers
In addition to these federal reform responses, numerous states and a 
number of urban communities embarked on their own versions of wel-
fare reform in the early to mid 1990s. Clinton entered the presidency 
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with a vision of reconnecting the Democratic Party’s social policy with 
that of the electorate (Weir 1998). By encouraging states to experiment 
with varied welfare models through waivers, the Clinton administration 
created momentum for reform and shaped the direction of the debate 
on welfare. In doing so, Clinton may also have pushed Republicans 
further to the right—a shift that strongly inﬂuenced the ﬁnal content of 
the 1996 act, passed following the Republicans’ sweeping victory in the 
1994 midterm elections. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996
Clinton’s decision to sign PRWORA prompted the resignation of 
several prominent staff at the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, who felt that in “ending welfare as we know it” with this partic-
ular legislation, the president was making a terrible mistake. PRWORA 
was indeed a watershed event in reforming welfare in the nation. A sum-
mary of key provisions of the act is provided in Table 2.2.
IMPACTS OF WELFARE REFORM
Institutional Changes
Nathan and Gais (1999) headed up a team of researchers studying 
the implementation of PRWORA and state-based reforms in 20 states, 
including both the largest (e.g., California, Texas, New York), as well 
as some of the most innovative and inﬂuential (e.g., Wisconsin).4 They 
concluded the act served to modify behavior of both families and state 
bureaucracies and that in the early stages its effects were best seen in 
terms of what they referred to as “the Three S’s”: signals, services, and 
sanctions. Stronger, bolder signals of a changed system ranged from 
new procedures for recipients securing aid (e.g., personal responsibility 
agreements), to diversion of potential recipients to work before welfare, 
and state work program participation requirements. 
While most states initiated some form of “work-ﬁrst” program, 
with a primary goal of getting recipients into any employment, they 
also offered a broad array of services to recipients, including remedial 
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Table 2.2   Key Provisions of the Personal Responsibility                                           
                  and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996       
                  (Public Law 104-193)
Goal. Reduce the number of families dependent on federal assistance by 
ending entitlements, promoting work, and encouraging personal responsi-
bility.
Temporary assistance. Under the act, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), a federal entitlement program, is replaced by Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The new program institutes a life-
time, 60-month limit on welfare assistance. 
Personal responsibility. Includes measures aimed at increasing rates of 
participation in work-related programs for both one and two-parent fami-
lies, and programs designed to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies and sup-
port family formation. Teen mothers are required to live with their families 
as a condition to receive aid.
Child support. Requires states to operate child support enforcement pro-
grams satisfying new federal requirements. States must establish a Federal 
Case Registry and implement national reporting requirements for all new 
hires, streamline paternity establishment, enact uniform interstate child sup-
port laws, and computerize central collection. New policies promote non-
custodial visitation, increase penalties for delinquency, and give families no 
longer receiving assistance priority in child support collections.
Performance incentives. Includes a $1 billion competitive performance 
bonus fund to be allocated to states demonstrating excellence in reducing 
TANF caseload and assuring moves to self-sufﬁciency. Criteria, updated an-
nually by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, include job 
entry and retention rates, child care subsidy payments, and increased family 
formation/stability, among others.
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education, GED preparation, and English as a Second Language in-
struction; substance abuse counseling; child care and other family sup-
port services; emergency housing; domestic violence and emergency 
intervention; and mental health services. Job training was downplayed 
initially, in part due to the immediate demands for all types of workers 
in the tight labor markets of the late 1990s and 2000. Post-TANF em-
ployment retention and advancement services have been added to the 
service mix more recently. 
The reformed system also places far greater stress on sanctions. 
Among the more important types of sanctions are those for failing to 
comply with portions of personal responsibility agreements. Casework-
ers report that the threat of sanctions may be more important than their 
imposition since they tend to be imposed selectively and infrequently. 
Nathan and Gais also emphasize that PRWORA has resulted in 
substantial devolution of responsibilities, both from the federal to state 
and local governments (“ﬁrst-order”), as well as from governments to 
private for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt organizations (“second-order” devolu-
tion). In the long run, states and localities face incentives to reduce the 
generosity of their welfare systems if potential recipients migrate in 
response to differences in potential beneﬁts. Although the evidence that 
such migration occurs is mixed, the concern with such migration does 
inﬂuence state policies (Brueckner 2000).
Changes in the Experiences of Welfare Recipients
There has been some controversy as to the importance of economic 
and institutional changes in explaining caseload declines since the early 
1990s. However, it seems clear that the implementation of the 1996 
federal welfare reforms, together with related policy actions reviewed 
above, has had a large impact on caseloads.5 
A review of recent literature reveals numerous attempts to de-
termine the employment experiences of those leaving welfare in the 
1990s. Clearly, a large share of welfare leavers is employed, but their 
labor market experiences are highly heterogeneous. Some appear to be 
appreciably better off than they were while on welfare, while others are 
appreciably worse off. For a summary of recent research ﬁndings, see 
Table 2.3. 
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Although much is known about the effects of welfare reform, exist-
ing studies are limited in a number of important respects. Because stud-
ies that allow explicit comparisons of the period prior to and following 
reform are usually national, there is little way to determine how state 
differences—demographic, economic, and policy—affect results. There 
are many local studies, but they tend to focus on the period following 
reform, and thus fail to provide information on whether recipient or 
leaver experiences changed. Even some of the most inﬂuential national 
studies focus on limited time periods, as for example Loprest (2001), 
whose prereform period is 1995–1997, after many states implemented 
initial reforms.
Our analyses focus on six urban areas, providing detailed informa-
tion about individual recipients’ experiences over an extended period 
of the 1990s, spanning most of the reform period. We have detailed 
information on the employment and related experiences of recipients 
over that period, and we are able to consider patterns of employment in 
much greater detail than most extant studies. 
WELFARE REFORM IN SIX URBAN AREAS
The six sites that are the focus of our empirical analysis provide 
a broadly representative picture of state variation in welfare reform. 
Table 2.4 provides a brief chronology for each of our sites, identifying 
statutory, policy, or administrative changes affecting welfare programs 
in our sites from 1991 through 2000. Listed changes reﬂect statewide 
programs as well as local policies, programs, or administrative actions 
that may have affected welfare receipt in each of the sites. Our sites 
represent systems with strong state control (e.g., Missouri, Texas) and 
those where local counties have substantial discretion (e.g., Georgia). 
For several of our sites in which changes in the rules prior to 1991 may 
have inﬂuenced the tone of the system, these are listed in the table as 
well. By the end of 1997, the TANF program was ofﬁcially in effect in 
all our sites, although full implementation of some federal rules was 
delayed because of existing waivers or specially negotiated arrange-
ments.
It is clear that there are substantial differences in the timing as well 
as the impetus for changes across our sites. Although it provides some 
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Table 2.3  Recipients’ Experiences under Reform: A Selective Survey
Issue Research
Response to 
time limits
Blank (2002), Mofﬁtt and Pavetti (2000), Grogger (2001), and 
Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003) found that welfare recipients 
respond to time limits, often exiting before limits bind.
Patterns of 
welfare use
Following reform, leavers are less likely to return to welfare 
(Carrington, Mueser, and Troske 2002). Those diverted 
from welfare have a high chance of returning at a later point 
(Schexnayder et al. 2002).
Employment Welfare-related policy changes are associated with substantial 
increases in labor force participation (Bishop 1998; Blank 2002; 
Mofﬁtt 1999; Kaushal and Kaester 2001; Meyer and Sullivan 
2001). Single mothers’ labor force participation rates rose by 10 
percentage points from 1994–1999; the share of former recipients 
employed increased from 19.8 percent in 1990 to 44.3 percent in 
2000 (Blank 2002). Studies based on prereform data show that 
employment played a larger role in exits than previously believed 
(Blank 1989; King et al. 1991; Lane and Stevens 1995; Harris 
1993; Hoynes 1996). High rates of employment for welfare leavers 
are conﬁrmed in local and national studies (e.g. Bavier 2001; Acs 
and Loprest 2001; Schexnayder et al. 2002; Loprest 2001; Tweedy 
et al. 1999), although only a minority of leavers are employed 
continuously for the full year following leaving (Schexnayder et 
al. 2002). Bavier (2001) suggests that high employment rates for 
welfare leavers are largely due to the strong economy; however, 
Lerman and Ratcliffe (2001) point out that employment for affected 
groups has not declined substantially following the economic 
decline after 1999.
Earnings/
poverty
Schoeni and Blank (2000) and Blank (2002) found that welfare-
related policy changes resulted in increased earnings and decreased 
poverty among welfare-eligible families. But Bavier (2001) 
found that only half of leavers averaged higher post- than preexit 
household incomes (see also Boushey 2001). Schexnayder et al. 
(2002) report that earnings for welfare leavers in Texas increased 
in all six quarters postexit, with average quarterly earnings of 
$2,500 in the sixth quarter measured. Hanson and Hamrick (2004) 
estimated that, in the period 1996–2000, entry of former recipients 
into the labor market due to welfare reform reduced overall wage 
growth for all workers in affected labor markets by 2–7 percentage 
points.
State and City Welfare and Employment Policies in the 1990s   33
Wages and 
employment 
stability
Following welfare reform, welfare leavers’ wages are low, although 
a large share works full time (Lawson and King 1997; Acs and 
Loprest 2001; Pavetti and Acs 2001). There is considerable 
cycling in and out of work among former recipients (Acs and 
Loprest 2001). Temporary Help Services provide an increasing 
share of employment for welfare recipients and leavers (Autor and 
Houseman 2002; Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske forthcoming).
Household 
arrangements
Bavier (2001) found that nearly two-thirds of all leavers reside with 
other household members with incomes.
Use of in-kind 
assistance 
programs
Acs and Loprest (2001) found that over one-third of 
leavers received Food Stamps and about two-ﬁfths utilized 
Medicaid. Medical insurance rates among adult leavers 
and their children ranged from 60% to 80%. Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (2001) showed that the expansion of Medicaid 
and other social services to low-income, nonwelfare 
families offered single mothers a signiﬁcant new incentive 
to work. Schexnayder et al. (2002) reported for Texas that 
while 68% of leavers received food stamps in the year after 
leaving TANF, only 30% did so after 18 months. Only 20% 
of adults and children continued to receive Medicaid when 
their TANF case was closed.
Barriers to 
employment
Many of those leaving welfare include long-term recipients and oth-
ers with substantial barriers to obtaining employment (Kalil et al. 
1998). Common barriers include physical disabilities, mental health 
or substance abuse issues, limited English proﬁciency, learning 
disabilities, and domestic violence (Holcomb and Martinson 2002; 
Danziger and Seefeldt 2002). Bavier (2001) found that self-reported 
work-preventing health conditions were more prevalent among wel-
fare recipients in 1999 than in 1996.
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Table 2.4 Legislative and Administrative Changes Affecting Welfare
 Programs at Study Sites
Atlanta
Prior to 
1991
Positive Employment and Community Help (PEACH) plan enacted, 
providing education, transportation, child care (1986).
1993 November: Personal Accountability and Responsibility Project 
waiver granted, strengthening work requirements, setting family 
cap, increasing access to Medicaid and cash payments for working 
recipients. 
1995 July: Inception of Work First, focused on income assistance for 
employment and job diversion.
October: Second waiver approved, providing income disregards and 
allowing vehicle ownership for commuting. New work requirements 
applied to those receiving welfare in 24 of previous 36 months.
1996 August: Work requirement strengthened (exemption requires child age 1 
or less rather than 3 or less). 
1997 January: TANF state plan approved.
March: State welfare reform enacted (Act 389) with four-year cash 
assistance maximum, family cap, work requirements. 
July-August: Georgia Work connection, collaboration between DHR,  
U.S. Dept. of Labor, and state training agencies, signals expansion of 
welfare-to-work efforts.
August: TANF recipients dropped if they failed to sign personal 
responsibility agreement.
Baltimore
1992 July: Primary Prevention Initiative creates incentives for preventive 
health care and school attendance for children receiving AFDC.
1995 November: State welfare reform Family Investment Program, 
implemented in Baltimore, with up-front job search requirements and 
child support provisions.
1996 August: Statewide waiver granted specifying work requirements, 
increasing work incentives.
October: TANF implemented. Welfare avoidance grants and child care 
only provisions implemented to aid working parents.
1997 January: Federal time limits effective start date.
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Chicago
Prior to 
1991
Employment initiative implemented under WIN (1986). Self-sufﬁciency 
demonstration waiver approved (1989). JOBS implemented (1990).
1993  November: Work Pays program implemented, increasing earnings 
disregard, along with related reforms.
1995 October: State legislation makes JOBS work exemptions and sanctions 
more stringent.
1996  February: New time limit (24 months) becomes effective but only applies 
to those with oldest child at least age 13. 
1997 July: TANF implemented with ﬁve-year time limit, increased work 
requirements, support services and work incentives.
1998 March: Job-ready applicants required to seek work as part of TANF 
application.
1999 Community Partners Diversion Program implemented for job-ready 
TANF applicants.
Fort Lauderdale
Prior to 
1991
Project Independence welfare reform (1986).
1991 January: Hiring freeze at Department of Health and Rehabilitative 
Services disrupts program. 
October: Changes in job readiness criteria. Caseload reduction measures 
initiated.
1993 Family Transition Act passed and signed by governor, specifying that 
waivers be sought and time-limit experiments begun.
1996 October: TANF implemented.  Work and Gain Economic Self-Sufﬁciency 
(WAGES) becomes effective statewide and time limits become 
effective.  Florida Dept. of Labor takes over workforce-related issues 
for TANF clients, providing screening and work support arrangements 
(e.g., child care) in the ﬁrst six weeks after entry onto TANF. Local 
WAGES coalitions, overseen by the state WAGES board, take on 
primary responsibility of moving TANF recipients to work.
1997 September: Parents Information Resource Center (Broward County 
nonproﬁt) awarded contract for WAGES intensive case management.
October: Local workforce coalition established in Broward County.
1999 July: Lockheed-Martin awarded contract for WAGES intensive case 
management in Broward County.
2000 State WAGES Board abolished and replaced by State Workforce Devel-
opment Board.  Workforce Florida Inc. takes over work-related and 
transitional services for TANF recipients.  All workforce development 
services are required to be provided by privately owned ﬁrms.
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Houston
Prior to 
1991
Job Opportunities in the Business Sector initiative begins. Transitional 
child care and Medicaid beneﬁts begin.  Federal JOBS program 
implemented (1990).
1991 April: Child Care Management System offers improved access to child 
care.
1995 September: JOBS and Food Stamps transferred from Department of 
Human Services to newly created Texas Workforce Commission.
October: JOBS programs shifts to work-ﬁrst orientation.
1996 March: Statewide waiver granted specifying work requirements and time 
limits, increasing work incentives.
April: Child care programs transferred to TWC.
September: Age of child exemption dropped to 48 months.
November: TANF implemented.
December: Time limits implemented.
1997 November: Texas Works initiative diverts applicants to work and 
community services.
December: Welfare applicants required to attend workforce orientation.
1998 August: One-time payments in lieu of TANF implemented.
1999 August: Fingerprint imaging of TANF and Food Stamp applicants 
implemented to deter/detect fraud.
October: Maximum TANF beneﬁts for 3-person family increased to $201/
month.
2000 January: Age of child exemption dropped to 36 months.
March: Earned income disregard increased from 33.3% to 90% with a 
$1,400 cap.
September: Age of child exemption dropped to under 24 months.
Kansas City
1991 July: Federal JOBS program implemented.
1994 June: 21st Century Program initiated (federal waiver), focusing efforts on 
employment for welfare recipients.
October: Missouri welfare reform bill (HB 1547) formally takes effect, 
requiring JOBS participation and signing of self-sufﬁciency pacts 
for most welfare recipients, allowing increased asset ownership, 
requiring minor parents to live with parents, and providing for wage 
supplementation.  Initially there is little effective enforcement of these 
provisions.
Table 2.4 (continued)
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1995 Wage supplementation and job placement program develop as uniﬁed 
system throughout the year.
April: Statewide waiver specifying work requirements and increasing 
work incentives granted.
June: First participants enrolled in self-sufﬁciency pacts.
1996 November: New rules require that JOBS clients called to participate must 
respond within ﬁve days or face sanctions.
December: TANF implemented.
1997 February: Post-employment case management developed.
July: Caseworker specialization instituted.  TANF time limits take effect.
October: Further training to shift caseworker emphasis to employment.
December: Work-ﬁrst approach adopted in JOBS.
1998 November: New rules limit sanctions; caseworkers are required to 
meet with clients prior to imposing sanctions.  New sanctions decline 
dramatically in the short run.
1999 October: Two-thirds income disregard implemented for recipients 
obtaining new employment.
SOURCE:  State and local administrative directives and interviews with government 
ofﬁcials.
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indication as to the extent of program changes, the identiﬁcation of par-
ticular milestones may be somewhat misleading in those cases where 
changes were largely continuous. For example, the 21st Century Pro-
gram, initiated in Kansas City in 1994 with a federal waiver, would 
have had its primary impact as it expanded over the next two years. The 
situation was similar in Houston. Texas was granted a federal waiver in 
late 1996 for its Achieving Change for Texans (ACT) demonstration. 
However, Texas’ welfare employment programs began to emphasize 
immediate labor force attachment over training as early as the fall of 
1995, when Texas began implementing state enabling legislation.
Although state policy changes prior to the 1996 federal welfare re-
form were of substantial importance, in most of our sites, implemen-
tation of the TANF program was associated with additional program 
changes, many of which were substantial. Most states passed new leg-
islation to implement TANF reforms, often further strengthening work 
requirements or imposing more stringent time limits. An exception 
among our sites is Kansas City. In contrast to most states, Missouri 
enacted no major legislation to facilitate implementation of the 1996 
federal welfare reform, so program changes necessary to make Mis-
souri’s welfare program consistent with the federal law were made at 
the administrative level.
In order to indicate the extent of changes associated with TANF 
implementation, Table 2.5 compares 10 types of provisions in effect in 
July 1996, prior to TANF implementation in our sites, to those in July 
1997, subsequent to implementation. These provisions have been se-
lected because of their likely effects on welfare receipt and labor market 
participation. 
Column 1 shows that differences between the sites in payment lev-
els that existed under AFDC were not substantially altered by TANF 
implementation. For a mother with two dependent children, the maxi-
mum beneﬁt levels in 1997 for families with no other resources were 
as follows: Atlanta, $280; Baltimore, $377; Chicago, $377; Fort Lau-
derdale, $303; Houston, $188; and Kansas City, $292. Except in Bal-
timore, where beneﬁts increased to $399 by 1999, these levels have 
remained essentially unchanged in nominal terms since 1990.6 Adjusted 
for inﬂation, maximum real beneﬁt levels have dropped signiﬁcantly in 
all sites. Columns 2 and 3 show that the initial eligibility thresholds and 
the earned income disregard changed in only two of the sites, Baltimore 
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and Fort Lauderdale, whereas in Chicago changes from AFDC rules 
had occurred under waivers approved by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services previously. Notably, in three of the sites the rules 
remained largely as they had been under AFDC.
All sites experienced the introduction of time-limited cash assis-
tance with the implementation of TANF or related policies under feder-
al waivers (column 4). TANF imposed a ﬁve-year lifetime limit on wel-
fare receipt, and none of the sites previously had this kind of limitation. 
In Florida, substantially more restrictive time limits were imposed than 
at other sites. In Texas, shorter time limits were imposed in the year 
following TANF implementation under its federal waiver program, al-
though they included exemptions that allowed most recipients to avoid 
binding time limits. In the year prior to TANF implementation, Illinois 
imposed restrictive time limits, but these applied only to cases where 
the youngest child was at least age 13.
All sites show substantial changes in the child age exemption from 
work or training requirements (column 5). Prior to TANF implementa-
tion, a mother with a child under age 3 was not required to participate 
in work or training programs. In three of our sites, this ﬁgure declined 
to 12 months with TANF, and in Fort Lauderdale to 3 months. In Mis-
souri, there was no decline with TANF implementation, although the 
age did decline in the following year. In Texas, the youngest child’s age 
actually increased in response to a perceived budget shortfall for child 
care assistance.
The other listed categories differ across sites, with changes gener-
ally implying more severe penalties for undesired behaviors (sanctions 
increase, a family cap is imposed) but also greater rewards for work by 
allowing recipients to maintain higher asset levels. 
State and local politics combined with federal initiatives to produce 
reform. It is worth considering brieﬂy the debates occurring in the states 
at the time of reform and the processes underlying the development of 
new welfare legislation and policy.
Atlanta 
Georgia administers TANF through its 159 counties, which have a 
great deal of discretion in program operations within a state-adminis-
tered system.7 Each county welfare ofﬁce operates under the auspices 
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Table 2.5  Changes in Welfare Rules Associated with TANF Implementation at Study Sites
Maximum 
monthly 
beneﬁts 
(family of 3)
($)
Initial 
eligibility 
threshold
($)
Earned 
income 
disregard
Time limit 
(months)
Youngest 
child age 
for working 
exemption 
(months)
Most severe 
sanction
Asset 
limits
($)
 Vehicle 
exemptionb 
($)
Diversion 
pay c
Family 
cap d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Atlanta
Pre-TANF 280 514 AFDC a None 36 Adult share, 
6 mo.
1,000 1,500 No Yes
1997 Same Same Same 60/48 e 12 Total grant, 
perm.
Same 4,650 No Yes
Baltimore
Pre-TANF 373 607 AFDC a None 36 Adult share, 
6 mo.
1,000 1,500 No Yes
1997 377 471 26% 60 12 Total grant, 
indef.
2,000 1 vehicle Yes Yes
Chicago
Pre-TANF 377 467 66.7% None f 36 Adult share, 
6 mo.
1,000 1,500 No Yes
1997 Same Same 66.7% 60 f 12 Total grant, 
3 mo.
3,000 1 vehicle No Yes
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Fort Lauderdale
Pre-TANF 303 574 AFDC a None 36 Adult share, 
6 mo.
1,000 1,500 No No
1997 Same 806/ 393 i $200 + 50% 24/48 g 3 Total grant, 
3 mo.
1,000/ 
2,000
1,500/  
8,500 i
Yes Yes
Houston
Pre-TANF 188 400 AFDC a None 36 Adult share, 
6 mo
1,000 1,500 No No
1997 Same Same Same 60 h 60/48 i Same 3,000 4,650 No No
Kansas City
Pre-TANF 292 558 AFDC a None 36 Adult share, 
6 mo
5,000 1 vehicle No No
1997 Same Same Same 60 36/12 i Same Same Same No No
a AFDC rules are $120 and 33.3% of remainder for ﬁrst 4 months, $120 next 8 months, $90 thereafter.
b All pre-TANF values are equity in vehicle.  Values for Atlanta and Houston in 1997 are fair market value; the values for Fort Lauderdale are equity 
values.  The 1997 value for Atlanta requires that the vehicle be used for work or transportation to work or school; otherwise the value is $1500.
c Diversion payments provide funds in lieu of welfare to help families facing short-term crises.
d The family cap limits incremental payments for those who have additional children while they are receiving welfare payments.
e A time limit of 60 months became effective with implementation of TANF in Janaury of 1997, but it was reduced to 48 months in March, when 
Georgia’s state welfare reform legislation became effective.
f In February of 1996, Illinois instituted restrictive time limits (24 months) that applied only to those with children 13 or over.  By 1998, families with 
earned income and 20 hours per week of work faced no time limits.
g Florida imposes a 24-month time limit in any ﬁve-year period and a 48-month lifetime limit.
h Texas imposed shorter time limits in September 1997 (12, 24, or 36 months, depending on recipient circumstances), but relatively few individuals were 
subject to these.  In practice, the 60-month limit became effective for recipients beginning in 1999.
 i The rule was different in 1997 and 1998; both rules are shown.
SOURCES: Rowe (2000). Time-limit information also from Crouse (1999).
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of its own board nominated by the county commission and appointed by 
the state commissioner of the Georgia Department of Human Resources. 
Georgia, like many states, implemented a series of major bipartisan wel-
fare reforms prior to TANF, beginning with Positive Employment and 
Community Help (PEACH), which started as an education and training 
oriented pilot in 1986 and expanded to include all Georgia counties by 
1993, and Work First, which was instituted in 1995. Both PEACH and 
Work First were highly collaborative in nature, engaging a broad array 
of partners at the state and local levels. Traditionally, Democrats have 
made political decisions in Georgia. Until the 2002 elections, Georgia 
was the only state in the Old South that had not elected a Republi-
can governor since Reconstruction, and both branches of its legislature 
were controlled by Democrats. The Georgia legislature, however, was 
growing increasingly conservative over the 1990s, with rising shares of 
both houses in Republican hands.
While Atlanta looms large in terms of its inﬂuence on state social 
policy, it does not dominate Georgia as Chicago does Illinois in policy-
making. Nearly one in three welfare households resides in the Atlanta 
metropolitan area; many but not most of them are in Atlanta (see Rich 
1999). 
Baltimore
 
Maryland’s political environment in the early 1990s reﬂected the 
national consensus that moving welfare recipients into jobs was criti-
cally important and that reforms of the system were necessary to effect 
this goal. In the early 1990s, a state reform commission solidiﬁed this 
consensus, forging concrete agreements that would result in state re-
form legislation in 1995. Notwithstanding the emphasis on work, the 
state’s approach to reform reﬂected its liberal, strongly Democratic, 
political environment. Although Maryland adopted a family cap, limit-
ing payments to women who had additional children while receiving 
welfare, a provision allowed such payments to a third party who could 
target them to child-related expenses. Maryland is one of the few states 
that increased nominal cash assistance levels during the 1990s, with 
payments increasing by 10 percent in the period 1996–1999. 
Local areas in Maryland have substantial ﬂexibility in the structure 
of welfare implementation. In Baltimore, which accounts for more than 
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half of the state’s caseload, recipients with identiﬁable barriers are gen-
erally exempted from work requirements, and activities such as looking 
for child care count toward work requirements. 
Chicago
Illinois began instituting its own welfare reforms several years be-
fore the enactment of PRWORA, starting with a liberalization of earn-
ings disregards and the implementation of its Work Pays program in late 
1993. The approach initially tended to favor “carrots” over “sticks” but 
was followed by increasingly stringent work requirements and sanctions 
enacted by the state legislature in late 1995 and 1996, as Illinois became 
caught up in the fervor to reform welfare. Unlike most of our states, 
these largely noncontroversial changes appear to have been driven by 
bureaucrats within the state’s human services agency who were closely 
monitoring related developments in other states and attempting to keep 
Illinois abreast of these policy trends. The state legislature appears to 
have played a smaller role than in some other states in determining the 
details of welfare policy. 
It is worth noting that Chicago dominates the Illinois landscape for 
most state policy issues, with the possible exception of agriculture. On 
economic and social issues, policies generally are framed for Chicago 
and the rest of the state.8 Welfare is largely seen as an urban issue in Illi-
nois, in large part due to the fact that around 70 percent of Illinois’ wel-
fare caseload resides in the Chicago area, most of it in Cook County.
Fort Lauderdale
Reﬂecting the basically conservative ﬂavor of Florida state poli-
tics, by 1992 a consensus existed against continuing unlimited access to 
public support through the AFDC program. Under Democratic leader-
ship, the ﬁrst legislative step toward reform was passage of the Family 
Transition Act, which began the process of seeking waivers for reform 
efforts, including setting up time-limited welfare in demonstration proj-
ects. Based in part on the results of such pilot projects, by 1996, legisla-
tors were convinced that work requirements and time limits, combined 
with increased services, provided workable reform elements that would 
not devastate families.
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The Work and Gain Economic Self-Sufﬁciency (WAGES) legisla-
tion was passed unanimously in 1996, and implementation of TANF 
under this legislation occurred in October. The state WAGES board had 
overall responsibility for implementing TANF, and local WAGES coali-
tions had responsibility at the local level. In some regions of the state, 
however, separate local boards oversaw job training and welfare activi-
ties. In Broward County, a single board assumed both roles. When the 
existing board assumed responsibility for TANF, there was relatively 
little disruption. 
In part, changes occurring in the late 1990s reﬂected attempts to 
improve program effectiveness by increasing the autonomy of local 
boards and moving the provision of social services to the private sector. 
This trend continued when Republicans obtained control of the state 
legislature in 1997, and later the governorship. With implementation of 
TANF, a nonproﬁt was awarded the contract for intensive case manage-
ment in Broward County, and, in 1999, a division of Lockheed-Martin 
was awarded the contract. In 2000, new legislation gave responsibility 
for welfare implementation at the state level to Workforce Florida Inc., 
a public/private entity reporting to the governor.  
Houston
Texas enacted major bipartisan welfare and workforce development 
reform legislation (House Bill 1863) in June 1995 that directed the state 
to request and secure a federal waiver in 1997 to implement its ACT 
demonstration.9 The Texas legislation and subsequent waiver provided 
for relatively lenient “tiered” time limits based on a recipient’s educa-
tion and recent work experience, and considerably increased resource 
and asset limits. The Houston area historically has accounted for be-
tween one-ﬁfth and one-quarter of Texas’s welfare caseload. Houston 
was among the more active areas of the state in terms of reforming its 
welfare and related systems, participating in pilot welfare employment 
initiatives to train and place recipients in jobs paying self-sufﬁciency 
wages as early as 1988. Welfare employment programs in the Houston 
area began shifting toward a work-ﬁrst orientation in the fall of 1995. 
The main provisions of TANF were implemented in Houston in late 
1996 and the early months of 1997.
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Kansas City
Observers trace welfare reform in Missouri during the 1990s to 
implementation of the 1988 federal Family Support Act, which began 
a process that gradually shifted the structure of the welfare system. By 
the early 1990s, the view that program reform was necessary to move 
AFDC recipients into employment was gaining wide support among 
policy actors in the state. However, when Mel Carnahan replaced John 
Ashcroft as governor in 1992, with obvious major changes in the po-
litical climate, the welfare reform momentum in the state was not sub-
stantially altered. The head of the Department of Social Services under 
Ashcroft remained in his position through most of the 1990s. It appears 
that interest in reform at the national level was also reﬂected in the 
state.
State welfare reform, passed in 1994, reﬂected a broad consensus 
that welfare should become a transitional program, with most recipients 
moving into employment after some period of time. Although advocacy 
groups protested the new legislation, and conservative lawmakers ar-
gued for less generous provisions, those who had serious disagreements 
with the basic legislation were clearly in the minority. 
In Kansas City, the Local Investment Commission, a community-
based organization with substantial representation from local business, 
played a central role in implementing welfare reform. The 21st Cen-
tury Program, which included wage supplementation as well as other 
local innovations, was among pilot programs implemented in Kansas 
City prior to state welfare reform. The Local Investment Commission 
continued to play an important role in administering welfare-to-work 
activities throughout the 1990s.
When PRWORA was passed in 1996, there was little interest among 
legislators in returning to welfare reform, and as a result TANF was 
implemented without any new state legislation. Although often listed as 
implementing TANF in December 1996, after extended negotiations the 
federal government agreed that time against the federal lifetime limit of 
60 months not begin until July 1997.
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LABOR MARKET AND CASELOAD DYNAMICS
Welfare reform played out against a backdrop of economic growth 
that had few parallels in the prior century. In what follows, we ﬁrst 
consider the economy at each of our six areas. We then examine the pat-
terns of ﬂows onto and off of welfare, considering explicitly the role of 
reform and the economy. We also consider patterns in recidivism across 
our sites and employment for welfare leavers.
Labor Markets
Unemployment rates for all six areas are presented in Figure 2.1. 
Since our concern is with general economic conditions in the relevant 
labor market, unemployment rates apply to the entire primary metro-
politan area, not just the central county that is our focus. In order to 
remove seasonal effects and reduce quarter-to-quarter volatility, we 
present four-quarter moving averages.10
Figure 2.1   Unemployment Rates for Six Metropolitan Areas (4-quarter  
 moving average)
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In all six areas, the data suggest very healthy economic growth since 
the early to mid 1990s. Atlanta and Kansas City appear to have had the 
tightest labor markets through most of the 1990s, both with unemploy-
ment rates dipping below 4 percent in the 1997–1999 period. The other 
sites had unemployment rates about a point higher than these, although 
the rate in Chicago was generally lower than that in the other sites in the 
second half of the decade. In Baltimore, until 1997, the recovery was 
not as pronounced as in the other sites, but in the last two years of our 
data, unemployment rates there declined substantially. 
Most sites experienced modest further declines or steady unem-
ployment in the 1997–1999 period. The exception was Houston, where 
unemployment increased substantially in the last year of our data. In 
short, while all areas have enjoyed economic growth, there are sub-
stantial inter-area differences that could inﬂuence the experiences of 
AFDC/TANF recipients. 
Caseload Trends 
Figure 2.2 presents the welfare caseload over the 1990s for each 
area. For three of our sites, the caseload increases from its level at the 
start of our period to a peak in the early to mid 1990s, followed by a 
continuous decline to the current level.11 For Houston, we identify two 
local peaks, one at the beginning of our data series in the second quar-
ter of 1992, and a second only slightly lower one in the ﬁrst quarter of 
1994, followed by a decline to the 1999 level. Although we do not have 
comparable data for prior periods, trends in the state suggest that these 
peaks are close to the maximum caseload. Similarly, we believe the 
actual peak in Fort Lauderdale is close to our observed initial caseload. 
In Chicago, the maximum caseload in our data occurs in the ﬁrst quarter 
for which we have data, the third quarter of 1995. Statewide data for 
Illinois suggest that this level may be substantially below the state’s 
peak caseload.12
Fort Lauderdale’s welfare caseload displays the greatest reduction, 
declining 56 percent from the peak (at the beginning of our data) to 
1997, and an additional 57 percent from 1997 to 1999. The decline for 
Houston is only slightly smaller. Declines for Atlanta, Baltimore, and 
Kansas City are smaller but still substantial. It seems likely that Chicago 
would appear similar to these three if we had data for the early 1990s.
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Welfare Entry and Exit Rates 
Figure 2.3 depicts the exit rate from welfare, while Figure 2.4 shows 
the number entering welfare. The time trend in the exit rate is strong-
ly positive for each site, although substantial differences exist among 
them. The lowest quarterly exit rates are in Atlanta, Baltimore, and Chi-
cago. Up through 1994, Atlanta and Baltimore had exit rates that aver-
aged around 7 percent, increasing gradually and matching Chicago with 
average rates around 8 to 9 percent through the mid 1990s. By the late 
1990s, welfare exit rates in Atlanta and Baltimore were more than 15 
percent, while the rate in Chicago was only slightly lower. In contrast, 
average exit rates in Kansas City in the early to mid 1990s were gen-
erally over 10 percent, with the rate exceeding 15 percent in the most 
recent quarter of 1999. Houston had an average exit rate in the 10–15 
percent range in the early to mid 1990s, with exit rates over 20 percent 
in 1998–1999. Exit rates in Fort Lauderdale were somewhat higher than 
Figure 2.2   Basic Welfare Caseloads
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in the other sites in the mid 1990s, nearly 20 percent, but they increased 
dramatically after 1996, averaging over 40 percent in 1998–1999.
Many of these patterns are clearly tied to legislative, policy, and 
administrative decisions. In Atlanta during the third quarter of 1997, the 
exit rate increased to 18 percent, from 8 percent in the previous quarter, 
and then declined to 11 percent in the following quarter.13 This reﬂects 
the fact that the Georgia Department of Human Resources dropped all 
welfare recipients in that quarter who had not signed personal respon-
sibility agreements. Also, the dramatic increase in exit rates in Fort 
Lauderdale is probably the result of Florida’s welfare reform legisla-
tion, WAGES, which included a maximum limit of two years of welfare 
receipt in any ﬁve-year period, a restriction that was effective state-
wide with few exceptions. Illinois and Florida have the most generous 
income disregard policies in this period, which would tend to reduce 
exits, although in Florida, stringent time limits undoubtedly overwhelm 
this effect.
Much of the growing concern in the last decade has focused on wel-
fare dependency, i.e., long-term welfare receipt with little work. Pro-
Figure 2.3   Overall Welfare Exit Rates (4-quarter moving average)
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grams designed to encourage employment among welfare recipients 
have frequently speciﬁed that long-term recipients be among the ﬁrst 
served. PRWORA provided explicit lifetime time limits for welfare re-
ceipt, and, as indicated, a number of our sites were in states that adopted 
even more stringent limits. In Chapter 1, we showed that welfare exit 
rates for long-term recipients, although remaining lower than those for 
other recipients, increased as well. In fact, exit rates for those who had 
been on welfare for at least two years exhibit a basic pattern that is al-
most indistinguishable from that shown in Figure 2.3. The large increase 
in exit rates for long-term recipients suggests that the special attention 
focused on this group has borne some fruit.14
Figure 2.4 shows that the number of welfare entries is declining at 
all sites in the 1990s. The decline is smallest for Atlanta, Baltimore, 
and Kansas City, which show 20–30 percent decreases in the number of 
entries over the period for which we have data. The decline is more than 
40 percent for Chicago, Houston, and Fort Lauderdale. Notwithstand-
ing important variation across sites, it is clear that changes in both entry 
and exit rates contributed to the marked decline in the welfare caseload 
at all sites.
Figure 2.4   Number Entering Welfare (4-quarter moving average)Figure 4 Number Entering Welfare(4-Quarter Moving Average)
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Recidivism
 
One concern is that many of those leaving the welfare rolls fol-
lowing reform may be returning within relatively short periods. In the 
presence of a booming economy, one would expect that people enter-
ing welfare would be those who have the most difﬁculty ﬁnding jobs, 
including those on welfare sometime in the recent past. As a result, the 
number of reentrants as a percentage of all individuals entering welfare 
should rise. On the other hand, once time limits on lifetime receipt of 
welfare take effect, prior recipients might be less likely to enter welfare, 
either because they have exceeded their allowable time or because they 
wish to “bank” remaining eligibility.15
Figure 2.5 shows the proportion of those entering welfare who 
had received welfare at some point in the prior two years for each site. 
Through the mid 1990s, the trend is clearly positive at all sites, but in 
the most recent two years trends clearly differ. In Chicago, increases in 
the proportion of repeat recipients continue in the last two years of our 
data. Although the trend in Baltimore is more variable and in Kansas 
City is less strong, the share of repeat recipients continues to increase in 
Figure 2.5   Proportion of Entries Who Received Welfare in the Previous  
 Two Years (4-quarter moving average)
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these sites in the last two years. The trend over the last two years for At-
lanta is irregular, while Houston and Fort Lauderdale reverse the earlier 
trend, showing a moderate decline in the share of recidivists.
It is useful to recognize that the number of those entering welfare 
declined quite dramatically over this period, while the number of indi-
viduals with prior welfare history may have increased. Hence, return 
recipients could become more important even if the chance of return-
ing to welfare for those leaving did not increase. In fact, Carrington, 
Mueser, and Troske (2002) show that in Missouri, the chance that an 
individual will return to welfare declined between the early 1990s and 
the late 1990s, despite an apparent increase in the relative importance 
of returns. 
WELFARE-TO-WORK TRANSITIONS
The focus on work as an alternative to welfare is a striking element 
of the reforms of the past decade. However, it is not clear whether em-
ployment drives caseload declines or merely represents a response to 
new constraints placed on recipients. Do exits from welfare reﬂect in-
creasingly attractive employment opportunities for welfare recipients in 
a strong economy, pulling them into the labor market? Or have welfare 
reforms operated primarily by pushing individuals from the rolls with 
little regard for their employment prospects? Of course, these explana-
tions are not mutually exclusive or fully distinct conceptually, and de-
termining their relative importance is not easy in practice. Since sanc-
tions are a part of many programs designed to encourage and support 
employment, successful job programs may rely on coercion to some 
degree. Equally important, even if individuals are forced from the wel-
fare rolls with little support and poor labor market prospects, a portion 
would doubtless obtain employment anyway.
Employment rates—and their changes—for individuals leaving 
welfare give an important indication of the role played by employment 
in recent caseload declines. Figure 2.6 presents trends in the number of 
recipients who discontinue a welfare spell and are employed or become 
employed, as a proportion of those exiting the welfare rolls.16 Prior to 
1997, this proportion is highest in Atlanta and Kansas City. In all of the 
sites except Fort Lauderdale, the proportion has increased until the last 
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two years of our data (i.e., 1998–1999). We observe a decline in the 
employment levels in Atlanta and Houston in this period, while in the 
other sites we see that there is little change or continued growth.
These trends are consistent with the view that through most of the 
1990s, individuals have been attracted to or deﬂected from welfare by 
employment opportunities. Or, if individuals were forced to leave wel-
fare, their efforts to obtain jobs have been at least somewhat success-
ful. 
One may wonder whether differences in rates of employment across 
sites reﬂect differences in economic growth. In Figure 2.1, we see that, 
by the mid 1990s, unemployment rates in Fort Lauderdale are similar 
to those in most of the other sites, so the failure of employment rates 
to increase there does not appear to be due to labor market conditions. 
Similarly, we do not see evidence of an economic downturn in Atlanta 
associated with the decline in employment of welfare leavers we ob-
serve there. Thus, it seems unlikely that differences in labor market 
conditions are the primary reason for variation across sites in the em-
ployment rates of those leaving welfare.
Returning to the patterns observed in the welfare caseloads, it would 
appear that the dramatic declines in the Fort Lauderdale and Houston 
welfare caseloads reﬂect increasingly stringent standards rather than 
Figure 2.6   Employment Rates for Welfare Leavers (4-quarter moving  
 average)
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improved job opportunities. Welfare reforms in Florida are of clear im-
portance, and major changes in the administration of the program in 
Texas may have been critical both in forcing recipients from the welfare 
rolls and in discouraging new applicants.17 The patterns we observed 
in both these sites do not suggest that these administrative changes re-
duced the welfare caseload by helping recipients access better job op-
portunities. 
Looking across all our sites, the fact that employment rates for wel-
fare leavers did not decline consistently at a time of dramatic caseload 
declines may well be viewed in positive terms. Atlanta appears to be the 
only site where welfare policy changes have clearly led to the departure 
of recipients who had serious difﬁculty obtaining jobs. The appreciable 
decline in welfare leavers’ employment rates corresponds to implemen-
tation of TANF and state welfare reforms.
Another comparison may be useful in gauging the extent to which 
welfare exits are a function of labor market opportunities. Figure 2.7 
reports the proportion of individuals who leave welfare among those 
who remain employed or become employed.18 There appears to have 
been a substantial increase in this proportion at all sites. In Houston 
and Fort Lauderdale, nearly 35 percent and 50 percent of employed 
individuals, respectively, exit welfare in a given quarter. This contrasts 
Figure 2.7   Welfare Exit Rates for Employed Recipients (4-quarter  
 moving average)
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with employed exit rates at the other sites that are generally in the range 
of 17–30 percent. Of course, these exits from welfare reﬂect in part the 
fact that anyone who obtains a job that pays well enough will become 
ineligible for welfare. For Houston, the initial eligibility threshold is 
low compared to the other sites (see Table 2.5), so only low levels of 
earnings are consistent with welfare receipt, and the maximum beneﬁts 
are also low, so retaining eligibility is of relatively little value. Such 
factors do not explain the very high departure rates in Fort Lauderdale, 
since, if anything, the rules would imply that welfare is compatible with 
higher earnings than in Houston. Rather, it appears clear that strictly 
enforced time limits are of critical importance in Fort Lauderdale.
One additional measure provides a rough sense of the extent to 
which individuals who obtain jobs are nonetheless being forced off of 
welfare. Among those who left welfare and were employed, a portion 
received no earnings in the last quarter in which they received welfare 
payments. These individuals were likely to experience a “support gap” 
between the time they discontinued welfare and the time they began to 
receive earnings from employment.19 If such individuals are a growing 
share of those exiting welfare with jobs, this suggests that shifts in the 
stringency of welfare standards are forcing people off welfare and into 
employment. In contrast, if this proportion is not growing, it suggests 
that most of those who are employed may have found employment op-
portunities more attractive than cash assistance.
Figure 2.8 shows the proportion who are likely to have experienced 
a support gap, among those leaving welfare who have jobs in the fol-
lowing quarter. Although the measure is not altogether stable, it is clear 
there are some initial differences, with levels higher in Baltimore and 
lower in Atlanta. In the last two years (1998–1999), the proportion ex-
periencing a support gap increased dramatically in Fort Lauderdale and 
modestly in Atlanta. This supports the view that employment rates for 
welfare leavers in those sites reﬂect, at least in part, an increase in the 
number of individuals who are pushed off of welfare yet who ultimately 
ﬁnd jobs. For the other sites, the proportions show very little trend. 
Even as exits from welfare accelerated, these sites continued to facili-
tate relatively successful welfare-to-work transitions for those leaving 
welfare.
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CONCLUSIONS
The relationships identiﬁed here provide a window into the dynam-
ics underlying the dramatic decline in welfare caseloads over the 1990s. 
On one hand, the public policy emphasis on moving welfare recipients 
into jobs is reﬂected in the observed trends, with an increasing number 
of those who leave welfare reporting earnings in the quarter following 
their exit from welfare. On the other hand, it is clear that employment 
is not the only path off of welfare. A large portion of those who leave 
welfare, some 35–50 percent in 1999, do not appear to obtain jobs at all. 
Although our earnings data miss certain kinds of employment, includ-
ing employment outside the state, such employment clearly accounts 
for only a small share of those leaving welfare.20
The impact of state policies is clearly reﬂected in the patterns of 
welfare receipt and employment that we observe. There is little doubt 
that Florida’s time limits were important in inducing the dramatic move-
ments off of the rolls, with long-term residents leaving at remarkably 
high rates. Atlanta’s implementation of TANF appears to have signaled 
a major shift in state policy, and, although caseload declines are not as 
great there, the statistics show the impact on employment of a much 
Figure 2.8   Proportion of Employed Exits with Support Gap (4-quarter  
 moving average)
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harsher set of policies than had been in place earlier in the 1990s. The 
results in both these sites suggest that the goal of assuring that former 
recipients obtain employment has suffered as policies that stress case-
load reduction are implemented.
Nonetheless, looking across all sites, although TANF implementa-
tion and related federal waiver programs in our sites induced more dra-
matic declines in the caseload than prior policy changes, the employ-
ment position of leavers does not appear to have suffered much. The 
caseload declines were undoubtedly facilitated by the continued strong 
economy, but it is clear that policy changes played a primary role. 
We suspect that the paths by which new policy affected recipient 
experiences and behaviors may be partly indirect. New regulations, 
as speciﬁed by both federal and state legislation, are implemented by 
agency employees whose understanding of policy is structured by the 
general social context and local imperatives. There is evidence that of-
ten the rules themselves are communicated to recipients as vague con-
cepts, and that their impact may stem in part from the general sense they 
convey.21 Given the national media focus on welfare reform, recipients 
and prospective recipients may be responding initially not so much to 
speciﬁc rule changes as to a general message that their options within 
the welfare system are receding. The general expectation now is that 
welfare is temporary and that work is expected for just about all moth-
ers, regardless of the ages and numbers of their children, their educa-
tion, and their work experience.
Notes
 1.  The possibility that an increase in the minimum wage might substantially re-
duce employment opportunities for low-skilled workers is hotly debated among 
economists but is not reﬂected in the views of the median voter in Congress.  
   2. The EITC has been referred to as “the most effective safety net program for chil-
dren in working poor families” (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 1998).
   3. Yates (1997) discusses child support enforcement and welfare reform.
   4. The principal authors of this book served as ﬁeld researchers for Texas and Mis-
souri, respectively.
   5. An extended literature uses data across states to examine the relative importance 
of economic growth versus policy changes in explaining the variation in the 
welfare caseload over time (see Mayer 2000 for a review). Studies of particular 
interest focusing on the period prior to the 1990s include Peskin (1993) and 
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Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2003). Studies examining the 1990s include 
Blank (1997); Council of Economic Advisors (1997, 1999); Martini and Wise-
man (1997); Figlio and Ziliak (1999); Mofﬁtt (1999); Wallace and Blank (1999); 
Bartik and Eberts (1999); Mueser et al. (2000); Ribar (2000); Ziliak et al. (2000); 
and Blank (2001). Blank (2002) reviews this literature.
   6. In Houston, the comparable beneﬁt increased by $13 in October 1999.
   7. Rich (1999) and his colleagues at Emory University provide a detailed look at 
welfare reform in Georgia, examining events at the state level (pp. 19–29) and in 
the Atlanta area (pp. 29–36). Rich is the Georgia Field Associate for the Rock-
efeller Institute’s State Capacity Study.
   8. Our ADARE project colleague John Baj of Northern Illinois University’s Center 
for Governmental Studies articulated this phenomenon and has also been helpful 
in enhancing our understanding of welfare reforms in Illinois.  
   9. For a summary of Texas’ welfare reforms, see Schexnayder (2003).
  10. In all the ﬁgures that follow, except for Figure 2.2, we present four-quarter mov-
ing averages. In each case, the moving average is indexed by the third quarter in 
the year.
  11. Details of the measures used here are provided in the appendix. 
  12. See Lee, Goerge, and Dilts (2000). If the trend for Chicago’s caseload corre-
sponds to that for Illinois, the data they present suggest that the actual peak may 
be about 10 percent above our initial caseload and that it occurred at some point 
in 1994.
  13. These patterns are hidden in the graphs due to the use of moving averages.
  14.  We also performed preliminary analyses using a ﬁve-year deﬁnition for long-
term recipients. Although rates of departure are lower, the general patterns are 
similar. We use the two-year deﬁnition because, for most of our sites, a ﬁve-year 
deﬁnition reduces the number of years for which we can report results.
 15.   Blank (2002) and Grogger and Michalopoulos (2003) provide excellent dis-
cussions of this phenomenon.
 16.  Of those who receive welfare in quarter t but not t + 1, this is the proportion 
who are employed in quarter t + 1. These deﬁnitions are further explained in the 
appendix.
 17.   It should be noted that the most important changes in the formal policy gov-
erning Houston’s welfare system did not take effect until late 1997. But the 
“mood” was certainly changing in prior years, as signaled by the administrative 
milestones shown in Table 2.4.
 18.   In Figure 2.7, the population at risk is all those meeting our criteria who are 
welfare recipients at time t and are employed at t + 1. The proportion of these 
who are not receiving welfare payments in time t + 1 is the welfare exit rate for 
this group.
 19. These individuals are deﬁned as those receiving welfare in quarter t but not in 
t + 1, and employed in quarter t + 1 but not t, and so the deﬁnition excludes any 
individual whose employment and welfare receipt overlap. Such an individual 
would not experience a support gap if she received the last welfare check in the 
third month of one quarter and started a job immediately at the start of the next 
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quarter. It should also be recognized that we have no measure of income from 
other household members, so many individuals may receive other support as 
well. Despite these limitations, the measure may still provide a valid indicator 
of changes in the number of those whom we count as employed but who do not 
have continuous support when they exit welfare.
 20.  Welfare mothers are far less mobile geographically than are their noncusto-
dial parent counterparts (see O’Shea et al. 2001 and Schexnayder et al. 2001). 
 21.  See the research on frontline welfare workers by Meyers, Glaser, and Mac-
Donald (1998), for example.
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The Determinants of Welfare 
Exits and Employment
(Coauthored with Julie Hotchkiss)
The success of welfare reform is largely a function of whether aid 
recipients 1) leave welfare, and 2) obtain employment. This chapter 
explores the dynamics of and the relationship between these outcomes 
for welfare recipients at our sites. In addition, we examine the role of 
demographics in the interaction of leaving welfare and employment. A 
desire to use limited resources as efﬁciently as possible has driven some 
states to target services where they have been found to be most effective 
(Eberts 1997). A key element of this targeting effort is to identify those 
who are most in need and who beneﬁt most from particular services; 
the use of demographics as determinants of the outcomes examined 
moves us closer to that goal. Finally, since the typical expectation is 
that positive employment outcomes lead to increased personal earnings, 
we investigate both short-term and longer-term earnings outcomes. The 
earnings analysis serves as a precursor to the following chapter, which 
focuses on job stability and earnings.
One strand of the welfare-to-work literature examines the impor-
tance of administrative and economic factors in reducing caseloads and/
or increasing the incidence of leaving. A second strand focuses on the 
effect of administrative and economic factors on increasing employ-
ment among welfare recipients. These studies typically ﬁnd that ad-
ministrative changes in the welfare system have had a discernible and 
important effect on getting people off of welfare and/or into employ-
ment. While these studies make it clear that administrative policies can 
be manipulated to facilitate both exit from welfare and employment 
of recipients, independently, it is not clear from the literature which 
efforts lead to the most effective attainment of leaving welfare and be-
ing employed. An understanding of the factors associated with each of 
these outcomes is crucial for targeting policy or structuring programs 
for greater effectiveness.
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This chapter begins by examining the importance of demographic 
and family characteristics in predicting welfare leaving and employ-
ment rates. The success (or lack thereof) of certain, identiﬁable groups 
of welfare recipients can help policymakers target resources toward 
those groups. On the other hand, if individual demographics play but a 
minor role in the actual ﬂow between welfare and work (i.e., time trends 
and unobservables guide the process more than individual characteris-
tics), then policies and resources focused on providing for an accom-
modating economy (i.e., available jobs) may make the most sense. We 
also consider how employment and welfare exits are related, and the 
degree to which each of these outcomes appears to facilitate the other. 
The chapter then explores the importance of changes in cohort charac-
teristics and changes in policy regimes in accounting for the observed 
trends in welfare leaving and employment. A bridge to the next chapter 
is made with an initial look at the quality of employment outcomes for 
recipients, both currently and over longer time periods.
Our data pertain to female-headed AFDC/TANF cash assistance 
cases in the central counties in the Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Fort 
Lauderdale, Houston, and Kansas City metropolitan areas, as described 
in Chapter 2. Table 3.1 presents statistics from each site for the variables 
used in the analysis of this chapter. The units of analysis are quarters 
spent receiving AFDC or TANF.1 Over all quarters, the percent leaving 
welfare in any quarter ranges from an average of 10 percent (Atlanta) to 
24 percent (Fort Lauderdale). Average employment rates range from 27 
to 44 percent. The average age and number of children are fairly consis-
tent across sites. The degree of minority representation varies quite a bit 
(from 69 percent in Kansas City to 96 percent in Atlanta), reﬂecting the 
populations of those areas.2 We also see that the proportion of recipients 
who have received aid for the prior eight quarters differs dramatically 
across sites, from a low of 21 percent in Fort Lauderdale to a high of 63 
percent in Chicago.3 Since a recipient will appear in our data for each 
quarter in which she receives welfare, the number of unique individuals 
is smaller than the total number of observations.
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Table 3.1  Sample Statistics for Recipients
Variable Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston
Kansas 
City
Leave = 1 Mean 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.13
Employment = 1 Mean 0.37 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.29 0.44
Age Mean 31.6 32.0 31.0 31.0 32.7 30.9
(9.8) (9.4) (8.2) (8.1) (9.1) (9.3)
Number of children Mean 2.14 1.92 2.22 2.09 2.08 1.98
(1.29) (1.17) (1.36) (1.23) (1.23) (1.19)
Minority = 1 Mean 0.96 0.89 0.90 0.76 0.84 0.69
Longterm = 1 (received welfare 
   for the preceding 8 quarters)
Mean 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.21 0.45 0.46
Real earnings ($) (if > 0) Mean 1,190 1,260 1,862 1,761 1,116 1,864 
(1,297) (1,384) (1,803) (1,638) (1,263) (2,038)
Number of observations 393,412 615,226 826,115 214,939 621,485 264,705
Number of unique individuals 40,597 57,709 141,785 40,865 87,970 30,817
Years of data available for analysis 1994:1– 
1999:3
1994:1– 
1999:3
1997:3– 
1999:4
1994:1– 
1999:3a
1994:4– 
1999:3
1994:1– 
1999:3
NOTE: Standard deviation in parentheses.
a Excludes 1995:3 and 1997:2, for which data were missing.
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LEAVING WELFARE AND EMPLOYMENT: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOGRAPHICS
The previous chapter examined welfare exit and employment rates 
across time for each site. The analysis suggested that policy changes as-
sociated with welfare reform played an important role in getting women 
off of welfare. This chapter extends the analysis of the previous chapter 
by making use of individual demographic characteristics to better un-
derstand the dynamics of movement between welfare and employment. 
It is of particular policy importance to determine whether certain groups 
of recipients have different experiences in these transitions in order to 
focus more resources on those who might ﬁnd the transition from wel-
fare to work systematically more difﬁcult. This section explores the 
question of how important individual characteristics are in explaining 
the experience of welfare exits and employment.4
Empirical Speciﬁcation
The incidences of leaving welfare (L = 1) and securing employment 
(E = 1) are estimated using simple univariate probit models for each site 
both with and without individual demographic covariates.5 This allows 
us to determine how much knowing about the demographic characteris-
tics of individual welfare recipients can help determine their probability 
of leaving and becoming employed. 
Empirical Results and Implications
Table 3.2 contains coefﬁcient estimates based on the probit equa-
tions. Table 3.2 also reports the value of the log-likelihood function ob-
tained from estimating the equations without demographic regressors.6
From a statistical perspective, the demographic coefﬁcients show 
that these factors are useful in predicting which recipients will leave 
welfare and obtain employment.7 Focusing on the determination of 
leaving welfare, we ﬁnd some consistent results across geographic 
sites.8 In general, older, nonminority recipients are signiﬁcantly more 
likely to leave welfare and those with more children are less likely to 
leave.9 These results are consistent with others’ ﬁndings (for example, 
see King et al. 1991; Wallace 2000; and Ribar 2000). When we translate 
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the coefﬁcients into marginal effects on the probability of exit, they are 
of modest size. In Fort Lauderdale, where the exit probability averages 
around 0.24, the predicted probability is about 0.03 higher at age 35 
than age 25. Effects at other sites are smaller but are comparable when 
viewed relative to their lower exit rates. Estimated effects of race are 
similarly modest, with minorities having lower exit rates. 
A recipient who has been receiving welfare for at least eight con-
secutive quarters (Longterm = 1) has a lower probability of leaving 
welfare. In practical terms, this effect is substantial. In Fort Lauderdale 
and Houston, long-term recipients have a chance of exiting welfare that 
is about 10 percentage points below others, while the comparable ﬁgure 
for other sites varies from 4 to 7 percentage points. In each case, the 
increment is between a third and a half of the mean exit rate. This lower 
probability of leaving for those who have been receiving welfare for 
some time could be due to unmeasured heterogeneity, perhaps tied to 
the inﬂuences of neighborhoods or peers (see, for example, Osterman 
1991). It could also result from positive duration dependence among 
welfare recipients, in which time on welfare actually increases the dif-
ﬁculty of exiting (see Chapter 3 of Bane and Ellwood 1994).
Turning to the probability of employment, we ﬁnd that minority 
recipients are more likely to be employed across all geographic sites. 
Differences are as large as 16 percentage points. This may be related to 
the fact that minorities are more likely—given other characteristics—to 
receive welfare for extended periods of time and so may be employed 
during their periods of recipiency. Further evidence on differential em-
ployment by race for welfare recipients can be found in Heinrich et al. 
(forthcoming). Older recipients are more likely to be employed in Hous-
ton but are less likely to be employed in the other sites. We also observe 
that having more children lowers the probability of employment. The 
decline in probability ranges across our sites from half a percentage 
point to two percentage points for each child. While the effect of other 
demographic characteristics on employment is not entirely consistent in 
the literature, the negative effect of children is robust across numerous 
studies (for example, see King et al. 1991; Ribar 2000; Wallace 2000; 
and Eberts 1997).
Both economic theory and common sense suggest that work and 
welfare participation decisions are made simultaneously, with a variety 
of measured and unmeasured factors inﬂuencing both. We do not have 
66  K
ing
and
M
ueser
Table 3.2  Probit Results for the Probability of Leaving and the Probability of Employment
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago Fort Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Variable Leaving Employ Leaving Employ Leaving Employ Leaving Employ Leaving Employ Leaving Employ
Intercept −1.891 −0.210 −1.536 −0.720 −1.657 −1.505 −1.494 −0.675 −1.173 −0.242 −1.793 −0.318
Age 0.058 −0.009 0.022 −0.012 0.046 0.076 0.043 0.028 0.026 −0.014 0.048 −0.001
Age squareda −0.863 −0.073 −0.256 0.145 −0.559 −1.308 −0.541 −0.705 −0.446 0.361 −0.683 −0.133
Number of           
children
−0.069 −0.034 −0.065 −0.038 −0.127 −0.012 −0.075 −0.024 −0.037 −0.012 −0.042 −0.056
Minority = 1 −0.133 0.241 −0.142 0.301 −0.165 0.120 −0.100 0.241 −0.089 0.106 −0.177 0.410
Longterm = 1 −0.285 −0.301 −0.210 −0.267 −0.245 −0.008 −0.349 −0.262 −0.376 −0.310 −0.305 −0.254
Log-likelihood
Full model −126,820 −252,696 −203,832 −350,693 −282,333 −542,824 −112,298 −139,263 −281,859 −356,397 −99,520 −175,621
Time only −129,383 −258,828 −206,076 −355,751 −289,288 −547,630 −114,159 −142,447 −288,629 −362,593 −1,011,585 −180,830
Intercept only −131,870 −259,813 −212,951 −359,428 −292,206 −549,888 −118,441 −143,072 −290,230 −363,502 −102,513 −181,656
Likelihood 
ratio index
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
Total 
observations
393,412 615,226 826,115 214,939 621,485 264,705
Unique 
individuals
40,597 57,709 141,785 40,865 87,970 30,817
NOTE: Parameter coefﬁcients reported are from a model that includes a time dummy variable for all but one quarter represented in the data for each site. 
a Coefﬁcient multiplied by 1,000. 
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sufﬁcient information to estimate direct effects of one decision on the 
other, but we can expand our model to account for unmeasured factors 
that inﬂuence both. This estimation strategy is taken up in the next sec-
tion.
JOINT LEAVING AND EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION
If employment and welfare exit are indeed the two desired out-
comes, policymakers have some choices about how to pursue them. 
In particular, there may be some choice about whether to channel re-
sources to the leaving outcome (L = 1), expecting that employment will 
follow, or to the employment outcome (E = 1), expecting that leaving 
will follow. In order to evaluate which process might be most fruitful 
in achieving the most desired outcome (L = 1 and E = 1), the leaving 
and employment outcomes are modeled simultaneously since there are 
likely many factors that inﬂuence both outcomes. Through such a speci-
ﬁcation, not only can we determine which factors contribute positively 
to the most desired outcome (L = 1 and E = 1), we can also evaluate the 
conditional probabilities of employment given that the recipient leaves 
welfare (E = 1|L = 1) and the conditional probability of leaving welfare 
given that the recipient is employed (L = 1|E = 1).
Empirical Speciﬁcation
The empirical speciﬁcation of this model takes the form of a bi-
variate probit. The probabilities that person i leaves welfare and is em-
ployed in time period t are jointly determined by a set of demographic 
and time period–speciﬁc regressors.10 The bivariate estimation strategy, 
which allows for correlation between the error terms in the two equa-
tions, is appropriate if there are unobserved factors that affect both the 
probability of leaving welfare and that of being employed. Maximum 
likelihood estimates will be used to predict how the probabilities of be-
ing in each, both, and neither of the two categories are affected by the 
different demographic variables. In addition, conditional probabilities 
are also easily calculated from the model.11
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The experiment of interest is to determine how important leaving 
welfare is to the expected probability of employment,
and how important being employed is to the expected probability of 
leaving welfare,
These partial derivatives measure the difference in expected out-
comes given the environment in which those outcomes are deter-
mined.
The model takes the leaving and employment outcomes as de-
termined simultaneously, with neither directly inﬂuencing the other. 
Rather, events and factors in each recipient’s life affect both outcomes 
simultaneously, which is reﬂected in the correlated error structure. The 
partial derivatives indicate how the probability of a particular outcome 
differs as the other outcome varies, based on inferences about how un-
measured factors are likely to differ. Of course, it is uncertain whether 
policies that affect one of these outcomes will in fact operate in this 
way, but the model is nonetheless a convenient way to summarize the 
empirical relationships.
Empirical Results and Implications
The bivariate probit model is estimated separately across each site. 
This procedure produced coefﬁcient estimates that parallel those pre-
sented in Table 3.2, but the estimates differ because this model takes 
account of the correlations between the error terms. In fact, the two 
models produce estimates where differences are statistically signiﬁcant, 
but there are no practical differences in estimated coefﬁcients. In al-
most all cases, estimates differ by only a few percent, and in no case is 
the difference of any substantive importance. The implication is that, 
from a practical standpoint, the coefﬁcients obtained from estimating 
the leaving and employment probabilities separately are not seriously 
∂Pr[L = 1]
∂E
= Pr[L = 1] | E = 1] − Pr[L = 1 | E = 0].
∂Pr[E = 1]
∂L
= Pr[E = 1] | L = 1] − Pr[E = 1 | L = 0],
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biased. We therefore do not present coefﬁcient estimates for the bivari-
ate probit.
Despite the similarities in estimated coefﬁcients, the estimated cor-
relation between the unobserved determinants of leaving welfare and 
of employment (σ
EL
) is signiﬁcantly different from zero, positive, and 
substantial for each site (see Table 3.3). The similarity in the correla-
tion estimates across sites, varying from 0.28 to 0.36, is notable. The 
positive estimate of σ
EL
 indicates that unobserved factors that increase 
the probability of leaving welfare also increase the probability of em-
ployment. For example, a recipient who is more likely in any quarter 
to leave welfare for some unmeasured reason (e.g., high motivation) is 
also more likely to be employed in that quarter. 
The parameter coefﬁcients from estimation of the bivariate speciﬁ-
cations are used to calculate the expected joint, conditional, and uncon-
ditional probabilities presented in Table 3.3. As noted above, although 
employment and leaving welfare are not modeled as having a causal 
relationship (they are modeled simultaneously), the importance of one 
outcome in the determination of the probability of the other outcome 
can be calculated through differences in conditional probabilities.
The partial derivatives reported at the bottom of Table 3.3 are inter-
preted as follows:
(a) Among recipients, how does the probability of leaving welfare 
differ between those who are employed and those who are not? Where 
unmeasured factors induce employment, we may interpret this as indi-
cating the extent to which employment is associated with a change in 
the probability of leaving.
(b) Among recipients, how does the probability of being employed 
differ between those who are leaving welfare and those who are not? 
Where unmeasured factors induce welfare exit, we may interpret this as 
indicating the extent to which welfare exit is associated with a change 
in the probability of employment.
The partial derivatives of the leaving probability, line (a), indicate 
that an employed recipient is more likely to leave welfare than a non-
employed recipient, with the differential between 9 (Chicago) and 17 
(Houston) percentage points. The implication is that employed recipi-
ents have a tremendous advantage over nonemployed recipients in leav-
ing welfare. The importance of leaving welfare on the probability of be-
ing employed is reported in line (b) of Table 3.3. These ﬁgures indicate 
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Table 3.3  Predicted Probabilities and Partial Derivatives, Leaving and Employment
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Error covariance
F
EL
0.350 0.356 0.277 0.289 0.360 0.297
Unconditional probabilities
Pr[L=1] 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.18 0.13
Pr[E=1] 0.37 0.27 0.38 0.38 0.27 0.44
Pr[L=1,E=1] 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.08
Pr[L=1,E=0] 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.05
Pr[L=0,E=1] 0.31 0.21 0.32 0.25 0.19 0.36
Pr[L=0,E=0] 0.59 0.68 0.57 0.51 0.64 0.51
Conditional probabilities
Pr[L=1|E=0] 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.09
Pr[L=1|E=1] 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.30 0.19
Pr[E=1|L=0] 0.34 0.24 0.36 0.34 0.23 0.41
Pr[E=1|L=1] 0.62 0.50 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.63
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Partial derivatives
(a) Pr[L=1|E=1] − Pr[L=1|E=0] 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.17 0.10
(As proportion of overall 
leaving probability)
(1.10) (1.09) (0.81) (0.58) (0.94) (0.77)
(b) Pr[E=1|L=1] − Pr[E=1|L=0] 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.22
(As proportion of overall 
employment probability)
(0.76) (0.96) (0.55) (0.50) (0.89) (0.50)
NOTE: Based on model with demographic controls estimated for entire sample period.  Terms in parentheses are the difference above 
divided by the unconditional probability.  For line (a), the divisor is Pr[L=1], and for line (b) the divisor is Pr[E=1].  Probabilities reﬂect 
the expected probability for a recipient drawn at random.  
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that a recipient leaving welfare has from a 19- to a 28-percentage-point 
increment in probability of being employed relative to a nonleaving 
recipient. It is notable that the patterns across sites are similar, even 
though exit probabilities are much higher in Fort Lauderdale and Hous-
ton than in the other sites.
Certainly, these results show that employment and welfare exits are 
closely associated, and that achieving one of these outcomes brings a 
recipient a long way toward achieving the other. If one simply asks 
how one obtains the highest probability of exiting welfare and being 
employed, it is clear that, if we observe an exit for the average person, 
the chance is around 50 percent that the individual will also be em-
ployed (Pr[E = 1|L = 1]). On the other hand, if one identiﬁes employed 
individuals, the chance that such an individual also leaves welfare in a 
given quarter is less than a third, and as low as 17 percent in two sites 
(Pr[L = 1|E = 1]). Since the welfare exit is the smaller probability event, 
achieving it moves one farther toward achieving the joint goal.
However, this comparison may understate the value of obtaining 
employment. Rather than looking at the simple probability, one may 
wish to apply an adjustment for the overall probability of each outcome. 
The ﬁgures in parentheses in line (a) divide the calculated differential 
for the chance of leaving by the overall probability of leaving. We see 
that, relative to the overall probability of leaving, the observed proba-
bility differences vary from about half to more than the full probability. 
The ﬁgures in line (b) show the differential for the chance of employ-
ment divided by the overall chance of employment. The percentage-
point gain in chance of employment across all locations amounts to 
from 50 to 96 percent of the overall employment probability. By these 
relative measures, it appears that the effect of getting a job is more sub-
stantial than it would otherwise appear.
It is important to note that these results say nothing about the qual-
ity of employment. For example, a recent MDRC study shows that 
employment mandates without income supplements are not effective 
in improving overall family welfare (Morris et al. 2001).12 This would 
certainly be expected if the job paid too little to disqualify a recipient 
for welfare or to bring a recipient above poverty levels. As a transi-
tion to the next chapter, which explores employment outcomes in more 
detail, the last part of this chapter takes an initial look at longer-range 
employment and earnings outcomes. We ﬁrst turn to examining how 
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the process of obtaining employment and leaving welfare has changed 
over time.
LEAVING AND EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION IN 
DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS
Much of the recent welfare-to-work literature has been focused on 
whether the welfare reform of 1996 has had any effect on welfare-to-
work dynamics or outcomes (for example, Schoeni and Blank 2000; 
and Loprest 2001). We would like to see that the emphasis that welfare 
reform has on employment and training leads to better alternatives to 
welfare. Of course, given that our analyses of post-welfare reform out-
comes are necessarily performed in an era of unprecedented economic 
expansion, it is difﬁcult to identify the effects of welfare reform or re-
lated policy changes, particularly since the cohort of welfare recipients 
before and after reform may differ in systematic ways. In spite of this 
limitation, it is of interest to see whether we can identify any systematic 
differences in transition dynamics before and after welfare reform. The 
goal of this effort is to see whether there are any differential trends or 
effects of demographics in explaining leaving and employment behav-
ior of welfare recipients.
Empirical Speciﬁcation
Comparisons across pre- and postreform time periods will be made 
using simultaneous bivariate probit results obtained from reestimating 
the empirical model for three distinct time periods: prereform (1994–
1995), mid-reform (1996–1997), and postreform (1998–1999). Each of 
these time periods is characterized by the demographic characteristics 
of welfare recipients and by the mechanism by which recipients tran-
sition out of welfare and into employment. This mechanism is deter-
mined by both the economy and the policy structure in place during the 
time period. Table 3.4 contains sample means for each site for the three 
time periods.
In general, across the three time periods, the recipient cohorts are 
becoming older, have more children, are more likely to be minority and 
are generally less likely to be long-term recipients.13 Changes in these 
characteristics will affect leaving and employment in different ways. 
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Table 3.4  Sample Means for Three Time Periods: Welfare Recipients
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Variable 1994–1995 1996–1997 1998–1999 1994–1995 1996–1997 1998–1999 1994–1995 1996–1997 1998–1999
Leave = 1 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.20
—
0.08 0.12
(0.26) (0.31) (0.36) (0.27) (0.31) (0.40) (0.28) (0.33)
Employment = 1 0.34 0.39 0.40 0.23 0.29 0.34
—
0.35 0.39
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.42) (0.45) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49)
Age 30.87 31.68 33.02 31.52 32.59 32.00
—
30.94 30.98
(9.32) (9.78) (10.81) (9.29) (9.83) (8.56) (8.20) (8.21)
Number of children 2.11 2.15 2.18 1.91 1.92 1.97
—
2.16 2.25
(1.26) (1.31) (1.34) (1.14) (1.16) (1.24) (1.33) (1.37)
Minority = 1 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.91
—
0.89 0.90
(0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32) (0.30)
Long term = 1 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.63 0.55
—
0.63 0.63
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)
Total observations 171,662 141,599 80,151 282,258 226,295 106,673 — 215,261 610,854
Unique individuals 30,341 26,218 19,650 49,301 41,858 26,775 — 115,993 127,400
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Fort Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Variable 1994–1995 1996–1997 1998–1999 1994–1995 1996–1997 1998–1999 1994–1995 1996–1997 1998–1999
Leave = 1 — 0.26 0.41 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.10 0.14 0.17
(0.44) (0.49) (0.36) (0.39) (0.41) (0.31) (0.34) (0.38)
Employment = 1 — 0.38 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.42 0.46 0.46
(0.47) (0.50) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Age — 30.84 31.46 31.62 32.74 34.85 30.58 30.91 31.55
(8.11) (8.43) (9.02) (8.98) (9.20) (8.96) (9.28) (9.89)
Number of children — 2.09 2.19 2.00 2.09 2.20 1.98 1.98 2.00
(1.22) (1.32) (1.17) (1.23) (1.31) (1.17) (1.19) (1.21)
Minority = 1 — 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.67 0.69 0.72
(0.42) (0.40) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45)
Long term = 1 — 0.32 0.20 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.44
(0.47) (0.40) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Total observations — 78,309 27,846 247,534 262,395 111,556 108,572 94,941 61,192
Unique individuals — 23,292 11,797 70,930 60,340 30,046 21,251 19,977 15,156
NOTE: In this analysis, the ﬁrst quarter of data for Fort Lauderdale is 1996:1.  The data for other sites are as listed in Table 3.1. — = data are   
unavailable. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Based on the results in Table 3.2, an older cohort implies a greater 
chance of leaving welfare but lower employment, a greater proportion 
of minorities implies a harder time leaving but greater employment, 
more children implies decreases in both leaving and employment, and 
fewer long-term recipients implies a greater chance of both leaving and 
employment.
By estimating leaving and employment probabilities separately for 
each time period, we can simulate the differences across policy regimes, 
holding recipient characteristics constant. This allows us to answer the 
question, “How much of the change in employment probabilities can 
be accounted for by changes in the policy and economic regime?”14 In 
addition, a comparison of cohorts can be made by evaluating the prob-
abilities of employment and leaving within one regime but for the dif-
ferent (1994–1995 versus 1998–1999) cohorts.15 
Using the calculated probabilities, the overall changes in employ-
ment and leaving probabilities can be “decomposed” into a portion that 
is accounted for by differences in cohort characteristics (differences 
between X
94-95
 and X
98-99
) and by differences in regimes (differences be-
tween β
94-95
 and β
98-99
).
Empirical Results and Implications
Table 3.5 contains predicted leaving and employment probabilities 
based on coefﬁcients for models estimated separately by time period. 
These analyses provide information on the role of recipient characteris-
tics and regime change in explaining variation over time in employment 
and leaving probabilities. Chicago and Fort Lauderdale are omitted, 
since information for 1994–1995 is not available for those sites.
The probability differences in lines (i) and (iv) conﬁrm results pre-
sented earlier, showing that postreform recipients have higher prob-
abilities of both leaving and being employed than prereform recipients. 
These increases in probability for leaving range from 7 percentage 
points in Houston and Kansas City to 12 percentage points in Balti-
more. Increases in employment probabilities range from 4 percentage 
points in Kansas City to 11 percentage points in Baltimore. These gross 
probability increases result both from changes in cohort characteristics, 
and from changes in policy structure and economic environment (“re-
gime”).
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Table 3.5  Predicted Probabilities of Leaving Welfare and Employment across Regimes and Cohorts
Atlanta Baltimore Houston Kansas City
Probability of leaving
 (a)  Pr L
94-95
|X
94-95
 0.072 0.073 0.141 0.099
 (b)  Pr L
98-99
|X
98-99
 0.153 0.191 0.209 0.165
 (c)  Pr L
94-95
|X
98-99
 0.071 0.076 0.135 0.098
 (d)  Pr L
98-99
|X
94-95
 0.161 0.191 0.225 0.167
  i. Gross change in leaving probability  (b)  −  (a) 0.081 0.118 0.068 0.066
 ii. Change in probability accounted for by differences  
in cohort characteristics  (c)  −  (a) 
−0.001 0.003 −0.006 −0.000
−1% 2% −9% 0%
iii. Change in probability accounted for by differences  
in regimes  (b)  −  (c) 
0.082 0.115 0.074 0.066
 101%  98%  109% 100%
Probability of employment
(e) Pr(E
94-95
|X
94-95
) 0.340 0.225 0.242 0.413
(f) Pr(E
98-99
|X
98-99
) 0.396 0.332 0.287 0.455
(g) Pr(E
94-95
|X
98-99
) 0.332 0.233 0.229 0.418
(h) Pr(E
98-99
|X
94-95
) 0.403 0.330 0.307 0.450
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Atlanta Baltimore Houston Kansas City
iv.  Gross change in employment probability (f) − (e) 0.056 0.107 0.045 0.041
 v.  Change in probability accounted for by differences  
in cohort characteristics (g) − (e)
−0.007 0.008 −0.013 0.005
 −13%  7%  −29%  13% 
vi.  Change in probability accounted for by differences  
in regimes (f) − (g)
0.064 0.099 0.058 0.036
 113%  93%  129%  87% 
NOTE: Reported percentages use the gross change as the base.
Table 3.5  (continued)
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Decomposing the changes in leaving probabilities indicates that in 
two of the sites, cohort characteristic changes would lead to declines in 
the probabilities of leaving. In contrast, in Baltimore, cohort character-
istics are changing in such a way as to make it easier for recipients to 
leave, whereas characteristics have essentially no effect in Kansas City. 
In all sites, the effect of characteristics is very small. The overwhelm-
ing bulk of the increase in leaving probability can be accounted for by 
differences in regime (line [iii]).
Decomposing the changes in employment probabilities indicates 
that cohort characteristic changes reduce employment probabilities in 
two of the sites and increase employment in the other two. In either 
case, the effects are modest (line [v]). As in the case of the leaving prob-
ability, the change in regime again must take most of the credit in the 
employment probability increases.
The number of demographic variables available in this analysis 
is clearly limited. Most notably, measures of education, labor market 
experience, marital status, and health are missing; these are either not 
available or not reliably available from the different state agencies dur-
ing this time period. Our results might differ if such measures were 
included. However, given the small effect of available measures and the 
fact that unmeasured factors are expected to be at least weakly associ-
ated with measured factors, we doubt that our main conclusions would 
be altered.
LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION
In policy formation or in targeting resources, it is often necessary to 
measure success in terms of longer-term outcomes. Knowing the rela-
tive importance of different demographic characteristics in determining 
immediate versus future employment outcomes could be useful in tar-
geting resources for long-term success. This section focuses on employ-
ment outcomes eight quarters after the current quarter. Leaving is still 
deﬁned relative to the current quarter. 
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Empirical Speciﬁcation
This section estimates the joint leaving and employment bivariate 
model following the same structure as the previous models, except that 
E* is the employment outcome eight quarters into the future (t + 8). 
The sample consists of all recipients at time t. The questions addressed 
by this speciﬁcation are 1) how the probability of employment in eight 
quarters is inﬂuenced by demographic and time variables, and 2) how 
this effect differs from the results presented earlier pertaining to the cur-
rent quarter. As above, the bivariate speciﬁcation allows for unmeasured 
factors to inﬂuence both outcomes. Estimates obtained are comparable 
to those presented in Table 3.3, but since employment is measured after 
the quarter in which the recipient may leave welfare, our conditional 
measures focus on the effect of exit on employment.
Empirical Results and Implications
Table 3.6 contains the predicted probabilities of being employed 
eight quarters out, plus the employment probabilities conditional on cur-
rent leaving status. Whether or not recipients leave welfare now, there 
is a substantial chance they will be employed in two years. Comparing 
the overall employment probabilities (Pr[E = 1]) in Table 3.6 with those 
in Table 3.3, employment is more likely over the long term than in the 
current quarter. Figures in the bottom two lines of Table 3.6 are much 
smaller than comparable measures reported in Table 3.3, implying that 
the importance of leaving for employment outcomes diminishes over 
the long term. In other words, leaving welfare this quarter is more im-
portant in employment determination this quarter than in employment 
determination eight quarters in the future. Of course, many of those 
who do not leave in the current quarter will leave sometime in the next 
two years. It should be recognized that the employment probabilities 
remain in the range of 50 percent, so it is clear that forcing recipients 
off welfare does not necessarily mean they will eventually ﬁnd employ-
ment.
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Table 3.6  Predicted Probabilities and Partial Derivatives, Current Leaving and Employment Eight Quarters Out
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago Fort Lauderdale Houston
Kansas 
City
Unconditional probabilities
Pr[L=1] 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.12
Pr[E=1] 0.37 0.41 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.54
Pr[L=1,E=1] 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.07
Pr[L=1,E=0] 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.05
Pr[L=0,E=1] 0.31 0.36 0.46 0.35 0.33 0.47
Pr[L=0,E=0] 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.42
Conditional employment probabilities
Pr[E=1|L=0] 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.53
Pr[E=1|L=1] 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.59
Partial derivatives
Pr[E=1|L=1] − Pr[E=1|L=0] 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06
(As proportion of overall             
employment probability)
(0.24) (0.24) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.11)
NOTE: Probabilities evaluated at sample means for each site separately.
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SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM EARNINGS OUTCOMES
We are interested not only in the dynamics of welfare-to-work tran-
sitions but also in the type of job that a recipient obtains. A recent MDRC 
summary of welfare-to-work programs argues that insufﬁcient attention 
is paid to the quality of welfare recipient and leaver jobs (Morris et al. 
2001). This section examines the quarterly earnings of employed wel-
fare recipients in a given quarter. It serves as a link with the analysis 
of the next two chapters, which expands on the quality of outcomes 
by looking in detail at the longevity and earnings of jobs obtained by 
welfare recipients.
Empirical Speciﬁcation
We examine total quarterly earnings in the next quarter (t + 1) and 
total quarterly earnings eight quarters out (t + 8) for a sample of wel-
fare recipients. Since many recipients at time t will not be employed at 
t + 1 or at t + 8, many observations have zero earnings. In order to ac-
count for this censoring of earnings at zero, and so that we might gen-
eralize the results to all welfare recipients (not just those who become 
employed), we use a tobit speciﬁcation for earnings.16
Empirical Results and Implications
Table 3.7 contains the partial derivatives calculated at the sam-
ple means for each geographic location (see McDonald and Mofﬁtt 
1980). The middle panel of the table provides the predicted quar-
terly earnings for a recipient drawn at random (E[W]) and for an 
individual who has a job (E[W|W > 0]). The conclusion that the 
types of jobs welfare recipients ﬁnd are fairly low-paying is con-
sistent across sites, with the highest expected earnings in quarter 
t + 1 for those with a job in Kansas City ($2,176) and the lowest expect-
ed quarterly earnings in Houston ($1,245). The effect of age is not con-
sistent across sites, with earnings at age 35 exceeding earnings at 25 for 
half of the sites, and the reverse at the others. Earnings differences by 
age are modest, never exceeding $70 per quarter. Minorities uniformly 
have higher quarterly earnings than whites. Having more children and 
being a long-term recipient lowers expected earnings across all sites. 
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The negative effect of having more children on earnings may suggest 
that alleviating recipients’ child care needs could improve not only the 
incidence of employment but also its quality.
The right side of Table 3.7 presents results from estimating the 
equation for long-term earnings. The effect of demographic variables 
is generally magniﬁed over time, so their importance is emphasized for 
long-term outcomes, although there are a fair number of exceptions. 
One partial exception is the effect of age. The difference between long-
term earnings at age 25 and age 35 is negative in ﬁve of the six sites; 
overall, older workers experience greater earnings disadvantages two 
years out than initially.
Expected earnings are larger two years from time t than in the quar-
ter just following t, largely due to increased rates of employment. If 
we look at those with jobs, increases in earnings are modest, which 
suggests that the observed employment is not providing real economic 
self-sufﬁciency for any but a small minority of recipients.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the relationship 
between leaving welfare and becoming employed and to explore the 
role that individual demographic characteristics play in this relation-
ship. Determining which demographics are important in the dynam-
ics of leaving welfare and obtaining employment helps to identify the 
most effective targets for scarce resources. For example, a consistent 
result across all speciﬁcations in this chapter, as well as across other 
cited research, is that women with more children have both lower exit 
rates and lower employment rates. This is clearly a call for assistance 
in integrating the needs of the children of welfare recipients to be cared 
for and the need for the recipient to get off of welfare. The effective-
ness of providing child care subsidies on employment outcomes has 
recently been addressed by Blau and Tekin (2001), who found that the 
provision of child care subsidies signiﬁcantly increases the probability 
that a welfare recipient obtains employment. The authors caution that 
tying eligibility for the child care subsidy to receipt of welfare appears 
to increase welfare participation.
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Table 3.7  Partial Derivatives from Tobit Estimates of Model Predicting  
Real Quarterly Earnings
Earnings ($) next quarter (t + 1)
Variable Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston
Kansas 
City
Intercept −888.2 −472.5 −2,136.5 −1,180.1 −170.8 −796.4
Age 16.4 −4.3 117.3 62.4 −3.9 17.5
Age2 −0.29 0.11 −1.88 −1.14 0.00 −0.18
Number of 
children
−80.2 −25.3 −7.8 −40.7 −10.2 -88.1
Minority = 1 341.9 174.7 125.9 237.5 56.0 419.5
Long term = 1 −579.2 −168.6 −77.3 −335.0 −193.2 −290.2
Expected earnings ($)
E[W] 504 382 887 821 395 980 
E[W|W>0] 1,299 1,287 2,163 1,968 1,245 2,176 
Total 
observations
393,412 615,222 826,115 189,813 584,254 264,705
Unique 
individuals
40,597 57,709 141,785 40,053 85,862 30,817
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NOTE: Sample is welfare recipients at time t.  Standard errors are not reported since 
parameter coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant with rare exception.  Tobit estimation 
includes time dummies for quarters.  Expected earnings are calculated for each 
person, then averaged over the sample at each geographic location.
Earnings ($) eight quarters out (t + 8)
Variable Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston
Kansas 
City
Intercept −1235.0 −455.5 −1,967.9 −1,297.4 −317.4 −949.2
Age 67.3 8.0 150.2 81.9 16.0 52.2
Age2 −1.24 −0.17 −2.61 −1.56 −0.38 −0.84
Number of 
children
−66.7 −30.9 −42.2 −67.5 −8.8 −87.5
Minority = 1 446.6 210.5 120.2 333.6 107.8 383.4
Long term = 1 −584.4 −211.6 −132.9 −298.7 −220.1 −318.0
Expected earnings ($)
E[W] 753 633 1,511 1,301 681 1,452 
E[W|W>0] 1,575 1,551 2,946 2,647 1,579 2,764 
Total 
observations
313,261 508,503 215,261 172,480 494,404 203,513
Unique 
individuals
35,420 56,479 115,993 36,596 83,222 27,437
Table 3.7  (continued)  
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Our results from the estimation of the bivariate model predicting 
both leaving welfare and becoming employed underscore the strong 
association between these two important policy outcomes, and they 
suggest that each outcome will likely facilitate the other. These results 
should be interpreted with an eye to the economic environment in which 
they were generated, however. While there was variation in economic 
activity across geographic regions of the country, all sites experienced 
sustained employment growth over the time period evaluated. The re-
sults might be quite different in a period when jobs are not as plentiful. 
In addition, this conclusion does not consider the costs associated with 
alternative strategies for reducing dependence or boosting employment. 
In looking at longer-term employment outcomes, we found that leaving 
welfare in the current quarter was strongly associated with employment 
eight quarters later, although the relationship was, as expected, dimin-
ished relative to that with current employment.
Despite the substantial effects that demographic factors have in ex-
plaining the probability of welfare exit and employment for particular 
recipients, changes in demographics are of little or no importance in ex-
plaining changes in exit and employment probabilities that occurred in 
the 1990s. The overwhelming bulk of the increases in both leaving and 
employment probabilities can be accounted for by changes in regime, 
which include both economic and policy changes occurring over the 
period of our study. Changes in cohort characteristics actually worked 
against these changes in some sites, tending to reduce leaving and em-
ployment probabilities, but these effects were substantively small and 
were overwhelmed by the effects of regime changes. All recipients ap-
pear to be more likely to leave in the more recent period. 
As a preliminary look at the quality of employment outcomes, we 
explored the determinants of quarterly earnings. For those with jobs 
(not just a recipient drawn at random), the quality of employment is 
low, with quarterly earnings ranging from only $1,245 in Houston to 
$2,176 in Kansas City. Of course, looking just at the next quarter will 
typically underestimate the ultimate labor market success of recipients. 
Expected real quarterly earnings (of those with jobs) two years from 
the current quarter were higher than in the current quarter. The effects 
of individual characteristics in determining earnings are magniﬁed 
over time, suggesting that the importance of addressing the difﬁculties 
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of certain groups of recipients (e.g., the young with children) is even 
greater the longer the time frame being considered.
Overall, the results from this chapter may be useful in telling us 1) 
on which recipients resources might best be focused, 2) whether poli-
cies should emphasize getting people off welfare or into jobs ﬁrst, and 
3) how important recipient characteristics versus the economic and pol-
icy environment are in determining post-welfare outcomes. Of course, 
decisions on resource allocation must consider the marginal effects of 
programs as well as their costs. However, if a program has similar ef-
fects and costs for different individuals, we might choose to focus ef-
forts on those who are least likely to exit welfare and obtain jobs in the 
absence of intervention. By this standard, resources devoted to getting 
people off welfare should be targeted to young, minority welfare recipi-
ents with more children and those who have been on welfare for long 
periods of time. Resources devoted to getting people into jobs should be 
targeted to older recipients with children and those who have been on 
welfare a long time. Welfare exit and employment chances are closely 
associated, and efforts to facilitate one will likely facilitate the other. 
Notes
 1.  The sample for analysis is the universe of all cases meeting our inclusion criteria 
in the given quarter but is slightly different than that used in Chapter 2 since we 
have omitted those cases for which data on relevant variables were not avail-
able. 
 2.  “Minority” is a dummy variable set equal to one for any race other than white. 
Hispanics are coded as nonwhites.
 3.  Due to a data problem, the 21 percent ﬁgure may underestimate the proportion of 
recipients in Fort Lauderdale who have received aid for eight or more quarters. 
Although we have not been able to determine the extent of this problem, we 
can conﬁrm that the actual percentage of long-term recipients is much lower in 
Fort Lauderdale than in the other sites—certainly less than 30 percent. This data 
problem has no effect on the substantive results we report.
 4.  The terminology “leaving welfare” and “welfare exit” are used interchangeably 
throughout the chapter.
 5.  A recipient is said to leave welfare during quarter t if she is receiving welfare in 
quarter t and is not receiving welfare in quarter t + 1, consistent with the deﬁni-
tion used in Chapter 2. In contrast to the analysis in Chapter 2, which examines 
employment of welfare leavers in quarter t + 1, the current measure of employ-
ment refers to welfare recipients and applies to quarter t. Simple probit models 
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  are estimated separately for each site as follows:
  
  where Eit refers to the unobserved employment propensity of person i in quarter 
t, Lit refers to the unobserved leaving propensity of person i in quarter t, Xit is a 
vector with individual demographic characteristics, YRQTRj is a dummy variable 
equal to one for quarter j, n is the total number of quarters (minus one) available 
for analysis from a given site, β and γ are parameters to be estimated, and ε
Eit
 
and ε
Lit
 are normally distributed random errors with means of zero and variances 
equal to one.  One could choose to model the process of leaving welfare as a 
hazard. However, since our data are discrete, the differences between results 
produced by a probit model and a hazard model are small.
 6.  Since the number of unique recipients represents from 9 to 17 percent of the 
total number of observations, statistical signiﬁcance will be overstated since we 
know errors will not be independent across quarters for a given individual. Most 
reported coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant, and given the large sample sizes, ad-
justments to take into account the error structure do not inﬂuence any substantive 
conclusions.
 7.  Likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that these covariates contribute 
nothing at highly signiﬁcant levels. 
 8.  It is not our intention to test for signiﬁcant differences in coefﬁcients across sites. 
The large sample sizes mean that differences that are highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant may be of little substantive importance.
 9.  The effects of age are considered by examining the difference in predicted leav-
ing probability at ages 25 and 35. This difference is slightly over a standard 
deviation. The mean age across sites varies from 31 to 33.
 10.  The equations may be written in the form speciﬁed above for the simple probit, 
except in this model ε
Eit
 and ε
Lit
 are potentially correlated normally distributed
   random errors with means of zero and variance Σ =                     .
 11. For example,
       Pr[E = 1 | L = 1] =                               ={
       Pr[E = 1 | L = 0] =                               ={
  where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. The conditional probabilities of 
Pr[L = 1|E = 1] and Pr[L = 1|E = 0] are analogously deﬁned. See Greene (2000, 
pp. 849–852).
Eit = Xit βE + ΣγEjYRQTRj + εEit , Eit = 1 if Eit > 0, 0 otherwise
* *
*
*
n
j=1
Lit = Xit βL + ΣγLjYRQTRj + εLit , Lit = 1 if Lit > 0, 0 otherwise
* *
n
j=1
  1     σ 
EL
  σ 
EL      
1
Φ(β
E 
X ,β
L 
X , σ
EL 
)
Φ(β
L 
X )
′ ′
′
predicted probability of the recipient being 
employed given that she leaves welfare
Φ(β
E 
X ,β
L 
X , σ
EL 
)
1 − Φ(β
L 
X )
′ ′
′
predicted probability of the recipient being 
employed given that she does not leave welfare
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 12.  This is also consistent with the conclusions offered by Brauner and Loprest 
(1998) regarding the quality of employment outcomes of welfare leavers.
 13.  Similar changes in recipient characteristics are also found by Loprest (2001) 
in her national sample. See also Mofﬁtt and Stevens (2001) and Zedlewski and 
Anderson (2001). 
 14.  This question is answered by calculating the following probabilities:
 
     Pr[E
94–95
 = 1 | X
98–99
] = Φ (β
94–95 
X
98–99 
) ={
  where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution and X
t  
is the mean characteristics 
level in period t and β
t 
is the estimated coefﬁcient for period t.
       Pr[E
98–99
 = 1 | X
98–99
] = Φ (β
98–99 
X
98–99 
) ={
15.  The employment probabilities corresponding to this comparison are:
       Pr[E
94–95
 = 1 | X
94–95
] = Φ (β
94–95 
X
94–95 
) ={
  
       Pr[E
94–95
 = 1 | X
98–99
] = Φ (β
94–95 
X
98–99 
) ={
 16.  The tobit speciﬁcation is as follows:
       Wit + 1 = Xit β1 + Σγ1jYRQTRj + εit + 1 ,
       Wit + 8 = Xit β8 + Σγ8jYRQTRj + εit + 8 ,
  where Wit + k = Wit + k (the observed earnings) if Wit + k >0. When Wit + k = 0, Wit + k  is 
negative and can be interpreted as capturing a continuous propensity that identi-
ﬁes how close an individual is to obtaining actual earnings.  Wit + k  refers to the 
quarterly real earnings of a welfare recipient in quarter (t + k) (k =1,8). All re-
gressors are in reference to the quarter in which the recipient receives beneﬁts (t). 
ε
it
 is assumed to be normally distributed with mean of zero and variance σ. The 
coefﬁcients obtained from the tobit estimation essentially identify the combined 
effect of earnings and chance of employment.  One could model this earnings 
outcome as part of a two-step selection process. However, when one applies a 
two-step methodology, the censoring selection equation only facilitates identiﬁ-
cation of selection effects in the earnings equation when one imposes identiﬁca-
tion restrictions. The value of ﬁtting such an equation here, where our potential 
identiﬁers are severely limited, is low.
predicted probability of the average 
postreform recipient being employed 
in the postreform environment
′
′
predicted probability of the average 
prereform recipient being employed 
in the prereform environment
′
predicted probability of the average 
postreform recipient being employed 
in the prereform environment
*
n
j=1
*
*
predicted probability of the average 
postreform recipient being employed 
in the prereform environment
′
*
n
j=1

91
4
Job Stability for Welfare Recipients
A Comparison of Matched Job Spells
(Coauthored with Shiferaw Gurmu)
In this chapter, our focus is on the character of jobs obtained by 
welfare recipients during the 1990s in our six urban areas. We consider 
explicitly job stability and earnings within a job, and changes in these 
measures over time. As a benchmark, we also examine jobs obtained by 
workers who are not welfare recipients but are employed by the same 
employers as welfare recipients, allowing a control for the economy in 
the local areas.
A small literature has examined the dynamics of employment for 
welfare recipients, most of it focused on the period prior to welfare 
reform. Gault, Hartmann, and Yi (1999) show that, even in the 1980s, 
prior to the latest round of welfare reforms, work was common among 
welfare recipients. About a third of recipients worked while receiving 
welfare at some point over a two-year period, while a slightly smaller 
number were seeking work. Of those who did not work while receiving 
welfare, approximately half were individuals who cycled between work 
and welfare.
Mofﬁtt and Rangarajan (1989) compared wage proﬁles of welfare 
recipients to those for other single parents, showing that although wel-
fare recipients had lower earnings initially, their earnings increased over 
time, approaching those of nonwelfare individuals for many cohorts. 
Gladden and Taber (2000) examined the earnings-experience proﬁles of 
low-skilled individuals, considering the impact of welfare receipt. Their 
results conﬁrm the view that welfare recipients do not experience lower 
levels of wage growth than others once actual experience is controlled. 
These results, in conjunction with those of Loeb and Corcoran (2001), 
suggest that, insofar as welfare recipients experience lower levels of 
wage growth, this can be traced to their intermittent work history. 
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Our work differs from prior analyses in one important respect: We 
focus on a particular “job,” deﬁned as a continuing relationship between 
an employer and an employee. This approach allows us to examine and 
compare the importance of employee and employer characteristics, as 
we do in Chapter 5. Jobs are clearly the building blocks from which 
economic self-sufﬁciency is constructed, but it should be recognized 
that information about job stability and earnings provides only one part 
of the picture. An individual may move from one employer to another, 
obtaining continuous employment even if each job is short-lived. In 
addition, under some conditions, workers may beneﬁt when they leave 
a job, trading a low-wage job for one that is higher-paying or offers 
health insurance and other fringe beneﬁts. So, job instability may not 
always indicate a problem. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that a stable 
job with high earnings provides valuable beneﬁts to most individuals.
ANALYTICAL CONTEXT: EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS
It is important to provide some context for the analysis that follows. 
For our purposes, a job or job spell is deﬁned as one or more consecu-
tive quarters during which an individual receives earnings from a given 
employer. Since job stability is central in helping individuals leave wel-
fare, we examine job spells beginning during a quarter in which an 
individual is receiving welfare payments, but we follow that job even if 
it continues after the individual leaves welfare. For comparison, we also 
examine job spells of those not receiving welfare but who secured a job 
with the same employer during the same quarter.
Before turning to job spells, it is useful to examine employment 
levels of welfare recipients and the extent to which recipients enter jobs 
while receiving welfare. Our initial examination of the data showed that 
employment and new job entry are highly seasonal, reﬂecting general 
economic variation in the kinds of low-skill service and retail positions 
recipients are likely to hold. In ﬁve of our six sites, the smallest number 
of new jobs occurs in the ﬁrst quarter of the year, and the greatest num-
ber occurs in the third or fourth quarters, with this seasonal variation in 
the range of 5–10 percent. The exception is Fort Lauderdale, where the 
peak in new jobs occurs in the ﬁrst quarter, reﬂecting Florida’s distinc-
tive high tourist season. 
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Figure 4.1 provides information on the level of employment for 
welfare recipients over the period of the study in our six sites, presented 
as a four-quarter moving average to remove seasonal effects.1 This ﬁg-
ure represents the proportion of those on welfare who have jobs in that 
quarter, without regard to whether the job began in that quarter or a 
prior one, or whether the job began while the individual was receiving 
welfare. In each site, changes in the welfare system have encouraged 
or required recipients to seek employment, so it is not surprising that, 
consistent with national statistics, there has been growth in employment 
at all sites since 1994. Nonetheless, there are substantial differences 
among the sites, with Kansas City displaying higher employment levels 
than the other sites. In the early 1990s, welfare employment rates were 
approximately 20 percent in Baltimore and over 30 percent in Kansas 
City, with the other sites between these. By 1999, while the ranking re-
mained similar, welfare employment in Baltimore was over 30 percent, 
whereas employment in Kansas City was approaching 50 percent. The 
growth in employment in Houston was smaller than that at the other 
sites, with an increase only from 27 percent to 31 percent.
Figure 4.1  Employment Rate for Welfare Recipients (moving average)
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Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of employed recipients who are in 
a new job, also presented as a four-quarter moving average. It is well 
known that job turnover is high for welfare recipients, and the levels 
here conﬁrm the view that a substantial number of employed recipients 
are obtaining new jobs, i.e., they are in the ﬁrst quarter of a job spell. 
In Atlanta, Kansas City, Fort Lauderdale, and Houston, the proportions 
are in the range of 55 percent in the early 1990s, increasing gradually 
to nearly 65 percent by the end of the decade. In contrast, we see little 
change in the importance of new jobs in Chicago, where the proportion 
of new jobs remains slightly below 50 percent. Since our employment 
data for Chicago begin in 1996, a change could have occurred prior to 
that time.
An interesting pattern is observed in Baltimore, where the propor-
tion remains unchanged at around 50 percent through 1995. This shifts 
dramatically in 1996 and 1997, as the percentage of new jobs increases 
to over 60 percent, approaching that in Kansas City, Houston, and Fort 
Lauderdale. The pattern suggests that policy changes may have played 
Figure 4.2  Employed Recipients with New Job (moving average)
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
19
90
:1
19
90
:3
19
91
:1
19
91
:3
19
92
:1
19
92
:3
19
93
:1
19
93
:3
19
94
:1
19
94
:3
19
95
:1
19
95
:3
19
96
:1
19
96
:3
19
97
:1
19
97
:3
19
98
:1
19
98
:3
19
99
:1
19
99
:3
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 w
it
h 
ne
w
 jo
b
(4
-q
ua
rt
er
 m
ov
in
g 
av
er
ag
e)
Kansas City Atlanta Chicago
Baltimore Houston Fort Lauderdale
Job Stability for Welfare Recipients   95
a particularly important role in Baltimore. As noted in previous chap-
ters, in late 1995, Maryland implemented major welfare reform, the ﬁrst 
major policy change in the state increasing emphasis on employment.2 
JOB SPELLS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS
In order to examine job stability for welfare recipients, we con-
sider the characteristics of job spells, changes in those characteristics 
over time, and differences across sites. As noted above, a job spell is 
deﬁned as one or more consecutive quarters in which an individual re-
ceived earnings from one employer. A spell is deﬁned as a “welfare job 
spell” if the employee was a welfare recipient at any time during the 
ﬁrst quarter that she received earnings from a given employer. We do 
not require that the individual remain a recipient after the initial quar-
ter of employment. Since we expect that stable employment will cause 
many individuals to leave welfare, longer welfare job spells often in-
clude extended periods after the individual has left welfare. The job, as 
we deﬁne it here, is a particular match or relationship between a worker 
and an employer, which ends when the individual leaves (for whatever 
reason). It should not be confused with a position in a ﬁrm, which may 
exist independent of its incumbent. 
Figure 4.3 presents survival functions based on welfare job spells 
at each of the sites, aggregated over all the spells we observe that begin 
in the period 1992–1999.3 Survival functions estimate the probability 
that an event will last more than a speciﬁed period of time. We see that 
the probability that a job lasts more than one quarter varies from 45 
percent for Kansas City to 56 percent for Chicago. The basic shapes of 
the survival curves are similar at all sites, with the ranking in stability 
maintained over all job lengths. Jobs in Chicago are most stable, those 
in Baltimore, Fort Lauderdale, and Houston similar to one another and 
slightly less stable, those in Atlanta less stable still, and those in Kansas 
City least stable.4
One might ask whether the survival curve differences are driven by 
differences in the early chance of job loss, since sites differ so dramati-
cally on this dimension. Figure 4.4 presents the same data in terms of 
the hazard that a job spell will discontinue at each point in the spell. As 
expected, the hazard of job loss declines dramatically in the ﬁrst two 
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Figure 4.3  Survival for Welfare Job Spells
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years on the job, remaining in the neighborhood of 10 percent after that. 
It should be noted that because a job can begin at any time during the 
ﬁrst quarter, the calculated hazard of job loss is artiﬁcially depressed 
by our use of the standard hazard formula. A rough correction for this 
would imply that actual job loss hazard, following the ﬁrst quarter, 
would be twice the reported ﬁgures.5 
It is clear that the hazard of job loss is not only higher in Kansas 
City at the beginning of a job spell, but it remains at least slightly higher 
than at the other sites at greater spell lengths. Similarly, the likelihood 
of a job loss in Chicago remains lower. In short, there are consistent, if 
modest, differences in the stability of jobs across these sites.
All the analyses reported so far combine job spells beginning any 
time during the period 1992–1999. We also examined survival curves 
for welfare job spells sorted by the starting quarter and found basic 
shapes of these curves are very similar. Hazard functions are also ba-
sically similar to those for the full period. In order to summarize the 
changes over time and to compare sites, it is convenient to choose a 
single measure of job stability. Panel A of Figure 4.5 graphs the chance 
that a job spell survives for eight quarters (two years) or more, again 
Figure 4.4  Hazard of Job Loss for Welfare Job Spells
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Figure 4.5  Job Spell Chance of Survival Eight or More Quarters by Beginning Year
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sorted by starting quarter. (We return to panel B of Figure 4.5 later.)
Figure 4.5 underscores differences among the sites. The chance an 
individual will hold a job for two years is about 10 percent in Chicago 
but is less than half of that in Kansas City. Of the six sites, Kansas City 
and Baltimore exhibit the clearest changes over time. In Baltimore, the 
chance that a welfare job spell lasts two years declines from nearly 9 
percent in 1994–1995 to only 6 percent in 1998–1999. In Kansas City, 
the decline is from 5.5 percent in 1992–1993 to 3.2 percent in 1998–
1999. Changes in Atlanta are somewhat smaller, and those at the other 
sites are much more modest.6 Although unstable jobs are generally less 
desirable, if declines in stability are associated with an increase in vol-
untary turnover, this could indicate movement to more desirable jobs.
Table 4.1 provides information about earnings received by welfare 
recipients in a given job spell. As a measure of the overall quality of 
the job, we present the total real earnings provided by the job during its 
entire duration, or the ﬁrst eight quarters if it lasts more than eight quar-
ters.7 Also presented are measures of earnings per quarter. We see that 
earnings per quarter (e.g., line c) differ across sites, with Atlanta having 
appreciably lower earnings than the other sites. Some of the observed 
differences may be due to differences in cost of living, although it is 
unlikely that this explains much of the observed differences. As there is 
no accepted way to adjust for cost of living differences across our sites, 
we will focus on changes over time across sites, and on the relationship 
between the earnings of welfare recipients and others.8
In considering changes over time, we might expect that declines 
in stability would reduce total earnings, but this does not appear to be 
the case. In Kansas City, although Figure 4.5 implies a decline in job 
stability, the table shows that overall earnings for a job spell actually 
increased in the last period. We also see that while job stability did not 
change appreciably for Chicago welfare recipients, their total earnings 
increased dramatically. For both Kansas City and Chicago, the increase 
in earnings is driven by an increase in earnings per quarter. We also 
observe a modest improvement in earnings in Houston, whereas there 
is a decline in Atlanta, Baltimore, and Fort Lauderdale.9 Overall, we 
conclude that declines in job stability over time do not appear to signal 
a serious deterioration in the quality of jobs obtained by welfare recipi-
ents.
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Table 4.1  Earnings Measures for All Welfare Job Spells and Matching Spells
A. Welfare job spells B. Matching job spellsc C. Ratio welfare/match
Date spell begins 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
Atlanta
a. Total number of spells 23,953 38,158 37,455 23,567 37,767 37,055
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 513 479 499 818 836 859 0.63 0.57 0.58
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 1,022 1,001 1,037 1,486 1,536 1,569 0.69 0.65 0.66
d. Mean quarterly earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a 
629 575 597 950 905 957 0.66 0.64 0.62
e. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)b
2,370 1,998 2,096 3,950 3,607 3,851 0.60 0.55 0.54
Baltimore
a. Total number of spells 28,113 35,964 39,455 27,462 35,201 38,712
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,113 1,041 958 1,862 1,669 1,563 0.60 0.62 0.61
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,040 1,980 1,908 3,105 2,976 2,872 0.66 0.67 0.66
d. Mean quarterly earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
1,305 1,245 1,190 2,089 1,946 1,884 0.62 0.64 0.63
e. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)b
5,031 5,006 4,535 8,946 8,654 7,715 0.56 0.58 0.59
Job S
tability for W
elfare R
ecipients   101
Chicago
a. Total number of spells n/a 42,543 157,159 n/a 40,526 149,294
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) n/a 798 876 n/a 1,249 1,352 n/a 0.64 0.65
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) n/a 1,647 1,836 n/a 2,345 2,643 n/a 0.70 0.69
d. Mean quarterly earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
n/a 1,691 1,863 n/a 2,590 2,897 n/a 0.65 0.64
e. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)b
n/a 4,379 5,002 n/a 7,270 8,272 n/a 0.60 0.60
Fort Lauderdale
a. Total number of spells n/a 19,257 19,327 n/a 17,613 17,374
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) n/a 966 977 n/a 1,453 1,468 n/a 0.67 0.67
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) n/a 2,041 1,999 n/a 2,744 2,704 n/a 0.74 0.74
d. Mean quarterly earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
n/a 1,211 1,216 n/a 1,788 1,747 n/a 0.68 0.70
e. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)b
n/a 4,687 4,343 n/a 7,597 6,662 n/a 0.62 0.65
Houston
a. Total number of spells 45,129 77,280 30,364 44,211 75,790 29,838
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 874 845 878 1,390 1,446 1,318 0.63 0.58 0.67
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 1,695 1,768 1,825 2,539 2,533 2,588 0.67 0.70 0.71
d. Mean quarterly earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
2,147 2,185 2,262 3,228 3,192 3,299 0.67 0.68 0.69
e. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)b
4,048 4,052 4,274 7,691 7,260 7,349 0.53 0.56 0.58
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Table 4.1  (continued)
A. Welfare job spells B. Matching job spellsc C. Ratio welfare/match
Date spell begins 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
Kansas City
a. Total number of spells 22,822 35,601 35,086 22,492 35,073 34,618
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 773 751 828 1,184 1,130 1,313 0.65 0.66 0.63
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 1,655 1,670 1,850 2,438 2,359 2,682 0.68 0.71 0.69
d. Mean quarterly earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
940 905 1,004 1,482 1,403 1,603 0.63 0.65 0.63
e. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)b
3,316 3,061 3,423 6,310 5,876 6,569 0.53 0.52 0.52
NOTE: All earnings expressed in real dollars for 1999, quarter 4.
a Calculated for quarters with earnings.
b For a spell lasting less than eight quarters, this is the total earnings.
c Spells matched by employer and beginning quarter.
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MATCHED JOB SPELLS: COMPARISONS OF WELFARE 
RECIPIENTS AND OTHERS
In interpreting differences across sites and over time, it is difﬁcult 
to determine the relative role of the local economy and welfare policy. 
One might wish to have information on job spells for those who are 
not welfare recipients for comparison. Of course, a random sample of 
all jobs would be inappropriate for comparative purposes because wel-
fare recipients differ dramatically from the average job holder, both in 
terms of their demographic characteristics (e.g., sex, age, education) 
and in terms of family characteristics, since most recipients are single 
parents, by deﬁnition. Given that our data lack demographic informa-
tion on employees who are not welfare recipients, we cannot compare 
similar individuals.10
On the other hand, our data do allow us to address the question of 
how characteristics of the employer affect individual success. Research 
suggests that welfare recipients who obtain jobs in traditionally high-
paying and stable industries are much more likely to be successful in 
remaining employed (Bartik 1997). By matching workers on welfare 
with others working for the same employer, we control for industry and 
other differences between employers.
In order to control both for employer and the time when the job 
spell begins, for each welfare job spell we have chosen at random a job 
spell that begins in the same quarter with the same employer but for an 
employee who is not a welfare recipient. Of course, a small number of 
welfare recipients obtained jobs in such small ﬁrms that there are not 
enough other workers to provide matches, but we ﬁnd that over 95 per-
cent of job spells are matched by this process.
It should be stressed that this approach does not control for indi-
vidual characteristics or occupation, since most ﬁrms hire a wide range 
of workers. It also does not fully control for the geographic area, since 
some employers who hire welfare recipients hire workers at other 
plants/locations throughout the state.11 However, the matching process 
does capture the industrial structure of welfare recipients’ jobs, which 
differ dramatically from those of workers in general. Welfare recipients 
are much more likely to be working in ﬁrms classiﬁed as service and 
retail trade. Since these ﬁrms tend to hire low-skill, female workers, the 
matching provides some degree of control for these characteristics.
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When we examine this matched set of job spells for each site, we 
ﬁnd that the shapes of the survival and hazard functions are qualitative-
ly similar to those for welfare recipients, although nonwelfare workers 
are much more likely to have stable employment. The survival function 
for the matched spells is higher everywhere, conﬁrming the view that 
those who are not welfare recipients experience consistently greater job 
stability, even when they obtain jobs with the same employers during 
the same quarter. 
Panel B of Figure 4.5 presents the chance that a matched job spell 
will last eight quarters or more. Most striking is the fact that the changes 
over time in a given site are similar for welfare job spells and matched 
nonwelfare job spells. The chance that a matching job spell will last 
eight quarters is declining in Kansas City and Baltimore, following the 
same pattern observed for welfare job spells. This suggests that the pat-
terns observed over time cannot be attributed primarily to the structure 
of welfare reform.
The relationships between welfare and matching spells are some-
what different across sites. If we compare welfare and matched job 
spells by taking the ratio of the chance that a spell will last eight quar-
ters (panels A and B of Figure 4.5), we ﬁnd that it is as low as 0.5 for 
Kansas City, around 0.7 for Baltimore and Houston, and over 0.8 for 
Chicago and Fort Lauderdale. In Atlanta, the ratio shifts over time, with 
an initial ratio of 0.8, declining to 0.65 in the last period. However, 
when we focus on earnings, these differences are less striking. Panel B 
in Table 4.1 presents total earnings (up to eight quarters) for matched 
nonwelfare job spells, and panel C indicates the ratio between earnings 
for welfare job spells and matched spells. Comparing total earnings re-
ceived during the spell (row e), we see that its lowest value is 0.52, for 
Kansas City in 1994–1995 and 1996–1997, and its maximum is 0.65, 
for Fort Lauderdale in 1996–1997.
The similarities in the observed patterns across the sites are clearly 
more striking than the differences. Welfare recipients’ job spells pro-
vide lower levels of earnings both because they are shorter and because 
they provide lower earnings each quarter. For example, during the ﬁrst 
quarter of the spell, recipients earn about two-thirds as much as those 
in matched spells.12 The number is slightly higher in the second quarter, 
suggesting that when recipients hold jobs through the second quarter, 
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their relative earnings increase. It is clear that welfare recipients land 
very different jobs with a given employer than do others.
One obvious question is whether welfare recipients who manage to 
keep their jobs do as well as others. Table 4.2 provides a partial answer 
to this question. In constructing this table, we have selected all welfare 
job spells that extend for at least three quarters. Similarly, we have se-
lected among matched spells those that last at least three quarters.13 The 
second quarter for both sets of spells is “interior,” so that earnings are 
not reduced because the job began or ended during the quarter. Panel C 
indicates that earnings in the second quarter for welfare job spells (row 
c) are 23 to 33 percent below those in the sample of matched spells.
What we have seen here conﬁrms the view that welfare recipients 
have markedly different job experiences, even when they work for the 
same employer, and that their earnings do not approach those of non-
welfare workers even if they keep a job for three quarters. The character 
of the results differs very little across our sites. Perhaps most surprising, 
we see little evidence that the relationship between welfare recipient 
jobs and jobs of others is changing over time, even in the face of dra-
matic welfare policy changes. Most of the variation over time in the job 
experiences of welfare recipients is paralleled in those for the matched 
spells of those not receiving welfare. Labor market structures rather 
than welfare policies appear to be determining here, but we still need 
to explore the extent to which these differences are real under stricter 
matching procedures.
Job Spells Matched by Earnings
Given the dramatic differences in earnings between welfare recipi-
ents and others working for the same employer, we consider the degree 
to which welfare recipients’ disadvantages can be traced to the kinds 
of jobs they obtain. Since our data do not provide us with informa-
tion about the occupational classiﬁcation or hourly wage of a welfare 
recipient’s job, we have chosen to match recipients’ job spells with 
job spells for other workers by the earnings received initially on the 
job. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst quarter does not provide a good measure 
of expected earnings in subsequent quarters. Since a job does not nec-
essarily begin at the start of the quarter, matching by initial earnings 
would match low-wage workers who worked for the full quarter with 
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Table 4.2  Earnings Measures for Welfare Job Spells and Matching Spells of Length 3 or Greater
A. Welfare job spells B. Matching job spellsb C. Ratio welfare/match
Date spell begins 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
Atlanta
a. Total number of spells 6,366 8,681 8,333 7,014 10,274 9,899
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 818 836 859 1,298 1,342 1,399 0.63 0.62 0.61
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 1,486 1,536 1,569 2,115 2,179 2,333 0.70 0.70 0.67
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 1,287 1,296 1,338 1,878 1,962 2,095 0.69 0.66 0.64
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
1,355 1,373 1,412 1,947 2,017 2,158 0.70 0.68 0.65
f. Mean of total wages in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
7,236 6,927 7,369 11,191 11,164 12,060 0.65 0.62 0.61
Baltimore
a. Total number of spells 8,263 10,917 11,469 9,430 12,292 12,523
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,780 1,661 1,496 3,039 2,724 2,480 0.59 0.61 0.60
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,828 2,746 2,699 4,135 4,007 3,933 0.68 0.69 0.69
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 2,538 2,430 2,382 3,807 3,637 3,610 0.67 0.67 0.66
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
2,881 2,803 2,767 4,194 4,030 4,024 0.69 0.70 0.69
f. Mean of total wages in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
14,301 13,973 12,965 22,725 21,843 20,429 0.63 0.64 0.63
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Chicago
a. Total number of spells of length 3 
or greater
n/a 13034 51520 n/a 14192 53813
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) n/a 1,249 1,335 n/a 1,916 2,164 n/a 0.65 0.62
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) n/a 2,335 2,552 n/a 3,229 3,655 n/a 0.72 0.70
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) n/a 2,088 2,283 n/a 2,954 3,377 n/a 0.71 0.68
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
n/a 3,612 3,906 n/a 5,244 5,911 n/a 0.69 0.66
f. Mean of total wages in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
n/a 13,973 12,965 n/a 21,843 20,429 n/a 0.64 0.63
Fort Lauderdale
a. Total number of spells n/a 5,439 5,191 n/a 5,731 5,250
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) n/a 1,551 1,488 n/a 2,338 2,387 n/a 0.66 0.62
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) n/a 2,837 2,751 n/a 3,749 3,737 n/a 0.76 0.74
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) n/a 2,538 2,492 n/a 3,465 3,481 n/a 0.73 0.72
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
n/a 2,870 2,820 n/a 3,827 3,797 n/a 0.75 0.74
f. Mean of total wages in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
n/a 13,832 12,968 n/a 20,308 18,426 n/a 0.68 0.70
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Table 4.2  (continued)
A. Welfare job spells B. Matching job spellsb C. Ratio welfare/match
Date spell begins 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
Houston
a. Total number of spells 12,063 20,136 7,444 14,183 22,677 8,051
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,276 1,283 1,297 1,923 1,895 1,836 0.66 0.68 0.71
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,382 2,483 2,504 3,319 3,332 3,277 0.72 0.75 0.76
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 2,071 2,097 2,116 3,040 2,934 2,875 0.68 0.71 0.74
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
2,439 2,510 2,547 3,500 3,372 3,356 0.70 0.74 0.76
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
10,907 10,607 10,021 17,626 15,627 14,034 0.62 0.68 0.71
Kansas City
a. Total number of spells 5,228 7,030 7,200 6,826 9,717 9,895
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,312 1,358 1,500 1,973 1,987 2,257 0.67 0.68 0.66
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,504 2,659 2,896 3,480 3,468 3,833 0.72 0.77 0.76
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 2,103 2,226 2,431 3,001 3,089 3,351 0.70 0.72 0.73
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
2,548 2,711 2,957 3,490 3,526 3,869 0.73 0.77 0.76
f. Mean of total wages in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
11,510 11,975 13,022 17,909 18,151 19,507 0.64 0.66 0.67
NOTE: All earnings expressed in real dollars for 1999:4.
a For spells lasting less than eight quarters, this is total earnings.
b Spells with three or more quarters among all spells matched by employer and beginning quarters.
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high-wage workers who worked only a portion of the quarter. Similarly, 
for any job that lasts only two quarters, the second quarter most likely 
reﬂects earnings over only a portion of the quarter. Hence, we limit con-
sideration to welfare job spells that last at least three quarters, matching 
second quarter earnings only.
In limiting consideration to job spells lasting at least three quarters, 
we are only focusing on the most stable job spells of welfare recipients. 
As indicated in Figure 4.3, in Kansas City, only 20 percent of spells last 
this long; in the other sites, the proportion is between 23 and 32 percent. 
The matching method is similar to that indicated above. For each wel-
fare job spell lasting at least three quarters, we examine job spells last-
ing at least three quarters for individuals hired by the same employer in 
the same quarter who are not welfare recipients. The matching spell is 
the one with second quarter earnings that are as close as possible to the 
second quarter earnings for the welfare job spell. If no matching spell 
exists for which earnings are within $150 of the welfare spell, we omit 
that welfare spell from further analysis. Across the sites, we eliminated 
between 20 and 30 percent of welfare job spells lasting at least three 
quarters because no appropriate match was available.14
When we observed the survival functions for welfare and other job 
spells matched by earnings, it was clear that differences were smaller 
than those based on the simple match. Some basic information on the 
job spells matched by earnings is provided in Table 4.3. We ﬁrst con-
sider the extent to which the matching actually produced spells with 
the same earnings in the second quarter. We see for all sites that mean 
earnings in the second quarter are within $2 for the welfare job spells 
and spells matched to them (compare row c for panels A and B), show-
ing that, as a mechanical matter, the matching is successful. When we 
look at ﬁrst quarter earnings, we see that welfare recipients earn 4 to 8 
percent less than their nonwelfare counterparts in that quarter (row b in 
panel C). Earnings in the third quarter are within 5 percent in all sites, 
with most sites within 2 percent (row d). This implies that once we have 
controlled for (or matched on) earnings in a given quarter, earnings in 
the following quarter are very similar. If we look at earnings in a typical 
quarter, they are also quite close (row e).
As a measure of the overall value of a job, we consider the total 
earnings obtained for the life of the job or, for jobs lasting more than 
eight quarters, for the ﬁrst eight quarters (row f). The difference be-
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Table 4.3  Earnings Measures for Welfare Job Spells of Length 3 or Greater and Nonwelfare Spells Matched by 
Second Quarter Earnings
A. Welfare job spells B. Matching job spellsb C. Ratio welfare/match
Date spell begins 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
Atlanta
a. Total number of spells 5,111 7,112 6,498 5,111 7,112 6,498
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 789 812 856 855 870 914 0.92 0.93 0.94
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 1,426 1,483 1,567 1,427 1,484 1,568 1.00 1.00 1.00
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 1,243 1,258 1,328 1,269 1,297 1,375 0.98 0.97 0.97
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
1,306 1,330 1,406 1,313 1,363 1,450 0.99 0.98 0.97
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
6,968 6,788 7,405 7,018 7,027 7,673 0.99 0.97 0.97
Baltimore
a. Total number of spells of length 
3 or greater
5,556 7,600 8,451 5,556 7,600 8,451
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,782 1,655 1,461 1,912 1,784 1,577 0.93 0.93 0.93
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,751 2,702 2,637 2,752 2,703 2,637 1.00 1.00 1.00
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 2,475 2,403 2,316 2,517 2,422 2,370 0.98 0.99 0.98
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
2,811 2,758 2,694 2,843 2,784 2,739 0.99 0.99 0.98
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
14,213 13,932 12,669 14,585 14,095 13,005 0.97 0.99 0.97
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Chicago
a. Total number of spells of length 
3 or greater
n/a 9292 36085 n/a 9292 36085
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) n/a 1,193 1,297 n/a 1,267 1,357 n/a 0.94 0.96
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) n/a 2,247 2,481 n/a 2,248 2,481 n/a 1.00 1.00
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) n/a 2,004 2,206 n/a 2,041 2,238 n/a 0.98 0.99
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
n/a 2,634 2,853 n/a 2,687 2,888 n/a 0.98 0.99
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
n/a 11,994 12,884 n/a 12,336 13,161 n/a 0.97 0.98
Fort Lauderdale
a. Total number of spells n/a 1,960 2,067 n/a 1,960 2,067
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) n/a 1,480 1,420 n/a 1,564 1,488 n/a 0.95 0.95
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) n/a 2,720 2,686 n/a 2,722 2,687 n/a 1.00 1.00
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) n/a 2,291 2,307 n/a 2,414 2,409 n/a 0.95 0.96
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
n/a 2,224 2,215 n/a 2,342 2,289 n/a 0.95 0.97
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
n/a 12,380 11,553 n/a 13,607 12,286 n/a 0.91 0.94
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Table 4.3  (continued)
A. Welfare job spells B. Matching job spellsb C. Ratio welfare/match
Date spell begins 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
Houston
a. Total number of spells 9,345 16,163 11,353 9,345 16,163 11,353
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,223 1,235 1,283 1,301 1,307 1,379 0.94 0.94 0.93
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,284 2,404 2,526 2,285 2,405 2,527 1.00 1.00 1.00
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 2,019 2,056 2,214 2,061 2,127 2,256 0.98 0.97 0.98
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
2,354 2,446 2,614 2,382 2,492 2,658 0.99 0.98 0.98
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
11,232 11,204 12,014 11,618 11,951 12,600 0.97 0.94 0.95
Kansas City
a. Total number of spells 3,569 4,814 5,008 3,569 4,814 5,008
b. Mean earnings in 1st quarter ($) 1,257 1,325 1,488 1,362 1,413 1,598 0.92 0.94 0.93
c. Mean earnings in 2nd quarter ($) 2,440 2,629 2,871 2,441 2,629 2,871 1.00 1.00 1.00
d. Mean earnings in 3rd quarter ($) 2,016 2,176 2,410 2,156 2,249 2,499 0.94 0.97 0.96
e. Mean quarterly earnings in all 
interior quarters ($)
2,481 2,669 2,929 2,517 2,713 2,954 0.99 0.98 0.99
f. Mean of total earnings in 1st 8 
quarters ($)a
11,075 11,824 12,974 12,231 12,985 13,963 0.91 0.91 0.93
NOTE: All earnings expressed in real dollars for 1999:4.
a For spells lasting less than eight quarters, this is total earnings.
b Spells matched by employer, beginning quarter and second quarter earnings.
Job Stability for Welfare Recipients   113
tween earnings for welfare and nonwelfare spells is greatest in Fort 
Lauderdale and Kansas City, where it approaches 10 percent. The dif-
ference is 3–6 percent in Houston, and only 1–3 percent in Atlanta, 
Baltimore, and Chicago.15
Figure 4.6 presents the likelihood that a job spell will last eight or 
more quarters for welfare and nonwelfare job spells matched by earn-
ings for the four time periods we have considered. Note that since prob-
abilities are contingent on the spell lasting at least three quarters, the 
numbers are much higher than those for all spells (Figure 4.5): both 
welfare and nonwelfare job spells are relatively stable representatives 
of their respective groups. There are some differences among the sites. 
For Baltimore and Chicago, there are almost no differences between job 
spells of welfare recipients and their matches. For example, for the pe-
riod 1996–1997 in Chicago, the chance that a welfare job spell will last 
at least eight quarters is 31.5 percent, whereas the chance for matching 
spells is only marginally higher at 31.9 percent. For Houston, the dif-
ference is in the range of 2–3 percentage points, still modest. In Kansas 
City, the difference is in the range of 4–6 percentage points, with the 
greatest difference in the ﬁnal period. The difference in Fort Lauderdale 
is 6 points in the earliest period, but the relationship actually reverses 
in the ﬁnal period.
Figure 4.6 also shows that time trends for job spells matched by 
earnings parallel those for all job spells (Figure 4.5). This indicates that 
the patterns reported in the previous section are not driven solely by dif-
ferences in spell survival over the ﬁrst three quarters of the spell, since 
all spells used in Figure 4.6 are at least three quarters in length.
The results for Atlanta are somewhat anomalous. For two of the 
four periods, the chance that a welfare job spell will last at least eight 
quarters is actually greater than that for matching spells, with this dif-
ference substantial in the most recent period. These results imply that, 
in the ﬁnal period, welfare recipients have a 23 percent chance of re-
maining in a job for at least eight quarters as compared with only 18 
percent for those in matching jobs. We are not sure what to make of this 
anomaly.
We turn next to several comparisons that allow us to quantify the 
extent to which matching by earnings captures job differences.
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Figure 4.6  Job Spell Chance of Survival Eight or More Quarters by Beginning Year for Spells Matched by Earnings
Panel A: Welfare Spells 
Length at Least 3
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999
Panel B: Nonwelfare Spells
Matched by Earnings
1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999
Atlanta Chicago
Baltimore Fort Lauderdale
Houston Kansas City
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Comparison of Simple Matching and Matching by Earnings
A natural question to ask is the extent to which matching by earnings 
removes differences between welfare recipients’ job experiences and 
those of others. Table 4.4 reports the ratio of earnings for welfare recipi-
ent job spells and others when various matching criteria are considered, 
using job spells from 1992 through 1997 as available at each site. The 
ﬁrst column shows that, over the course of a job, welfare recipients earn 
between 52 and 63 percent as much as others who obtained jobs with 
the same employers in the same quarter. When we limit consideration 
to jobs that last at least three quarters, the ﬁgure increases to an average 
of about 65 percent (column 2). When job spells are matched by second 
quarter earnings, the number increases to over 90 percent.
Of course, the ﬁnding that matching by earnings reduces the dif-
ference in earnings between welfare recipients and others is partly an 
arithmetic necessity, since earnings in the second quarter are part of the 
earnings being measured. Columns 4–6 show that ﬁrst quarter differ-
ences follow a very similar pattern, conﬁrming that matching by sec-
ond quarter earnings identiﬁes jobs that provide similar earnings in all 
quarters.
To what degree does matching by earnings remove or account for 
differences in job stability? Table 4.5 compares expected job spell length 
for welfare recipients and matched nonwelfare spells, based on survival 
estimates for each site.16 The ﬁrst two columns show that welfare recipi-
ents’ job spells are generally between 0.4 and 0.8 quarters shorter than 
are matched spells, a difference of 15 to 30 percent. The exception is 
Fort Lauderdale, where the difference is only 0.2 quarters.
Since we can match by earnings only for jobs lasting at least three 
quarters, it is useful to focus on spells for such jobs. Columns 4–6 show 
that in ﬁve of the six sites there remain notable differences in expected 
spell length even contingent on the spell lasting for at least three quar-
ters. This conﬁrms our earlier conclusion that welfare recipients are in 
jobs that are less stable even after an initial trial period. 
A substantial portion of these differences is explained by differenc-
es in earnings. Once jobs are matched by second quarter earnings (col-
umns 7–9), we see that the differences in expected spell length decline 
markedly.17 Column 10 reports the percentage decline in the difference, 
a measure of the extent to which the earnings match explains this dif-
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Table 4.4  Earnings Ratios of Welfare Job Spells and Matching Spells with Alternative Matching Criteria,  
Spells 1992–1997
Ratio of total earnings for welfare 
job spells and matching spells
Ratio of ﬁrst-quarter earnings for 
welfare job spells and matching spells
Cumulative 
 conditions 
 on spells 
Spells matched 
by employer 
and quarter 
(1)
Length of 
3 or more 
quarters 
(2)
Matched by 
2nd-quarter 
earnings 
(3)
Spells matched 
by employer 
and quarter 
(4)
Length of 
3 or more 
quarters 
(5)
Matched by 
2nd-quarter 
earnings 
(6)
Atlanta 0.56 0.62 0.97 0.59 0.62 0.93
Baltimore 0.58 0.63 0.98 0.61 0.60 0.93
Chicago 0.60 0.64 0.98 0.65 0.62 0.95
Fort Lauderdale 0.63 0.69 0.92 0.67 0.64 0.95
Houston 0.55 0.66 0.95 0.61 0.68 0.94
Kansas City 0.52 0.66 0.92 0.65 0.67 0.93
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Table 4.5  Expected Spell Length in Quarters for All Available Spells, 1992–1999
All spells Contingent on length at least 3
Spells matched by earnings Percent 
explained 
by earnings 
matcha 
(10)
Welfare 
job spells 
(1)
Matched 
spells 
(2)
Difference 
(3)
Welfare job 
spells 
(4)
Matched 
spells 
(5)
Difference 
(6)
Welfare 
job spells 
(7)
Matched 
spells 
(8)
Difference 
(9)
Atlanta 2.77 3.20 0.43 7.62 8.08 0.46 7.89 7.63 −0.26 157
Baltimore 3.02 3.48 0.45 7.13 7.64 0.50 7.18 7.20 0.02 95
Chicago 3.48 3.83 0.34 7.98 8.29 0.31 8.11 8.20 0.09 72
Fort Lauderdale 2.90 3.10 0.20 7.16 7.02 −0.13 6.29 6.84 0.54 —
Houston 2.90 3.66 0.75 6.80 8.16 1.36 7.84 8.38 0.54 60
Kansas City 2.34 3.15 0.81 6.41 7.73 1.33 6.39 7.26 0.86 35
a Calculated as 100 × (column 6 − column 9) / column 6.
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ference. There is substantial variation across sites. In Kansas City the 
difference declines by about a third, and in Houston it declines by three-
ﬁfths. The decline is 72 percent in Chicago and fully 95 percent in Bal-
timore; in Atlanta, the relative spell lengths reverse, with welfare jobs 
actually estimated to last slightly longer than matched nonwelfare jobs. 
In Fort Lauderdale, matching by earnings reveals a gap that was not ap-
parent in the simple comparisons.18
We conclude that in Atlanta, Chicago, and Baltimore, welfare re-
cipients who remain on a job at least three quarters have jobs that are 
almost indistinguishable—in terms of job stability and expected earn-
ings—from others working for the same employers who have similar 
initial earnings. In contrast, welfare recipients have substantially less 
stable jobs than nonwelfare individuals with initially comparable jobs 
in Fort Lauderdale, Kansas City, and Houston. 
CONCLUSIONS
These results conﬁrm the view that not only do welfare recipients 
suffer less stable employment than others, but this is, in part, a function 
of lower levels of stability in the particular jobs they hold. Our analy-
sis shows that this difference cannot be attributed to industry or other 
employer characteristics, since differences remain large when welfare 
recipients are matched with nonwelfare individuals working for the 
same employers. The difference between welfare recipients and others 
is marked across all of our sites. As noted above, some of the difference 
may be accounted for by the fact that welfare recipients of necessity 
must deal with child care and a number of other challenges as poor 
single parents that nonwelfare workers may not be faced with. Lacking 
demographic and family information for our nonwelfare matches, we 
cannot fully account for such differences.
In all sites, we observe modest declines over time in the apparent 
stability of jobs for welfare recipients, but these are similar to declines 
observed for nonwelfare jobs with the same employers, so it appears 
that these are not attributable to welfare reform. Perhaps equally impor-
tant, even in the face of declines in job stability, earnings declined little 
or not at all in most sites, suggesting that growing instability does not 
reﬂect declines in job quality.
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As expected, when welfare recipients’ jobs were matched with other 
jobs with the same employers providing similar earnings, observed dif-
ferences in job stability declined markedly. In three of our sites, substan-
tial differences remain, implying that even when welfare recipients have 
the same job, their chance of remaining with that job for an extended pe-
riod is smaller. Nonetheless, the variation across jobs for welfare recipi-
ents clearly dwarfs differences between welfare recipients and others. 
The next chapter focuses on the extent to which recipient and employer 
characteristics contribute to the observed success on a job.
Notes
 1.  We index the moving average by the third quarter of the year for which the aver-
age applies. The employment data for Fort Lauderdale are missing in 1995:3 and 
1997:2. Moving averages for periods including these quarters merely omit them 
from the average.
 2.  This also corresponds to the implementation of a new data management system, 
and the shift may reﬂect incompatibilities between systems.
 3.  Survival and hazard calculations are consistent with normal life table methods, 
although we have treated censored data in a slightly different way than is con-
ventional to reﬂect the character of our data. We write the conditional probability 
that the spell is terminated at t quarters as
   q
t
 = (d
t 
−
 
w
t 
) / (n
t
− w
t 
) ,
  where d
t
 is the number of spells terminating at length t, n
t
 is the number of spells 
of length t or greater, and w
t
 is the number of spells of length t but which are 
censored at that length because data for quarter t + 1 are not available. This treat-
ment of censored spells differs from the conventional approach in that here all 
censored spells are removed from the risk set. The conventional formula assumes 
that censored observations can be distinguished from spells where the event of 
interest occurs. In our data, when a spell is censored at length t because data for 
quarter t + 1 are unavailable, this wipes out all information about whether the job 
terminated due to job loss in quarter t. Hence, the formula above, which we use, 
ignores all spells that are censored in quarter t.
  The survival function is calculated as
   S(t) = Π t
j=1
 (1 − q
j
).
  The hazard of job loss we report is calculated in the usual way using the quarter 
as the time unit,
   h
t
 = q
t
  / (1− q
t
 /2).
120 King and Mueser
  This approximation is based on the assumption that the hazard of job loss is 
constant throughout quarter t. For t > 1, this is a reasonable approximation in our 
data, but it is not correct for t = 1 because jobs do not generally begin at the start 
of the quarter. We discuss this issue below.
 4.  Missing data in quarters 1995:3 and 1997:2 in Fort Lauderdale required special 
attention. Survival and hazard calculations omit any spell beginning in a quarter 
for which data are missing as well as spells beginning in the following quarter, 
since it is not possible to determine whether employment ﬁrst observed in the 
following quarter actually began in that quarter. We used the ratio for the spell 
length distribution observed for spells with available data to determine the num-
ber of spells terminating during the two quarters hidden by the missing data. 
We also used an additional correction to account for the possibility that a spell 
spanning a quarter with missing data actually discontinued prior to the missing 
quarter but that the individual began a new job spell with the same employer im-
mediately after the missing quarter, based on experiments in which we omitted a 
quarter of actual data.
 5.  We have chosen not to adjust the ﬁrst-quarter hazard rate for the expected date 
of job start because there are clearly other serious inaccuracies that are relevant 
in the ﬁrst period. It is known that the hazard of job loss increases after the ﬁrst 
few weeks on a job, followed by a dramatic decline. Since the biases are similar 
across sites, there is no difﬁculty in comparing ﬁrst-period hazards.
 6. For these analyses, only job spells that could last a full eight quarters can be 
included, and so spells used in the analysis for the period 1998–1999 differ by 
site according to data availability. For Baltimore, Fort Lauderdale, and Kansas 
City, only spells beginning in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 are included. For Chicago, 
spells beginning in the ﬁrst three quarters of 1998 are included, and for Atlanta, 
spells beginning in 1998 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 are included. No informa-
tion on spells beginning in Houston in 1998 or 1999 is available. Houston data 
for 1996–1997 include only information on spells beginning through the ﬁrst 
quarter of 1997.
 7. All reported earnings have been adjusted to real dollars for the fourth quarter of 
1999 based on the U.S. Consumer Price Index for urban consumers. As in the 
previous analyses, in Houston, information on job spells as reported in Tables 4.1 
and 4.2 extends only through the ﬁrst quarter of 1997.
 8.  There is no government-sanctioned measure comparable to the Consumer Price 
Index that attempts to capture cost of living differences across cities in the Unit-
ed States. One commercially produced index suggests that, among our sites, cost 
of living is highest in Fort Lauderdale, nearly 30 percent above the U.S. aver-
age, with Chicago about 20 percent above the national average, and Atlanta 10 
percent above the national average. Our other sites are 5 to 10 percent below 
the national average (http://houseandhome.msn.com). These cost-of-living es-
timates bear little relation to observed differences in earnings reported in Table 
4.1. It should be recognized that not only are such measures crude, but they are 
not designed to reﬂect the costs faced by welfare recipients.
 9.  As above, special calculations were necessary to obtain earnings measures in 
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Fort Lauderdale because of missing data in two quarters. We omit any spell be-
ginning in a missing quarter or any spell beginning in the following quarter. 
For job spells beginning in other quarters, we constructed the spell omitting the 
missing quarters of data, allowing a job to span across the missing quarter. For all 
analyses in which second quarter earnings were matched, we omitted any spell 
with a second quarter corresponding to the quarter with missing data. For analy-
ses reported in Tables 4.1–4.3, which require measures of earnings for each job, 
we substituted data from other spells in Fort Lauderdale as follows: For a spell 
missing earnings data in a particular quarter, we selected spells beginning within 
the same general time period (1992–1993, 1994–1995, or 1996–1997) that were 
of the same length as the spell in question and with the same welfare status, ﬁll-
ing in the data from a random spell. Where we were unsure of the length of the 
spell because the spell ended immediately prior to a missing quarter, we matched 
the spell randomly with a spell from a population containing spells of both pos-
sible lengths, taking from the matching spell both the spell length, and, when 
necessary, the missing earnings information.
 10.  Chapter 5 examines the impact of individual and employer characteristics on job 
stability for welfare recipients. 
 11.  Employers are deﬁned according to the account maintained in the state unem-
ployment insurance program. In general, all employees of a ﬁrm within a state 
are deﬁned as being employed by a single employer, while employees outside the 
state are excluded.
 12.  Even if weekly earnings were the same for welfare recipients and those in 
matched job spells, we would expect welfare recipients to earn less in the initial 
quarter since they are more likely to leave the job during the quarter. Calcula-
tions show that if the only difference were due to such differential stability, earn-
ings in the ﬁrst quarter for welfare recipients would be within 10 percent of the 
earnings for others.
 13.  Unlike the comparison provided in Table 4.3, the two groups are not perfectly 
matched by employer. 
 14.  In most sites, earnings decline by 1 to 5 percent due to dropping these spells, 
although declines in Chicago and Fort Lauderdale are over 10 percent in some 
periods. In the case of Fort Lauderdale, we omitted spells when data were not 
available for certain quarters, and this may reﬂect weaknesses in our methods of 
dealing with this problem. 
 15.  The data used in this analysis for Houston require additional comment. We made 
a special data request to undertake matching by earnings, and we were able to ob-
tain information on spells that began as late as the third quarter of 1998. Hence, 
in contrast to statistics reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, in which Houston data 
extend only through the ﬁrst quarter of 1997, in Table 4.3, spells beginning in 
all quarters of 1996–1997 are included. Spells underlying the Houston analysis 
reported in Figure 4.6 extend through the third quarter of 1998. 
 16.  Expected spell length in Table 4.5 is calculated as the expected number of quar-
ters an observed job will last, based on the survival function calculated from all 
available spells 1992–1999 at a particular site. The measure is extrapolated to a 
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  40-year working life based on the assumption that the geometric mean survival 
function in the last 10 quarters applies to the remainder of the 40 years. 
 17.  Columns 4 and 7 in Table 4.5 both refer to welfare job spells, but they may differ 
at all sites because only spells that could be matched are included in column 7. In 
Fort Lauderdale and Houston, because data on earnings were missing for certain 
quarters, the matching sample was further restricted.
 18.  Recall that, in Fort Lauderdale, missing earnings data in two quarters required 
that we apply special methods.
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Explaining Job Stability 
for Welfare Recipients
(Coauthored with Shiferaw Gurmu)
In the previous chapter, we examined the structure of the job spells 
of welfare recipients in our six sites, comparing them with job spells 
for others working for the same employers. This chapter focuses on 
the determinants of job stability, earnings within a job, and changes in 
the determinants of job stability over time. The analysis considers ﬁrst 
the basic demographic factors inﬂuencing job stability and the impact 
of employer industry. We also control for personal characteristics by 
examining those individuals who held multiple jobs; we control for em-
ployer characteristics by examining job spells of different workers with 
the same employers.
These analyses allow us to shed light on the important question of 
how important it is for welfare recipients to obtain “good” jobs. One 
polar view suggests that the job an individual lands is of little or no im-
portance because the source of job instability is the individual. Accord-
ing to this view, even if welfare recipients get good jobs, they will lose 
them in short order because of behavioral, skill, or other personal is-
sues. The opposing view is that instability is a characteristic of the job, 
so that if welfare recipients can obtain stable jobs, perhaps those with 
“good” employers, they will be able to achieve stable employment.
While our results conﬁrm the importance of individual factors, they 
show that industry and other employer characteristics are important de-
terminants of job stability. This suggests that although individual char-
acteristics and behaviors have important impacts on stability, it is also 
the case that “jobs matter.” We also examine changes in the determi-
nants of job stability over the 1990s, ﬁnding that changes are relatively 
modest. Finally, we examine the determinants of earnings on a job for 
welfare recipients, considering how earnings and job stability across 
industries are related. We conﬁrm that stable jobs generally provide 
higher earnings, although there are some notable exceptions.
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METHODS
Our deﬁnition of a job spell is the same as that in the previous chap-
ter: one or more consecutive quarters in which an individual received 
earnings from a particular employer. The analysis will be limited to 
welfare job spells, those for which the employee was a welfare recipient 
during the ﬁrst quarter that she received earnings from the employer. 
We do not require that the individual remain a recipient after the initial 
quarter of employment.
Our concern in this analysis focuses on the factors that produce 
stable employment. In the previous chapter, we examined the survival 
functions for job spells, ﬁnding that—across sites and over time—even 
when survival curves differed substantially, they seldom crossed. This 
implies that the relative stability of groups of spells can be ranked by 
average length. In the analysis here, our measure of job stability will 
be the length of the job spell, measured in quarters, truncated at eight 
quarters. Among welfare job spells, about half of all spells last just one 
quarter, while fewer than 1 in 10 lasts for eight quarters or more. For 
some of our analyses we also examine the total earnings during the life 
of a job, up to eight quarters, with earnings adjusted for inﬂation.1
Table 5.1 provides means and standard deviations for the sample of 
spells that we will be examining at each of the sites. Recall that an indi-
vidual can contribute more than one spell to this sample, and spells for 
a given person may be overlapping. The mean spell length varies from 
2.06 quarters in Kansas City to 2.65 quarters in Chicago, with a stan-
dard deviation of around 2 in all sites.2 There are also substantial differ-
ences in earnings across sites, with rankings corresponding largely to 
those of spell length.
Means for age and number of children in a family and the propor-
tion with high school degree (where available) are remarkably similar 
across the sites.3 In contrast, the proportion of the spells coded minority 
differs across sites, ranging from 75 percent in Kansas City to 97 per-
cent in Atlanta. Equally important, although not identiﬁed in the table, 
in Atlanta, Baltimore, and Kansas City, almost all of the minority re-
cipients are black, whereas in Chicago, Houston, and Fort Lauderdale, 
a substantial portion is Hispanic.
The lower portion of Table 5.1 provides information on the indus-
trial structure of employment for each of the sites. The industries iden-
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tiﬁed correspond to one-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) 
codes, except that certain detailed industries have been separated out 
because they each account for a relatively large share of welfare re-
cipients. In particular, employment for SIC major group 58, eating and 
drinking places, has been tabulated separately, accounting for between 
9 and 17 percent of all spells at our sites; the remainder of retail trade 
accounts for up to 19 percent of spells. In all sites, upwards of half of 
recipients’ spells are in ﬁrms classiﬁed as service, so we have divided 
service industry jobs into four categories: hotels and motels, temporary 
help ﬁrms, nursing homes, and other service ﬁrms. 
There are substantial differences among the sites in the industrial 
structure of jobs. Temporary help service ﬁrms account for more than 
one in ﬁve spells in Atlanta and Kansas City, but the proportion is as 
low as 1 in 10 in other sites. Overall, however, the basic employment 
structure of the sites is quite similar. One exception is Chicago, where 
use of an alternative industrial classiﬁcation code made it difﬁcult for 
us to translate the code into the SIC categories.4 As a result, we were 
unable to determine industry in over a third of the spells, and these are 
simply classiﬁed together as “not ascertained.” 
Demographic Determinants of Job Stability
Table 5.2 presents coefﬁcients for regression equations predicting 
spell length at each of the six sites. Both age and education have the 
expected effects. Those with high school degrees have spells that are up 
to a ﬁfth of a quarter longer in the sites where it is available. Older indi-
viduals have longer job spells, although in Atlanta, Baltimore, and Kan-
sas City, the effect of age increases at older ages, whereas it decreases 
in Chicago and Fort Lauderdale.5 Nonetheless, the overall effects are 
similar, with coefﬁcients implying that at age 35 predicted spell length 
is 0.25 to 0.34 quarters longer than that for an individual with similar 
characteristics who is age 25. The effect of children is estimated to be 
negative at all sites, but it is substantively small for each site.
Other variables display somewhat different impacts across sites. 
The effect of minority status has the expected negative sign in Atlanta, 
Chicago, and Kansas City, but is essentially zero in Baltimore and posi-
tive and substantial in Fort Lauderdale and Houston. The effect of being 
a long-term recipient is negative in Atlanta, Baltimore, Fort Lauderdale, 
126 Table 5.1  Means and Standard Deviations for Spells across Six Sites
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago Fort Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
1994:1–1998:4 1992:1–1998:1 1995:3–1998:4 1995:1–1998:1 1994:4–1998:4 1992:1–1998:1
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Length of spell (up to 8 quarters)  2.12 1.83 2.50 2.13 2.65 2.25 2.43 2.04 2.35 1.99 2.06 1.78
Total earnings (1999:4 dollars) 2,676 7,812 4,871 9,378 4,974 9,175 4,084 7,763 3,900 7,604 3,243 7,069
Minority (nonwhite or Hispanic) 0.97 0.17 0.91 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.80 0.40 0.84 0.37 0.75 0.43
Age 28.81 7.49 29.19 7.51 28.92 7.17 28.98 7.13 27.97 7.41 27.86 7.13
Age2 885.96 491.97 908.45 497.55 887.28 458.44 890.44 460.29 837.40 480.08 827.00 457.71
Number of children 2.05 1.22 1.80 0.99 2.01 1.19 2.01 1.16 1.96 1.11 1.97 1.15
High school graduate — — — — 0.58 0.49 — — 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49
Long-term recipient 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.38 0.48
Industry
 1. Eating, drinking estab. 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29
 2. Agriculture, mining, const. 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.10
 3. Manufacturing 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20
 4. Transportation, etc. 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
 5. Wholesale trade 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.19
 6. Retail trade, not eating estab. 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34
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 7. Finance, ins., real estate 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16
 8. Hotels, motels 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.20
 9. Temporary help ﬁrms 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.37 0.22 0.41
10. Skilled nursing, inter. care 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.26
11. Other service 0.26 0.44 0.34 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.45
12. Public administration 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08
13. Industry not ascertained 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Number of spells 85,382 100,963 281,479 26,127 142,754 95,809
NOTE: — = data unavailable
128 Table 5.2  Estimated Impacts of Welfare Recipients’ Characteristics on Job Spell Length
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Independent variables Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Minority (nonwhite or Hispanic) −0.098
(0.038)
0.009
(0.023)
−0.178
(0.015)
0.119
(0.032)
0.206
(0.014)
−0.101
(0.013)
Age 0.020
(0.005)
−0.000
(0.006)
0.065
(0.005)
0.085
(0.012)
0.039
(0.004)
0.004
(0.006)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Number of children −0.021
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.007)
−0.010
(0.004)
−0.029
(0.012)
−0.016
(0.005)
−0.008
(0.005)
High school graduate — — 0.227
(0.009)
— 0.107
(0.011)
0.222
(0.012)
Long-term recipient −0.073
(0.013)
−0.035
(0.014)
0.163
(0.009)
−0.149
(0.029)
−0.043
(0.012)
0.057
(0.012)
R2 0.0221 0.0160 0.0188 0.0147 0.0185 0.0202
Adjusted R2 0.0218 0.0157 0.0187 0.0143 0.0184 0.0198
NOTE: Also controlled: quarter dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. — = data unavailable.
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and Houston; it is positive although small in Kansas City and strongly 
positive in Chicago.
It is natural to ask whether differences across sites in observed re-
cipient characteristics are responsible for variation across sites in spell 
lengths. We used the coefﬁcients reported in Table 5.2 for the regres-
sions at each site to identify the extent to which mean differences in the 
independent variables for a given site could explain the deviation from 
the mean spell length across sites. Spell lengths in Kansas City and 
Chicago differ most dramatically, by nearly 0.6 quarters, but our calcu-
lations show that essentially none of this difference can be explained by 
the demographic factors controlled in this equation.
The impact of the basic demographic variables is expected to oper-
ate, in part, through the kinds of jobs that individuals obtain. We discuss 
the industrial composition of jobs as well as other differences across 
employers in some detail below, but at this point it is worth noting how 
the estimated effects of the basic demographic variables change when 
we control for employer.6 In all of our sites, part of the effect of age 
is mediated by employer, but at least two-thirds of the effect remains. 
Similarly, in our sites where we have information on education, we ﬁnd 
that about a third of its effect works through employer. For the other 
measures, the extent to which the effect operates through employer is 
variable, although the basic pattern of results is not changed dramati-
cally by controls for employer. 
EMPLOYER AND INDUSTRY AS DETERMINANTS  
OF JOB STABILITY
What role do industry and employer play in determining the job 
stability of welfare recipients? Table 5.3 shows impact estimates for 
all 12 industries, where each identiﬁes an effect relative to the aver-
age industry.7 The regressions control for minority status, age and age 
squared, and number of children, allowing full comparability across 
sites. In those sites where data for education and long-term welfare sta-
tus are available, the coefﬁcients of the industry variables change very 
little, generally much less than their standard errors, when these are 
controlled, so it is clear that the results would not be altered by includ-
ing these additional measures.
130 Table 5.3  Estimated Impacts of Major Industry on Job Spell Length
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Independent variable Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Industry 
 1. Eating, drinking estab. −0.052
(0.013)
−0.164
(0.019)
0.171
(0.010)
−0.110
(0.034)
−0.089
(0.011)
−0.072
(0.016)
 2. Agriculture, mining, const. −0.316
(0.068)
−0.616
(0.064)
−0.304
(0.057)
−0.484
(0.087)
−0.196
(0.036)
−0.205
(0.050)
 3. Manufacturing 0.411
(0.038)
0.001
(0.026)
0.520
(0.022)
0.151
(0.066)
0.329
(0.033)
0.213
(0.025)
 4. Transportation, etc. 0.537
(0.035)
0.478
(0.044)
0.855
(0.027)
0.401
(0.069)
0.452
(0.037)
1.214
(0.029)
 5. Wholesale trade 0.349
(0.040)
0.012
(0.046)
0.645
(0.038)
0.253
(0.073)
0.290
(0.039)
−0.135
(0.027)
 6. Retail trade, not eating estab. −0.031
(0.015)
−0.174
(0.014)
0.158
(0.012)
0.138
(0.027)
0.006
(0.011)
0.028
(0.013)
 7. Finance, ins., real estate 1.090
(0.048)
0.560
(0.040)
1.307
(0.030)
0.394
(0.065)
0.568
(0.037)
0.737
(0.031)
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 8. Hotels, motels 0.168
(0.027)
−0.349
(0.034)
0.375
(0.036)
−0.332
(0.072)
0.010
(0.039)
−0.386
(0.025)
 9. Temporary help ﬁrms −0.559
(0.012)
−0.818
(0.014)
−0.804
(0.013)
−0.719
(0.031)
−0.608
(0.012)
−0.535
(0.010)
10. Skilled nursing, inter. care 0.166
(0.038)
0.455
(0.026)
−0.176
(0.019)
0.345
(0.090)
−0.192
(0.035)
−0.065
(0.019)
11. Other service 0.165
(0.010)
0.290
(0.009)
0.467
(0.008)
0.281
(0.018)
0.224
(0.007)
0.237
(0.008)
12. Public administration 1.332
(0.041)
1.852
(0.038)
1.034
(0.053)
−0.237
(0.034)
2.423
(0.077)
1.536
(0.064)
13. Industry not ascertained −0.080
(0.039)
 −0.424
(0.006)
 0.064
(0.117)
 
R2 0.066 0.073 0.062 0.042 0.047 0.068
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.072 0.062 0.042 0.047 0.068
NOTE: Also controlled: minority, age, age squared, number of children, and quarter dummies. Beta values are estimated impacts relative 
to the average industry. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Despite some differences across sites, the patterns of coefﬁcients 
are remarkably similar. Those working in agriculture, mining, and con-
struction have lower job stability than the average, but these industries 
are relatively unimportant, since fewer than 2 percent of the spells fall 
in this category. Manufacturing jobs, which make up between 2 and 5 
percent of all spells, are appreciably more stable than other jobs at ﬁve 
of the six sites, with spells 0.2 to 0.5 quarters longer. 
The two major industries that display the greatest job stability are 
transportation, communications, electric, gas, sanitary services, and 
public administration (except in Fort Lauderdale). Each of these makes 
up a very small portion of the spells at most sites. The exception is that 
in Fort Lauderdale, public administration makes up 11 percent of spells, 
in contrast to proportions below 4 percent at all other sites, suggesting 
that this category may be deﬁned differently there.
The effect of jobs in wholesale trade is not consistent across sites. 
The very high stability that Chicago workers in wholesale trade experi-
ence appears less signiﬁcant when it is observed that fewer than 1 per-
cent of Chicago workers are in such jobs, as compared with 2 percent 
at other sites. Retail trade outside of eating and drinking establishments 
offers greater stability than the average in Chicago, Fort Lauderdale, 
and Kansas City, but the effect on stability is small at two of the other 
sites, and negative at one.
Of particular interest is the job stability offered by service ﬁrms, 
which contribute a very large share of welfare recipients’ jobs in all 
sites. Temporary help service ﬁrms alone make up 9 to 22 percent of all 
spells in the six sites. Stability is lower in that category than any other, 
with spells at least half a quarter shorter than the average and a full 
quarter shorter than jobs in manufacturing. This is a substantial differ-
ence, given that the mean spell length is under 3. Among other service 
jobs, nursing homes and hotels and motels display inconsistent patterns 
across sites. On the other hand, the residual category of service jobs 
provides substantially greater levels of job stability at all sites, spells 
being longer than the average by 0.2 to 0.5 quarters. Eating and drink-
ing establishments have slightly lower stability than the industry aver-
age in all sites but Chicago, where such jobs appear to be more stable 
than the average.
While the differences observed among these job categories are 
large, one may wonder whether using more detailed industry categories 
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would alter the results. In order to test this, we considered a variety of 
detailed controls for employer industry. Table 5.4 reports the proportion 
of variance explained (as indicated by adjusted R2) for various models 
predicting length of job spell. When only the basic demographic char-
acteristics are controlled, just 1 to 2 percent of the variance is explained 
by the model (line 1). Controlling for major industry (categories listed 
in Table 5.3), the explained variance is 4 to 7 percent (line 3). Lines 2 
and 4 control for long-term recipiency, and, for the three sites where it 
is available, the indicator of high school graduation. These results sug-
gest that including these variables would not alter our conclusions in 
any important way.
Line 5 shows that controlling for two-digit industry increases ex-
plained variance to between 8 and 11 percent, and line 6 shows that 
controlling for four-digit industry increases explained variance another 
two percentage points. It is clear that although the broad industry cat-
egories capture much of the differences between detailed industries, 
ﬁner gradations are still of signiﬁcance.8
Although line 6 provides controls for industry as deﬁned by the 
most detailed measure available in our dataset, there may be other dif-
ferences between employers not captured by SIC code. Line 7 in Table 
5.4 presents adjusted R2 in a model that controls for employer ﬁxed 
effects, equivalent to ﬁtting a separate dummy variable for each em-
ployer in the sample. Explained variance increases quite substantially, 
to around 20 percent at all sites. Still, more than half of the explained 
variance due to employers is explained by four-digit industry, and more 
than a third is explained by two-digit industry.
Overall, our conclusion is clear. Even after controls for recipient 
characteristics, the industry of the employer and other employer char-
acteristics play an important role in predicting employment stability. Of 
course, we expect there are important unmeasured recipient characteris-
tics that inﬂuence job stability and also inﬂuence the type of job. Insofar 
as these are important, we expect that job type, per se, is less important 
than these analyses suggest. 
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Table 5.4  Proportion of Variance Explained for Models Predicting Spell Length
Independent variables Adjusted R2
Model
Industry/
employer 
controls
Quarter 
dummies Minority
Age, 
age2 Children
High 
schoolb
Long-
term
All 
person 
effects Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston
Kansas 
City
(1) None X X X X 0.021 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.019
(2) None X X X X X X 0.022 0.016 0.019 0.014 0.018 0.020
(3) Major industry X X X X 0.066 0.072 0.062 0.042 0.048 0.068
(4) Major industry X X X X X X 0.066 0.073 0.064 0.042 0.048 0.068
(5) 2-digit industry 
and selected 
othersa
X X X X 0.093 0.111 0.078 0.083 0.077 0.100
(6) 4-digit industry X X X X 0.119 0.135 0.126 0.106 0.096 0.127
(7) Employer X X X X 0.200 0.224 0.218 0.213 0.173 0.198
(8) None X X X 0.270 0.263 0.282 0.348 0.258 0.253
(9) Major industry X X X 0.294 0.293 0.306 0.360 0.277 0.280
 (10) 2-digit industry 
and selected 
othersa
X X X 0.312 0.319 0.315 0.378 0.297 0.302
a Selected industry detail SIC code:
53 5311 (dept. store)
  53 all other
54 5411 (grocery stores)
  54 all other
55 5541 (gasoline stations)
  55 all other (automotive and boat sales)
70 7011 (motel, hotel)
  70 all other
72 721 (laundry, dry cleaning)
  72 all other
80 8051 (skilled nursing care)
  8052 (intermediate care)
  8062 (hospitals)
  808 (home health care)
  80 all other
83 8322 (individual and family social services)
  8361 (residential care)
  83 all otherb High school is available only for Chicago, Houston, and Kansas City.
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PERSON FIXED EFFECTS 
In order to address this issue, we estimated regression equations 
where ﬁxed effects for each individual in the sample are controlled. 
Such a model estimates the effect of industry on the basis of those 
welfare recipients who have multiple job spells. Of course, one might 
imagine this is a fairly unusual population. In order for an individual to 
have multiple spells, it is necessary that the initial job did not result in a 
sufﬁciently good match to induce the individual to discontinue welfare 
receipt. For that reason, one might anticipate that differences between 
industries for this selected population would understate differences 
across all individuals.
Table 5.5 presents estimates of the effects of industry using this 
method to control for all person effects. Omitted from this speciﬁca-
tion are the basic demographic characteristics that do not change over 
time. Number of children and the quarter in which the spell starts are 
controlled. Age is excluded, since the effect of age and the quarter in 
which the spell begins are not separately identiﬁed in this ﬁxed effects 
speciﬁcation.9
Remarkably, industry effects reported in Table 5.5 closely parallel 
those obtained when simple demographic characteristics are controlled, 
with impacts only slightly reduced. For example, if we compare tempo-
rary help and manufacturing ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that spells in temporary help 
ﬁrms are between 0.5 and 0.8 quarters shorter. This gap is only about 
20 percent smaller than that obtained when only basic demographic 
factors are controlled. Consistent with the prior results, we ﬁnd that 
public administration jobs are generally the most stable (again, with the 
exception of those in Fort Lauderdale), with jobs in transportation and 
related industries only slightly less stable.
It is worth stressing that these results are consistent with the view 
that individual characteristics play an important role in determining job 
stability, independent of job type. Lines 8–10 in Table 5.4 show that, in 
models controlling for individual ﬁxed effects, the proportion of vari-
ance explained increases dramatically relative to other models. Indi-
vidual effects are more important than ﬁrm effects at all sites; hence, 
knowing a recipient’s job history is more important than knowing her 
employer’s reputation for retaining workers. On the other hand, the dif-
ference in explained variance is less than one might expect. Knowing 
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Table 5.5  Estimated Impacts of Major Industry on Job Spell Length, Controlling Person Effects
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago
Fort 
Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Independent variable Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Industry dummies
 1. Eating, drinking estab. 0.062
(0.015)
−0.053
(0.024)
0.161
(0.013)
−0.019
(0.046)
−0.021
(0.014)
0.005
(0.018)
 2. Agriculture, mining, const. −0.354
(0.076)
−0.547
(0.080)
−0.147
(0.070)
−0.306
(0.116)
−0.103
(0.044)
−0.215
(0.055)
 3. Manufacturing 0.345
(0.042)
−0.045
(0.033)
0.474
(0.027)
0.241
(0.087)
0.289
(0.039)
0.138
(0.028)
 4. Transportation, etc. 0.418
(0.039)
0.449
(0.054)
0.705
(0.034)
0.318
(0.091)
0.360
(0.044)
1.061
(0.033)
 5. Wholesale trade 0.225
(0.045)
0.023
(0.057)
0.594
(0.046)
0.130
(0.097)
0.225
(0.047)
−0.118
(0.030)
 6. Retail trade, not eating estab. −0.070
(0.017)
−0.240
(0.017)
0.035
(0.014)
0.060
(0.036)
−0.029
(0.013)
−0.004
(0.015)
 7. Finance, ins., real estate 0.840
(0.054)
0.425
(0.050)
1.069
(0.036)
0.296
(0.086)
0.480
(0.044)
0.480
(0.035)
  137
 8. Hotels, motels 0.171
(0.030)
−0.067
(0.043)
0.266
(0.044)
−0.270
(0.095)
−0.007
(0.047)
−0.138
(0.028)
 9. Temporary help ﬁrms −0.447
(0.013)
−0.602
(0.017)
−0.546
(0.016)
−0.487
(0.041)
−0.514
(0.014)
−0.416
(0.011)
10. Skilled nursing, inter. care 0.130
(0.042)
0.441
(0.032)
−0.016
(0.023)
0.339
(0.119)
−0.093
(0.041)
0.040
(0.021)
11. Other service 0.098
(0.011)
0.195
(0.011)
0.314
(0.010)
0.159
(0.024)
0.171
(0.009)
0.131
(0.009)
12. Public administration 1.032
(0.046)
1.635
(0.047)
0.768
(0.064)
−0.140
(0.045)
2.287
(0.092)
1.417
(0.071)
13. Industry not ascertained −0.111
(0.044)
 −0.337
(0.008)
 −0.022
(0.140)
R2 0.490 0.563 0.589 0.703 0.540 0.455
Adjusted R2 0.294 0.293 0.306 0.360 0.277 0.280
NOTE: Controls: quarter dummies, number of children, person ﬁxed effects. Beta values are estimated impacts relative to the average 
industry. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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only the employer allows one to explain about a ﬁfth of the variance in 
job stability, whereas knowing only about the employee explains about 
a quarter. 
To what degree do individual differences play a role in determining 
what kinds of jobs individuals obtain? If, in fact, industry patterns that 
predict stability are largely determined by individual differences (e.g., 
if each individual who obtains multiple jobs is very likely to obtain 
those jobs in a given industry), controlling for industry will add rela-
tively little explanatory power after individual effects are controlled. 
In this case, we could say that certain industries appear to offer stable 
employment because they hire stable people. Although the pattern of 
explained variances in Table 5.4 conﬁrms the viewpoint that stable in-
dustries do in fact attract more stable individuals—the contribution of 
industry to explained variance is smaller when individual effects are 
controlled than when not—the extent of this effect is quite small. Most 
of the explanatory power of industry predicting job stability is indepen-
dent of individual effects. This ﬁnding provides the strongest evidence 
that getting the “right” job is critical in assuring job stability for welfare 
recipients.10
As noted above, there are signiﬁcant differences between sites in 
the average job spell length, with Kansas City displaying the shortest 
mean at 2.06 and Chicago the longest at 2.65. If we examine the distri-
bution of jobs by industry (Table 5.1), it is clear that Kansas City has a 
much larger share of jobs in temporary help ﬁrms, the industry category 
with the lowest level of stability. Using the estimates of the impact of 
job type on stability reported in Table 5.5, we have predicted the extent 
to which these differences in industrial distribution are responsible for 
mean differences in spell length. We ﬁnd that for Houston and Kansas 
City, the spell length is reduced by 0.05 to 0.06 because of the industrial 
distributions in these sites, whereas, for the other sites, the adjustment 
is less than 0.02.11 Hence, industry—at least as gauged by broad catego-
ries—plays a relatively small role in explaining observed differences 
between sites.
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CHANGES OVER TIME IN JOB SPELL LENGTH  
AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Over the 1990s, major policy reforms occurred in welfare policies 
and programs at each site, accompanied by dramatic improvements in 
local economic and labor market conditions. The previous chapter pro-
vided evidence of declines in job spell length at several sites among 
welfare recipients. Here, we consider this decline, identifying the extent 
to which it can be explained by changes in the characteristics of welfare 
recipients and the kinds of employers who hire them. We also consider 
the extent to which the factors explaining spell length have shifted over 
time.
When we examine quarter coefﬁcients predicting spell length, we 
ﬁnd that there are consistent seasonal effects. Although there are some 
differences across sites, the basic patterns are remarkably similar. In 
all sites, job spells beginning in the fourth quarter are shorter than oth-
ers, whereas those beginning in the ﬁrst quarter are generally longer. 
Since employment and the number of new jobs are generally low in 
the ﬁrst quarter (see Chapter 4), it should not be surprising if those 
who obtained such jobs are more likely to keep them. In contrast, jobs 
in the ﬁnal quarter of the year may be temporary, reﬂecting retail job 
expansion in the holiday season. Despite the consistency, the size of 
these seasonal differences is modest. Controlling for individual charac-
teristics, spells beginning in the ﬁrst quarter of the year last about 0.2 
quarters longer than those beginning in the fourth quarter at most sites, 
although the difference is as small as 0.1 (in Houston) and as large as 
0.3 (in Chicago).
In order to account for seasonal effects and to reduce variation from 
quarter to quarter, Figure 5.1 graphs the four-quarter moving average 
of mean spell length for our sites over the 1990s.12 The scale identi-
ﬁes spell length relative to that for 1997:4, and the solid line indicates 
spell length with no controls. We see that at each site, the spell length 
declines moderately over at least the latter portion of our period, with 
declines in the range of 0.1 to 0.2.
Since the population of recipients is changing over this period, one 
might ask to what extent differences can be traced to characteristics of 
recipients and the jobs they obtain. When we calculated quarter effects 
controlling for basic demographic characteristics and industry of em-
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ployer (as in regressions speciﬁed in lines 1–6 in Table 5.4), we found 
that the pattern reported in Figure 5.1 changed little, implying that these 
factors did not contribute much to observed patterns. Further controls 
for ﬁxed employer effects, however (as in line 7 in Table 5.4), altered 
estimated trends. Figure 5.1 shows that when employer is taken into 
account, declines in job stability are greater, as indicated by the dashed 
line. This implies that recipients are more likely to obtain jobs with 
employers offering greater stability in the recent period, which served 
to lessen actual stability declines.
In order to examine whether the determinants of job stability have 
shifted, we present in Table 5.6 separate regressions for each of the 
sites predicting stability for spells beginning at different points in time 
as a function of demographic characteristics. Changes over time in ef-
fects appear to be idiosyncratic to each site. In Houston, the positive 
effect of minority status appears to decline, while the negative effect in 
Chicago increases. In Fort Lauderdale, the effect of age (as gauged by 
the difference between the ages of 25 and 35) increases by more than 
50 percent in the most recent period, while the effect changes relatively 
little at other sites. In Kansas City, the effect of completing high school 
declines dramatically in the last year, but there are no similar changes 
in the other sites where education is available.
Nationally as well as in our sites, welfare reform emphasized the 
importance of employment for long-term recipients as a means of re-
ducing welfare dependency. This focus may be reﬂected in the esti-
mated effect of being on welfare for two years or more, our measure 
of long-term recipiency. In three of the sites, the estimated coefﬁcient 
for this measure is positive in the ﬁnal period and is appreciably great-
er than that estimated for earlier periods. The most extreme case is in 
Baltimore, where recipients on welfare at least two years in the ﬁnal 
period have spells that last 0.22 quarters longer than similar individu-
als, whereas in the initial period their spells are actually 0.07 quarters 
shorter. However, in Fort Lauderdale, long-term recipients actually 
have shorter job spells than others and the effect may be increasing; in 
the other two sites, long-term recipiency has little effect.
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Table 5.6  Estimated Impacts of Welfare Recipients’ Characteristics 
on Job Spells for Spells Beginning in Various Periods 
Period job spell begins
1992–95 1996–97 1998
Independent variables Beta Beta Beta 
Atlanta Minority (nonwhite or 
Hispanic)
−0.081
(0.055)
−0.048
(0.059)
−0.343
(0.109)
Age 0.000
(0.000)
0.028
(0.008)
0.020
(0.013)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Number of children −0.021
(0.008)
−0.020
(0.008)
−0.029
(0.013)
Long-term recipient −0.083
(0.019)
−0.077
(0.020)
−0.043
(0.033)
R2 0.019 0.025 0.025
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.024 0.025
Baltimore Minority (nonwhite or 
Hispanic)
0.029
(0.030)
−0.022
(0.039)
−0.052
(0.127)
Age −0.007
(0.007)
0.024
(0.010)
0.032
(0.036)
Age2 0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.001)
Number of children −0.011
(0.009)
0.006
(0.011)
−0.012
(0.034)
Long-term recipient −0.066
(0.018)
−0.006
(0.022)
0.222
(0.073)
R2 0.019 0.011 0.010
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.011 0.008
Chicago Minority (nonwhite or 
Hispanic)
−0.160
(0.036)
−0.159
(0.020)
−0.228
(0.028)
Age 0.083
(0.012)
0.069
(0.006)
0.046
(0.008)
Age2 −0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Number of children −0.010
(0.011)
−0.013
(0.005)
−0.005
(0.007)
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Period job spell begins
1992–95 1996–97 1998
Independent variables Beta Beta Beta 
Chicago
High school graduate 0.255
(0.023)
0.215
(0.012)
0.231
(0.016)
Long-term recipient 0.041
(0.023)
0.157
(0.012)
0.239
(0.017)
R2 0.016 0.018 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.018 0.022
Fort 
Lauderdale
Minority (nonwhite or 
Hispanic)
0.160
(0.066)
0.114
(0.038)
0.018
(0.128)
Age 0.088
(0.026)
0.083
(0.015)
0.098
(0.044)
Age2 −0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.001)
Number of children −0.054
(0.025)
−0.024
(0.014)
−0.001
(0.040)
Long-term recipient −0.086
(0.059)
−0.175
(0.035)
−0.148
(0.122)
R2 0.011 0.015 0.026
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.014 0.023
Houston Minority (nonwhite or 
Hispanic)
0.256
(0.023)
0.189
(0.021)
0.119
(0.038)
Age 0.040
(0.007)
0.034
(0.007)
0.047
(0.010)
Age2 −0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
Number of children −0.013
(0.009)
−0.021
(0.007)
−0.005
(0.011)
High school graduate 0.086
(0.018)
0.122
(0.016)
0.118
(0.026)
Long-term recipient −0.097
(0.019)
−0.011
(0.017)
−0.003
(0.029)
R2 0.018 0.019 0.019
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.019 0.019
Table 5.6  (continued)
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Period job spell begins
1992–95 1996–97 1998
Independent variables Beta Beta Beta 
Kansas City Minority (nonwhite or 
Hispanic)
−0.100
(0.017)
−0.110
(0.022)
−0.020
(0.071)
Age 0.008
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.010)
0.064
(0.032)
Age2 0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.001)
Number of children −0.008
(0.007)
−0.003
(0.008)
−0.047
(0.028)
High school graduate 0.220
(0.016)
0.241
(0.020)
0.076
(0.064)
Long-term recipient 0.032
(0.016)
0.094
(0.020)
0.120
(0.065)
R2 0.071 0.019 0.010
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.019 0.008
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
EARNINGS ON A JOB
Our focus to this point has been on the stability of a job, as mea-
sured by the number of quarters an individual remains with a given 
employer, but it is clear that, in any attempt to assure self-sufﬁciency, 
earnings would be an important measure of employment success. As a 
measure of the overall beneﬁts from a job, we have summed the total 
earnings obtained from the employer during the job spell for its ﬁrst 
eight quarters and have ﬁtted regressions that predict this measure.
Of course, we expect total earnings to be strongly correlated with 
the duration of the job, although the variation in total pay is appreciably 
greater than the variation in spell length. Table 5.1 indicates that the 
standard deviation of total earnings is about twice its mean, whereas 
the standard deviation of spell length is generally slightly less than its 
mean. Variation in hourly wage, hours of work per week, and weeks of 
work per quarter cause the two measures to differ, so there is no cer-
tainty that regressions for spell length and earnings will yield the same 
results in all analyses.
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Table 5.7 presents coefﬁcients for the industry of a job in regressions 
predicting total earnings. Estimates in the column on the left for each 
site include controls for our limited set of demographic characteristics; 
estimates in the column on the right control for person ﬁxed effects. The 
pattern of coefﬁcients is very similar to that predicting spell length. One 
notable exception is that spells in the category agriculture, mining, and 
construction (almost all in construction), which are generally shorter 
than those in other industries, provide earnings that are substantially 
higher than the average industry in three sites. This is consistent with 
the view that such jobs tend to provide higher wages in order to attract 
skilled individuals despite their obvious instability.
The most important result of this analysis is that industry effects on 
total earnings survive the inclusion of person effects, and that the basic 
pattern of coefﬁcients does not change. At almost all of the sites, the 
coefﬁcients decline in absolute value, indicating that some of the dif-
ferences between industries are explained by person effects. Given that 
person effects explain more of the variation in earnings than in spell 
length (compare the estimates of adjusted R2 in Table 5.7 with those 
in Table 5.5), it should not be surprising that some of the differences 
between jobs are also explained by person effects. Yet, our general con-
clusions for earnings are the same as for stability: When an individual 
gets the right kind of job, she experiences appreciably greater rewards.
Although the above conclusions suggest little difference between 
analyses using spell length and total earnings, their trends over time 
appear to differ somewhat. Figure 5.2 presents mean total earnings in 
each of the sites, based on when the spell begins. As in the case of 
spell length (Figure 5.1), the numbers represent deviations from mean 
total earnings in 1997:4, with four-quarter moving averages plotted in 
the ﬁgure. In Kansas City, average earnings per spell decline by nearly 
$400 from the early 1990s to 1995, but then increase to their previous 
level by the end of the period. This is in contrast to the trend in spell 
length, which shows an overall decline during the period. Controls for 
employer reveal a decline in total earnings, suggesting that part of the 
earnings gain is due to workers getting jobs with higher-paying em-
ployers. It should be stressed that earnings are adjusted for inﬂation, so 
changes are in real terms.
Houston and Chicago, like Kansas City, exhibit increases in total 
earnings even while spell length declines, indicating that workers are 
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receiving greater earnings in each quarter they work. Controls for em-
ployer reduce (Chicago) or reverse (Houston) this trend, suggesting that 
part of the observed increases in earnings at these sites is due to recipi-
ents obtaining jobs with higher-paying employers. Only in Baltimore 
does the trend for total earnings closely parallel that for spell length.
It may be of interest to consider the extent to which industrial dif-
ferences in spell length parallel differences in earnings per quarter. We 
have calculated expected earnings for each of the major industry group-
ings as well as expected spell length, controlling person ﬁxed effects, 
number of children, and quarter dummies. Since actual time worked 
during both the initial quarter and the ﬁnal quarter of a spell will usu-
ally not extend the full length of the quarter, the predicted spell length, 
as we have measured it, generally overstates the actual continuous time 
that a job lasted. In calculating earnings per quarter, we have therefore 
adjusted spell length to represent continuous time.13
Figure 5.3 provides a scatter plot for each site of the expected length 
of a spell by the expected earnings per quarter for our major industry 
groupings. Although there is clearly variation around the trend line, the 
relationship is positive at each site. It is clear that if welfare recipients 
are placed in industries providing them with stable employment they 
also tend to have high earnings per quarter. (In each site, the industry 
category that contains construction workers is an obvious outlier, yield-
ing relatively high earnings per quarter but low job stability.) Of course, 
our analyses do not allow us to identify the reason for the effect, and it 
may well reﬂect the incentives of workers to keep jobs that pay well. 
The important point is that we see no evidence that there is a trade-off 
between jobs that pay well and those that provide stability.
CONCLUSIONS
Job stability is an important factor in efforts to achieve self-sufﬁ-
ciency for welfare recipients. The analysis here shows that differences 
in job stability can be attributed both to individual characteristics and to 
the kinds of jobs individuals obtain. After controls for employer, both 
age and education have positive effects on stability, while the number 
of children generally has a negative effect. We ﬁnd, in addition, that 
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Table 5.7  Estimated Impacts of Welfare, by Major Industry, on Total Earnings in Job
Atlanta Baltimore Chicago Fort Lauderdale Houston Kansas City
Independent variables Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Industry dummies
  1. Eating, drinking estab. −829
(57)
−134
(57)
−1,762
(83)
−979
(98)
−438
(42)
16
(47)
−1,407
(130)
−508
(161)
−1,193
(43)
−616
(49)
−1,043
(65)
−464
(68)
  2. Agriculture, mining, const. −147
(292)
−179
(289)
58
(281)
−145
(330)
1,970
(232)
954
(264)
−869
(331)
−252
(408)
1,214
(138)
1,040
(158)
619
(196)
534
(207)
  3. Manufacturing 3,179
(163)
2,198
(161)
971
(115)
440
(135)
3,545
(90)
2,945
(102)
1,014
(249)
1,345
(307)
2,945
(123)
2,666
(142)
2,112
(98)
1,578
(103)
  4. Transportation, etc. 2,850
(149)
1,784
(147)
2,936
(191)
2,291
(224)
4,760
(112)
3,584
(127)
2,825
(260)
1,742
(320)
3,846
(140)
2,724
(160)
4,926
(116)
3,918
(123)
  5. Wholesale trade 2,199
(171)
1,672
(169)
987
(201)
726
(236)
4,014
(153)
3,247
(174)
1,929
(277)
1,036
(341)
2,578
(149)
2,070
(171)
308
(105)
309
(111)
  6.  Retail trade, not eating estab. −327
(64)
−349
(64)
−1,145
(61)
−1,196
(72)
−376
(48)
−470
(54)
−128
(103)
−168
(127)
−290
(41)
−313
(47)
−237
(53)
−215
(56)
  7. Finance, ins., real estate 5,470
(205)
4,236
(203)
4,372
(175)
2,934
(206)
7,805
(121)
5,897
(137)
3,158
(245)
2,073
(301)
4,343
(140)
3,223
(160)
4,324
(123)
2,873
(130)
  8. Hotels, motels 113
(115)
386
(113)
−2,857
(150)
−1,046
(177)
1,240
(146)
1,136
(166)
−3,147
(272)
−1,279
(335)
−396
(147)
−90
(169)
−2,405
(100)
−915
(106)
  9. Temporary help ﬁrms −1,842
(50)
−1,499
(50)
−3,218
(61)
−2,441
(71)
−2,922
(54)
−2,242
(61)
−2,495
(117)
−1,847
(144)
−1,847
(45)
−1,807
(52)
−2,102
(39)
−1,747
(42)
10. Skilled nursing, inter. care 432
(161)
119
(160)
1,968
(114)
1,894
(134)
−686
(77)
−67
(88)
1,162
(340)
1,499
(419)
−751
(131)
−209
(150)
−30
(74)
263
(78)
11. Other service 530
(44)
277
(44)
1163
(37)
741
(44)
1,673
(34)
994
(39)
1,208
(68)
589
(84)
623
(27)
481
(31)
832
(32)
434
(34)
  149
12. Public administration 6,075
(175)
4,269
(173)
9,142
(164)
8,330
(193)
7,293
(213)
5,460
(242)
−532
(127)
−295
(157)
14,204
(291)
12,808
(334)
8,859
(251)
8,220
(264)
13. Industry not ascertained −364
(167)
−401
(166)
  −1,368
(25)
−1,047
(29)   
2361
(443)
1693
(508)   
Controls
Minority, age, age2 X X X X X X
Number children, quarter dummies X   X X   X X   X X   X X   X X   X
All person effects   X   X   X   X   X   X
R2 0.063 0.597 0.085 0.520 0.070 0.648 0.053 0.748 0.064 0.585 0.085 0.520
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.441 0.085 0.365 0.070 0.405 0.052 0.456 0.064 0.348 0.085 0.365
NOTE: Beta values are estimated impacts relative to the average industry. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 5.2  Earnings Variation over Time
Figure 2. Earnings Variation Over Time
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Figure 3. Length of Job Spell and Quarterly Earnings for Major Industry Categories
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there are important unmeasured individual characteristics that predict 
the stability of a job.
Perhaps the most important policy implication is that even in the 
face of large individual effects, the industry of the employer continues 
to play a substantial role. Three industry groups (public administration; 
ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate; and transportation, communication, 
electric, gas, and sanitary services) display the greatest job stability. 
Jobs in temporary help services and jobs in agriculture, mining, and 
construction are the least stable. Substantial portions of the estimated 
industry effects remain after controlling for person-speciﬁc effects as 
well as observed recipient characteristics that change over time. The 
analysis here provides strong evidence that getting the right job both in 
terms of industry and employer is critical in assuring job stability for 
welfare recipients. 
Of course, our analyses that control ﬁxed person effects obtain re-
sults based on individuals who began more than one job spell during the 
time they were receiving welfare. One may be hesitant to extend these 
results to individuals who have great difﬁculty obtaining any employ-
ment. On the other hand, by focusing on individuals who had multiple 
job spells while receiving welfare, we omit many of the most successful 
individuals, those who were able to obtain a stable job and immediately 
moved off welfare. Such selection—which reduces variation within 
the sample—should tend to reduce the estimated effect of all relevant 
variables. The strength of our ﬁndings is therefore of particular signiﬁ-
cance.
The analysis pertaining to changes over time in job stability shows 
that there are modest seasonal effects on job spell length, with job spells 
beginning in the fourth quarter shorter than others and those in the ﬁrst 
quarter generally longer. We observe a decline in job stability over the 
period of our study in most sites. This decline is partly mitigated by a 
trend toward employment in ﬁrms offering more stable employment.
More generally, our results support the view that welfare recipients 
are responsive to opportunities in the environments they face. Although 
there are important differences that inhere in individual recipients that 
affect their labor market experiences, the industry and employer effects 
we have estimated suggest that if good jobs can be made available to 
them, recipients will beneﬁt from them. 
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Notes
 1.  Since the proportion of job spells lasting more than eight quarters is small, we 
do not expect that our substantive results would be affected by including longer 
spells. Truncating spells to eight quarters allows us to compare spells beginning 
at different points in time without considering the impact of truncation.
 2.  Throughout the analysis, as in Chapter 4, spell length will be measured as a dis-
crete variable indicating the number of quarters in which the individual received 
earnings from a particular employer. Since most individuals do not work the full 
quarter at the beginning and end of the spell, to obtain a continuous time estimate 
of the spell length would require a downward adjustment of slightly less than one 
quarter. Such an adjustment is applied where earnings per quarter are calculated; 
see the discussion of calculations for Figure 5.3.
 3. All individual and job information is taken from records referring to the ﬁrst 
quarter of the job spell. Number of children is permitted to differ across job 
spells for a given individual. Other personal characteristics are assumed constant 
across job spells. Although, in theory, educational attainment could differ across 
jobs if an individual obtained additional schooling between job spells, such dif-
ferences are unusual. This is, in part, because of data limitations, as the education 
variable is infrequently updated after initial entry into welfare.
 4.  In Chicago, the North America Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) is used.
 5.  This can be seen by examining how the slope of the quadratic function changes.
 6.  We use a ﬁxed effects model, which controls for unobservable employer-speciﬁc 
effects by examining all job spells with the same employer. To the extent that 
job spells in a given ﬁrm tend to differ from those in other ﬁrms in ways not 
predicted by employee or employer characteristics, this approach attributes this 
to the impact of unmeasured employer characteristics. 
 7.  See Kennedy (1986) for interpretation of dummy variable coefﬁcients of this 
kind. Estimates of effects are normalized so that the weighted average of the co-
efﬁcient estimates sum to zero, where the weight is the proportion of the sample 
in each industry.
 8.  The increase in explained variance is greater in Chicago. We used the NAICS 
code to construct codes equivalent to the two-digit SIC code, but in a third of 
all cases lack of correspondence forced us to group ﬁrms together in a missing 
category. Where the analysis at other sites used the four-digit SIC code, we used 
the original NAICS industry coding. Although it is not directly comparable to the 
SIC, it is of similar detail, with 898 separate categories, compared to approxi-
mately 600 SIC four-digit industries.
 9. The long-term recipiency indicator is excluded; regressions including this mea-
sure show that results are not affected by its exclusion.
 10.  Bartik (1997) and Lane and Stevens (2001) examine impacts of job type on out-
comes for welfare recipients. While neither analysis is directly comparable to 
ours, their results also suggest that industry effects may be important.
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 11.  For each broad industry category, we have calculated the simple unweighted 
mean proportion across all six sites. Using the coefﬁcients for a given site, we 
estimate how predicted spell length would change if the industry distribution at 
that site corresponded to this mean.
 12.  In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the moving average for Fort Lauderdale has been includ-
ed in the graph even where the average includes as few as two quarters because 
of the missing data for spells beginning in selected quarters.
 13.  If the chance of obtaining a job is uniform during the initial quarter and the 
chance of ending the job is uniform during the ﬁnal quarter, this implies that, on 
average, an individual with a spell of recorded length of two or more quarters 
actually is on average employed for one quarter less than this discrete measure. 
For those who are recorded as working only one quarter, the assumption of con-
tinuous hazard implies an average actual length of one-third of a quarter. Since 
approximately half of spells end after one quarter (see Chapter 4), we subtract 
0.834 from predicted spell length to obtain an estimate of the actual expected 
length measured in continuous units. The results are not sensitive to the details 
of this method. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
for Welfare and Beyond
The 1990s were a remarkable period in the United States in many 
respects, but nowhere more so than in the nation’s large urban areas. 
The economy soared, and productivity posted signiﬁcant gains. Em-
ployment grew at a remarkable pace, and unemployment dropped to 
levels not seen in decades. Welfare reforms at the federal, state, and lo-
cal levels—bolstered by important contributing federal policy changes 
such as the EITC, Medicaid, and child care expansions—led to unprec-
edented declines in caseloads for cash assistance programs. Nationally, 
welfare caseloads fell to their lowest levels in three decades. Labor force 
participation rates for single mothers—never-married women as well as 
those who were separated or divorced—increased, approaching those 
of single women without children (Blank 2002). Even if the net result 
of all of these economic and policy changes failed to reduce income and 
earnings inequality (Marshall 2000), it was a truly remarkable era. 
Our analysis has taken advantage of the availability of welfare and 
labor market data spanning most of the 1990s in six large urban areas. 
While the patterns we have presented for these areas may not be repre-
sentative of all urban areas, they provide unique insights into welfare 
and work behaviors in a number of signiﬁcant urban population centers 
that together account for 1 out of every 20 recipients in the nation. In 
important respects, they are a diverse set of cities, so we feel conﬁdent 
that those patterns that occur in all or most of our sites are common if 
not universal across urban areas. In addition, where we observe discrep-
ant patterns, this provides an indication of how great variation across 
urban areas may be. 
Our major conclusions tend to complement those from other wel-
fare-to-work analyses that have been published recently, but they also 
provide intriguing nuances that shape our understanding of the existing 
body of research. We are able to identify recipient ﬂows and patterns 
of employment in our six sites prior to and after welfare reform, so we 
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are able to make inferences about the impacts of reforms that go be-
yond existing studies. Furthermore, our analysis of job spells for both 
welfare and nonwelfare individuals provides unique information about 
the welfare-to-work experience and how it relates to work in low-wage 
jobs more generally. We believe our work leads to a number of major 
conclusions that policymakers and researchers should consider as the 
nation emerges from this period of dramatic reform and considers how 
to “ﬁne tune” the welfare system. We should acknowledge as well that 
our conclusions are based on welfare recipients’ experiences in one of 
the most robust economic expansions in decades, while policymakers 
are having to address welfare reauthorization in what some have re-
ferred to as a “jobless recovery.” Their task is a challenging one.
This chapter draws on our analyses to answer broad questions about 
welfare and welfare reform in the United States. We begin by addressing 
how successful the welfare reforms of the 1990s were. First, we con-
sider policy success in reducing the welfare rolls and, second, success 
in assuring that welfare recipients obtain employment and ultimately 
achieve self-sufﬁciency. We then turn to the more general question of 
whether welfare reform has succeeded in making those affected by the 
program—that is, recipients, potential recipients, and former recipi-
ents—better off. Even if many recipients are employed and receiving 
increased income, we may ask whether their gains are sufﬁcient to com-
pensate them for the burden of long hours of work.1 Although we will 
reference others’ ﬁndings on the impacts of welfare reform, our primary 
focus will be on the conclusions that follow from our results.
We next turn to a discussion of the policy implications of our ﬁnd-
ings. Welfare reform is an ongoing process at the federal, state, and, in 
some cases, local level. In fact, major elements of these reforms were 
implemented over several years in the 1990s and until the present. Can 
we identify any lessons about what policies will best achieve accepted 
goals?  Tension continues to exist between the view that primary em-
phasis should be placed on getting a recipient into a job—any job—im-
mediately, and the view that only training designed to build human cap-
ital is of real long-term value to recipients. Although our analysis does 
not allow us to estimate the efﬁcacy of these alternative approaches, 
our results do suggest the limits and possibilities associated with them. 
We are able to provide insight into the value of helping recipients land 
“good jobs,” addressing an issue of long-standing concern. Our ﬁnd-
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ings also suggest the degree to which policies that focus primarily on 
caseload reduction are supportive of the goal of self-sufﬁciency through 
employment, and under what circumstances such policies may serve to 
undermine it. 
THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM 
Caseloads
Consistent with national trends, the caseload at each of our sites 
showed large declines both in the middle 1990s and following federal 
welfare reform. Observed patterns show both signs of substantial diver-
sity across sites and remarkable consistency. Caseload declines in our 
sites vary from less than 50 percent to over 80 percent, but the pattern 
over time and the relative importance of welfare entry and exit rates 
in explaining caseload declines are broadly similar. At every site, the 
number of individuals entering welfare declined markedly, such that 
caseload declines would have been substantial even if exit rates had 
remained unchanged. However, exit rate increases also played an im-
portant role at every site, independent of the effects of demographic 
changes in the recipient population.
The marks of speciﬁc policies also are clear in our analysis. New 
requirements imposed on recipients in Atlanta led to a “spike” in wel-
fare exits. In Fort Lauderdale, time limits clearly played an important 
role in increasing welfare exits, especially for long-term recipients. But 
many of the differences across sites are difﬁcult to trace to speciﬁc poli-
cies. For example, in Houston, although the decline in entries was more 
important than at any other site and was substantially more important 
than the growth in exit rates in inducing observed caseload declines, we 
cannot link this to a particular policy change.2
Of course, any careful analysis of the incentive effects of welfare 
policy changes recognizes that ﬂows both onto and off of welfare will be 
affected. In Fort Lauderdale, the decline in entries onto welfare would 
alone cause a larger decline in the caseload than declines observed at all 
sites but Houston. This decline in entries may be, at least partly, due to 
time limits. Under Florida’s rules, those who left welfare because they 
exceeded the 24-month limit were not permitted to return over the next 
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two years. In fact, the proportion of those entering welfare in Fort Lau-
derdale who had received welfare in the prior two years declined pre-
cipitously in 1998, just when Florida’s time limits would have become 
binding for those who had received aid continuously for two years. In 
addition to those directly affected by limits, those who wish to “bank” 
their remaining time on assistance may also be less likely to choose to 
accept aid (Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003).
Employment growth very likely played a role in reducing the case-
loads, but the variation in economic conditions across sites is not the 
primary reason for differences in the caseload declines. For example, 
employment growth rates in Fort Lauderdale and Houston were not 
substantially greater than at all other sites, so this does not explain the 
greater caseload declines we observe at those sites. Perhaps more com-
pelling than comparisons across our sites is the time pattern of caseload 
declines. Declines in rates of unemployment at our sites were generally 
quite modest in the period 1997–1999, yet caseloads at all sites declined 
at greater annual rates during that period than before.
Although we cannot trace out the speciﬁc roles of policy changes 
and economic factors in inducing caseload declines, our results are con-
sistent with the view that welfare reforms induced substantial declines. 
State reforms in the 1990s prior to PRWORA display a host of common 
elements, and these were both supported and extended with the federal 
legislation, so the acceleration of caseload reductions is consistent with 
the importance of these factors (Blank 2002). We suspect that the great-
est impacts are due to reforms that implemented various restrictions 
and requirements making welfare receipt less attractive; such changes 
would both reduce new applicants and increase exits from the rolls. 
We also believe that nationwide changes in attitudes, especially among 
workers in the social services, stressing the need for recipients to seek 
alternatives to government cash support, played an important role. 
While frontline welfare workers may have had great difﬁculty clearly 
communicating the speciﬁcs of various federal, state, and local reform 
provisions (Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald 1998), it was very clear to 
all involved—workers and recipients alike—that the environment had 
changed dramatically in the 1990s, and that work was to be preferred 
over welfare.
Overall, our conclusions strongly support the consensus that the re-
forms were successful in reducing welfare caseloads. While other policy 
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reforms—especially increases in the EITC in the early 1990s—facili-
tated movements by individuals off of welfare, as did extraordinary and 
sustained economic growth, there is little question that, in the absence 
of welfare reforms, many more individuals would have continued to 
receive welfare payments.
Employment
Given explicit requirements under state waivers and TANF that re-
cipients participate in training or paid employment, it is no surprise that 
employment rates of recipients increased over the period of reform. In 
addition, at each of our sites, we observe that welfare leavers are appre-
ciably more likely to be employed in 1999 than in 1994. This suggests 
that the implicit goal of providing work as an alternative to welfare has 
been successful.
The timing of employment growth, however, is not supportive of 
the view that welfare reforms, deﬁned narrowly, had a direct role. Evi-
dence on caseloads, both at our sites and nationally, in conjunction with 
an analysis of state-level rules, suggests that reform was more intense 
in the period after TANF was implemented. If reforms operated largely 
by improving labor market opportunities for recipients, for example, 
through training and related programs, we would expect employment 
rates for leavers to grow particularly fast after federal reform. In fact, 
the growth in the employment rate is greater at all of our sites prior to 
1997 than in the period 1997–1999. This experience is consistent with 
the view that the expansions in EITC, Medicaid, and child care that oc-
curred earlier in the decade may have had a primary role in increasing 
employment of leavers by increasing the attractiveness of work.
Of course, we might expect that the economy would be of critical 
importance in fostering increased employment. As noted above, both 
nationally and at our sites, the unemployment rate declines were par-
ticularly precipitous beginning in the early to mid 1990s, and declines 
in unemployment rates were relatively modest at most sites after 1997. 
One exception is in Baltimore, where economic growth was somewhat 
less pronounced before 1998 but displayed an appreciable increase in 
1998–1999. We observe an increase in employment for welfare leavers 
in Baltimore during this latter time period, suggestive of the role of the 
economy. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that eco-
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nomic growth played a central role in causing the increase in employ-
ment of former recipients.
Still, it is clear that the economy is not the sole factor in explain-
ing increased employment of welfare leavers. We observe dramatic im-
provements in employment levels of leavers in Chicago in the period 
1996–1999, although declines in unemployment rates were only slight-
ly greater than at most of the other sites. At three of our sites where the 
economy continued to be strong, we observe declines in leaver employ-
ment rates over the last two years of our analysis.
Our analysis of the dynamics of leaving welfare and obtaining em-
ployment provides no evidence that the basic relationship between work 
and welfare has shifted over the 1990s.3 Throughout the period, those 
more likely to obtain employment are more likely to leave welfare, with 
little change in this relationship, despite the substantial increase in exit 
rates. 
In the face of attempts to increase the employment focus of the 
welfare system, we might also expect important changes in the types of 
jobs individuals obtain. On the one hand, emphasis on “work-ﬁrst” ac-
tivities, in conjunction with increased pressure for employment, might 
well create incentives for individuals to obtain short-term employment, 
reducing movement into more stable employment. On the other hand, 
job readiness and training programs designed to increase recipients’ 
long-term economic self-sufﬁciency might well help recipients obtain 
better jobs. Our results do not suggest substantial impacts of either kind: 
On net, welfare reform had little effect on the types of jobs individu-
als obtain. It would appear that welfare reform did little or nothing to 
change the underlying structure of the low-skilled, low-wage market 
faced by former recipients.
Throughout the period of our study, we observe that welfare re-
cipients obtain jobs with very short expected durations. Only half of 
the jobs obtained by recipients last beyond the quarter in which they 
were obtained, and average quarterly earnings in these jobs are low. At 
several of the sites, we observe a decline in average employment dura-
tion over this period, but this seems to parallel declines observed for 
employees in the same ﬁrms who are not welfare recipients. More sig-
niﬁcantly, the declines in duration at our sites do not parallel declines in 
overall earnings on a job, suggesting that earnings improvements over 
the 1990s more than compensated for any declines in job stability.
Conclusions and Implications for Welfare and Beyond   163
Whatever changes occurred over the period, it is clear that there 
are few cases where recipients who leave jobs will usually be eligible 
for state unemployment insurance beneﬁts.4 It is worth recalling that 
the movement to reform welfare in recent decades has in part been a 
way of prodding recipients to join the economic mainstream and thus 
become eligible for ﬁrst-tier safety net programs such as UI when times 
got tough (e.g., Murray 1984). Although analyses that focus on employ-
ment spells for former welfare recipients (e.g., Martinson 2000) suggest 
that many work continuously, our results show the ﬂip side of this coin: 
The overwhelming majority of jobs obtained are short-term; few can be 
said to provide a source of economic stability.
Although we do not ﬁnd evidence that welfare reform has forced 
recipients to accept jobs that are worse than those held by recipients 
in prior years, pressure for employment may be inducing recipients to 
seek jobs more aggressively. At every site, we observed increases in the 
proportion of recipients who had begun at least one new job in a given 
quarter. Such increases will occur if individuals obtain new jobs more 
quickly after leaving a prior job or if they are more likely to obtain a 
second job.
Are Individuals Better or Worse Off? 
Supporters of welfare reform argued that the emphasis on employ-
ment would introduce, or reintroduce, recipients to the world of work, 
providing them with support and incentives to leave the welfare sys-
tem. In the most optimistic picture, recipients would develop new work 
skills on the job, many eventually achieving self-sufﬁciency through 
employment, and former recipients would ultimately credit welfare re-
form with improving their lives. Opponents of welfare reform drew a 
sharply contrasting picture of low-skilled single parents forced onto the 
streets, competing in a labor market choked by a deluge of similarly 
desperate job seekers. In this environment, increasing numbers of in-
dividuals would face the prospect of extended unemployment, depen-
dence on private and family charity as well as criminal activity, and, for 
some, homelessness or worse.
It should be clear that our results, consistent with other studies of 
welfare reform, allow us to unambiguously reject both of these polar 
views. Although we cannot provide a ﬁnal answer of whether individu-
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als are made better or worse off by reform, our results are consistent 
with a particularly simple view of how reform has inﬂuenced individu-
als’ experiences. Overall, reform can be viewed as comprising two sets 
of changes: one imposing new constraints on recipients, and the other 
providing new resources supportive of work and self-sufﬁciency. The 
latter, sometimes referred to as “work supports,” include training, child 
care and transportation subsidies, and related services.
The high rates of departure from the rolls and the steady or increas-
ing employment rates, both for recipients and leavers, suggest that re-
cipients are responsive to the combination of incentives provided by 
these reforms. On net, our evidence suggests that it is welfare reform’s 
new constraints—such as requirements that people seek employment or 
engage in training, and limits on lifetime aid receipt—that are most im-
portant. The evidence for this view is based on two observations from 
our research. First, we ﬁnd that caseloads have declined both because of 
an increase in the exit rates and because fewer individuals are entering 
welfare. If welfare reforms affected the caseload primarily by providing 
very attractive training or job opportunities for recipients, we would not 
expect such substantial declines in the numbers of individuals entering 
onto the rolls.
Second, at most of our sites, among those individuals who leave 
welfare and obtain a job in the following quarter, we observe an in-
crease over the period 1996–1999 in the proportion that experiences 
a “support gap”; that is, those who exit welfare but do not obtain paid 
employment until some point in the following quarter. Such individuals 
very likely left welfare prior to ﬁnding employment. Although it may be 
legitimate to count these individuals as welfare-to-work successes, it is 
hard to argue that most were drawn off of welfare by attractive employ-
ment opportunities. Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that their 
exit from welfare reﬂected other factors, and, in the face of necessity, 
they responded by obtaining employment.
If this interpretation is correct—that is, if welfare reform has had 
its impact largely because it imposed new constraints on welfare re-
cipients—we believe that individuals are not likely to have been made 
better off by reform. Since the option of exiting welfare was available 
to recipients prior to the latest reforms, this was a choice many judged 
to be inferior. In general, policy changes that operate by reducing the 
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attractiveness of one of the options—welfare receipt—will not yield a 
net beneﬁt to single parents.
Whatever new constraints recipients face, our results imply that 
many are responding constructively, pursuing increased employment 
as their best chance in the new policy environment. They are securing 
employment at rates at least as high as leavers prior to reform. In most 
important respects, these former welfare recipients have done what was 
asked of them under welfare reform.
Welfare recipients have always faced a daunting set of barriers that 
limit their personal life chances. They generally suffer from low job 
skills, inadequate and unreliable child care, the burdens of family often 
embedded in a chaotic and disorganized household unit, family vio-
lence, and personal and psychological problems that limit their ability 
to cope in these difﬁcult circumstances. Welfare reform certainly has 
not changed this, nor has it changed the nature of labor market demand 
for their services, which seldom provides earnings sufﬁcient to pull a 
family out of poverty. But it has shown that such problems do not pre-
clude moving substantial numbers of such individuals from welfare to 
work.
It is now typical for middle-class families with children to have 
both parents in the labor force. Whatever taxpayer support there once 
was for a program allowing poor single parents to withdraw from paid 
work has now evaporated. Welfare reforms represent an attempt to bring 
welfare in line with these general sentiments and mores, and they have 
certainly achieved that end.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What lessons does our study of urban welfare and work patterns 
provide about the efﬁcacy of various kinds of reform? Variation across 
our sites gives us some indication of the impacts of alternative poli-
cies. Our analysis also provides us with information about the kinds of 
jobs welfare recipients obtain and the determinants of job stability. In 
this section, we discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for choices that 
policymakers face in their ongoing efforts to reauthorize U.S. welfare 
programs. 
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The Trade-Off between Caseload Reduction and Employment
From the inception of the latest round of debate on welfare reform 
in the early 1990s, one of the central questions has revolved around the 
potential trade-off between the goal of reducing caseloads and that of in-
creasing recipient employment and assuring economic self-sufﬁciency. 
Those expressing caution argued that time limits and other restrictions 
would merely exacerbate the already-desperate conditions of the poor-
est single parents, while reform supporters argued that such restrictions 
would create incentives to push and pull recipients into the labor market 
and ﬁnd their own paths to independence. When welfare reform is de-
ﬁned broadly, including the substantial expansions of EITC, Medicaid, 
and child care in the early part of the 1990s, we ﬁnd strong support for 
the latter view. 
In our examination of speciﬁc programs, however, we do see evi-
dence of trade-offs between case reduction and movement into employ-
ment. This is clear for Atlanta, where regulations requiring recipients 
to sign self-sufﬁciency pacts in 1998 led to both increases in exit rates 
and, very likely, declines in employment rates. Similarly, in Fort Lau-
derdale, when the two-year time limit began to bind, there were de-
clines in employment rates for leavers, along with continuing high exit 
rates. Finally, in Houston, although we cannot identify a speciﬁc policy 
that is responsible, the very large caseload declines are associated with 
unchanging employment rates among leavers, in contrast to the upward 
trend at other sites. 
These patterns conﬁrm that ever-more-stringent welfare policies 
will not automatically lead to higher levels of employment. Despite the 
overall positive record, some state policies have had the effect of reduc-
ing caseloads at the cost of recipient employment. In contemplating 
further policy changes, all states will need to recognize that the remain-
ing recipients may be limited in their ability to adapt to the labor market 
and the new welfare regime. Time limits, or other reforms that make 
welfare receipt less attractive, may leave an increasing number of poor 
single parents with options that are dramatically worse.
Of course, reforms providing services and continued support to re-
cipients, allowing them to expand or enhance their job skills or subsidiz-
ing their job search and work activities, provide an alternative approach 
to reducing caseloads over the longer term. We turn next to a discussion 
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of how our results bear on the question of what kinds of programs and 
strategies support successful transitions from welfare to work.
Work-First versus Human Capital Development
At each of our sites, recipients are required to participate in pro-
grams designed to provide skills to aid in obtaining employment that 
will ultimately allow them to leave welfare and obtain economic self-
sufﬁciency. The underlying philosophy of these programs varies from 
those that are focused on merely getting people into any job (“work-
ﬁrst”) as soon as possible to those that attempt to ﬁrst augment their job 
skills through training. Although there are differences in focus across 
our sites, none of the programs provide long-term job skills training to 
a substantial share of welfare recipients. A recent review of evaluations 
of training programs for welfare recipients and others argues that seri-
ous efforts to improve human capital through training have not really 
been attempted: participants in HCD programs evaluated as part of the 
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS) were 
mainly provided basic and adult education services (40 percent), rath-
er than occupational skill training (28 percent) (King 2004). Further, 
NEWWS sites were only able to boost participation in vocational train-
ing by 5 percentage points, while adult education increased by fully 20 
percentage points. Supporters argue that skill development programs 
are essential to improving the long-term labor market prospects of cur-
rent welfare recipients (for example, in addition to King 2004, see Hotz, 
Imbens, and Klerman 2000; Krueger 2004; and Martinson and Strawn 
2002).
Our results provide some evidence in support of this claim. We ﬁnd 
that the jobs obtained by welfare recipients are appreciably less stable and 
provide lower pay than jobs obtained at the same time by others with the 
same employer. Of course, such differences reﬂect the fact that welfare 
recipients may differ on average from other employees on a variety of 
personal characteristics, including education, gender, and family struc-
ture. However, we ﬁnd that even when we compare welfare recipients 
with one another, after controlling for characteristics we can observe, 
unmeasured personal characteristics have a large effect on job stability 
and earnings. Two welfare recipients with the same external character- 
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istics who obtain a job with the same employer may differ dramatically 
in their expected success on the job.
These results suggest that there is substantial room for beneﬁts from 
any program that can succeed in building individual job skills. If long-
term training can, in fact, augment individual job skills, in effect mak-
ing the least successful recipients more like those who are successful, 
such training will provide generous returns, possibly in the range of 10 
percent or more (Krueger 2004). While our work opens up the possibil-
ity of such beneﬁts, it provides no indication of whether programs are 
in fact successful. Our reading of the literature (Barnow and King 2000; 
King 2004) is that some programs yield modest and continuing returns, 
while others have great promise, but results are hardly deﬁnitive. Our 
own results are also consistent with the alternative view that stable—
and largely unalterable—personal characteristics play the primary role 
in determining who among welfare recipients will be successful in the 
labor market.
Does this mean that “work-ﬁrst” programs do not work? Although 
our results indicate clear limits on their efﬁcacy, there remains much 
room for such programs to affect recipients’ success in the labor market, 
certainly in the near term. We turn next to a discussion about the kinds 
of directed job search that may be most valuable to recipients.
The Value of a “Good” Job 
One of the guiding principles of work-ﬁrst programs is that imme-
diate paid employment—almost any paid employment—should be en-
couraged. Supporters argue that recipients without job experience will 
learn the everyday work skills that enable them to continue in employ-
ment, and recipients with prior job experience will avoid unemployment 
and the personal debilitation and stigmatization that it often entails. In 
fact, recent evaluations indicate that near-term (i.e., 1–3 years) gains in 
employment and earnings from such programs are signiﬁcant and sub-
stantial (Hamilton 2002; Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman 2000). This view 
is often stated as “Get a job, any job,” or sometimes, “Get a job, get a 
better job, get a career.”
However, our results suggest that, in at least some cases, recipients 
may beneﬁt by waiting for “better” job offers. Even after controlling 
for all personal characteristics (using a person ﬁxed-effects model), we 
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found that jobs in certain industries offered higher pay and more stable 
employment. Furthermore, high pay and stability tend to go together, so 
it is seldom necessary to sacriﬁce one to get the other. While this ﬁnding 
may accord with common sense, our results are unique in conﬁrming 
the powerful effect of type of job in the welfare environment. Previous 
work has seldom controlled for unmeasured differences across people, 
nor has there been work focusing on the experiences of welfare recipi-
ents.
More generally, programs that focus on helping recipients obtain 
those jobs with the greatest expected pay and stability may have sub-
stantial beneﬁts. Such beneﬁts are particularly attractive, because they 
may occur without costly investment in new job skills. Of course, such 
programs should not be viewed as a panacea. Our analysis refers only 
to the returns from a single job, not to the future pattern of employment. 
It appears likely that even a short-term job is better than an extended 
period without any job.5 A program that increases placements in bet-
ter jobs without reducing the likelihood of employment would almost 
certainly beneﬁt workers. This is also consistent with the results from 
two key studies. The NEWWS evaluation found larger longer-term 
employment and earnings impacts from its Portland site, a hybrid em-
ployment- and training-oriented program that encouraged participants 
to sort job prospects carefully and select those offering better pay, ben-
eﬁts, and chances for advancement. And, King et al. (2000) found that 
more stable employment and higher earnings resulted from programs 
that stressed skills training and more selective job search strategies in 
Illinois and Texas.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Our results support the growing consensus that American welfare 
reform has met many of the primary goals of its supporters, and it has 
avoided the dire predictions of its severest critics. We have made major 
strides in terms of reducing welfare caseloads and promoting employ-
ment among former and potential welfare recipients. 
It must be recognized that this success occurred against the back-
drop of an extraordinarily strong economy and earlier federal policy 
changes (e.g., EITC and Medicaid expansions), which greatly facili-
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tated increasing labor market involvement for welfare recipients. Fu-
ture reforms may not face such a supportive environment, and policy 
choices may be more likely to face difﬁcult trade-offs between the goals 
of caseload reduction and employment.6
Our work also highlights the poor earnings and unstable employ-
ment of former welfare recipients and others at the bottom of the earn-
ings distribution in six large urban areas. The success of welfare reform 
has resulted in most former recipients joining the ranks of the working 
poor and introduced them to the daily stresses that all single parents 
must face when juggling work and family demands. The next policy 
frontier we face is addressing the enormous challenges that collectively 
confront the working poor.  Policies that deal with work and family is-
sues have a far larger audience and presumably far greater public appeal 
than those that are focused solely on recipients of cash assistance. Poli-
cymakers at the national, state, and local levels will have to join forces 
in meeting these challenges, as will employers as a group.
Notes
 1.  This point is emphasized by Boushey and Gunderson (2001) and Edin and Lein 
(1997).
 2.  For an attempt to identify causal impacts of policy choices in Texas, see 
Schexnayder’s (2003) report, which is based on random assignment of recipients 
to alternative rules under the Achieving Change for Texans waiver demonstra-
tion.
 3.  This view is echoed in Blank (2002) and Schexnayder et al. (2002). 
 4.  Evidence from TANF leaver studies suggests that a larger share of former wel-
fare recipients is eligible for UI beneﬁts in the postreform era, but the proportion 
remains small. Rangarajan, Razaﬁndrakoto, and Corson (2002), reporting results 
from New Jersey during the late 1990s when the state’s economy was still boom-
ing, found that between three-ﬁfths and three-quarters of TANF leavers would 
potentially be monetarily eligible for UI, but that as many as 60 percent of these 
would be ineligible for nonmonetary reasons (e.g., voluntary quits). 
 5.  Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (forthcoming) show that welfare recipients in tem-
porary help services jobs, those that we ﬁnd to be the least stable here, do ap-
preciably better in terms of ultimate employment than do recipients without jobs, 
and only slightly less well than the average employed recipient.
 6.  State ﬁscal difﬁculties are considered by Chernick and Reschovsky (2002).
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Appendix A
Data Sources 
 
Our data are for AFDC/TANF cases in each central county in six met-
ropolitan areas: Fulton County, Georgia (Atlanta); Baltimore City, Maryland 
(county equivalent unit); Cook County, Illinois (Chicago); Broward County, 
Florida (Fort Lauderdale); Harris County, Texas (Houston); and Jackson Coun-
ty, Missouri (Kansas City). In each case, the county contains all or almost all 
of the central city population. With the exception of Baltimore, the county also 
contains substantial population outside the central city, although a large share 
of the county’s welfare recipients resides in the central city. The proportion 
of the metropolitan population included in the central county varies from less 
than one-ﬁfth (for Fulton County in the Atlanta metropolitan area) to nearly 
three-quarters (for Harris County in the Houston metropolitan area). Although 
we follow the convention of referencing each site by the name of its central 
city, all information on welfare participation applies to the central county, un-
less explicitly noted otherwise.
We have limited our focus to families headed by females aged 18 but less 
than 65 years who received AFDC-Basic or TANF cash payments. These se-
lection criteria omit all men as well as recipients who received aid as part of the 
AFDC-Unemployed Parent program or its TANF successor. We retain cases 
where the head has been coded as “inactive.” In contrast to other analyses, this 
approach includes cases that have been sanctioned and cases where the case 
head is not the parent of the dependent children (“child only” cases).
The unit of analysis can be viewed as the family or as the case head, who is 
the mother or female payee. We omit those who received only noncash beneﬁts 
even if they were reported as AFDC or TANF recipients. We have aggregated 
monthly beneﬁt payments to quarterly totals, so that anyone who received pay-
ments in any month in a quarter is counted as receiving payments in that quarter. 
This allows greater comparability with quarterly earnings data and smoothes 
over much of the administrative “churning” inherent in welfare data.
In order to examine the employment experiences of welfare recipients, 
we obtained quarterly total earnings for all individuals in jobs covered by un-
employment insurance (UI) in these states, matching these to the records of 
AFDC/TANF recipients. For the Kansas City analysis, both Missouri and Kan-
sas earnings data were accessed and used. The vast majority of employment in 
each of the states is covered by these data, although illegal employment, self-
employment, and several classes of nonproﬁt and federal employment are not 
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covered.1 The ﬁles also fail to identify employment for individuals who left the 
state. Out-of-state employment for residents in our sites is not expected to be 
signiﬁcant, except in Kansas City, where Jackson County residents often have 
jobs across the border in Kansas. 
Because administrative practices regarding the archiving of data differ 
across states, the period of coverage for our sites varies somewhat. AFCD/
TANF data for Baltimore and Kansas City are available beginning in 1990, At-
lanta and Houston in 1992, Fort Lauderdale in 1993, and Chicago in 1995. In 
all sites, welfare data extend through the end of calendar year 1999. However, 
where we have used employment data in our analysis, in many cases necessary 
data do not extend to the end of 1999, as noted in the text.
As an indicator of the general economic climate in the region, we use 
the unemployment rate for the primary metropolitan area. Our decision to use 
the metropolitan area rather than the county stems from our concern that our 
measure of the local economy not be inﬂuenced by welfare policy. Whereas 
unemployment for a single county might be inﬂuenced by an inﬂux of former 
welfare recipients and by intra-metropolitan mobility and local demographic 
changes, such effects will be much smaller at the level of the metropolitan 
area.
The measures underlying caseload and employment are summarized in 
Table A.1. As noted above, those women receiving any welfare cash payments 
in a quarter are viewed as recipients. Given monthly turnover, the caseload 
measured this way for a given quarter will be slightly greater than the highest 
monthly caseload. In examining movements onto and off of welfare, we deﬁne 
an individual as leaving welfare in a given quarter if she received welfare dur-
ing that quarter but not during the following quarter. Similarly, an individual 
is deﬁned as entering welfare if she was not receiving welfare in that quarter 
but was receiving welfare in the following quarter. This structure implies that 
caseload can be identiﬁed as changing according to the equation of motion:
Caseload(t + 1) = Caseload(t) − Exits(t) + Entries(t),
 
where Exits(t) and Entries(t) are deﬁned by comparison between quarter t and 
quarter t + 1.2 The rate of exit is calculated as Exits(t) / Caseload(t), so that it 
indicates the chance that an individual receiving welfare in quarter t receives 
no welfare in the following quarter. In order to examine exit rates for long-
term recipients, we deﬁne the exit rate analogously for all individuals who had 
received welfare payments continuously for eight quarters prior to the quarter 
in question. 
The extent of welfare recidivism is determined by the numbers of those 
entering welfare (i.e., who received welfare in a given quarter but not the prior 
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quarter) who had also received welfare payments at any point in the prior eight 
quarters, divided by the total entering welfare in the quarter in question. Our 
determination of prior welfare experience is limited to the same county, since 
we did not identify those who had received welfare elsewhere.
Our measure of the rate of employment for welfare leavers is the propor-
tion receiving earnings in quarter t + 1 among those who received welfare 
payments in quarter t but not in quarter t + 1. As indicated above, our measure 
of earnings is limited to employment within the state (or two adjoining states 
in the case of Kansas City) that is reported to the state Unemployment Insur-
ance system. This measure includes both individuals who obtained jobs prior 
to or immediately after leaving welfare, as well as some individuals who left 
welfare but found a job only after a period of unemployment, perhaps as long 
as ﬁve months.
Table A.1 also provides deﬁnitions for welfare exit rate for those who are 
employed, and our measure of the proportion of employed leavers who likely 
experienced a “support gap.”
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Caseload in quarter t is deﬁned as the total number of families (or case 
heads) receiving AFDC/TANF payments and ﬁtting our selection criteria at 
any point during the quarter.
Exits in quarter t is deﬁned as the number of case heads who received  
payments in quarter t but not in t + 1.
Entries for quarter t is deﬁned as the number of case heads who received 
welfare payments in quarter t + 1 but not in t.
Exit rate is the number of exits at quarter t divided by the caseload in quarter t.
Exit rate for long-term recipients is deﬁned as above but applies to indi-
viduals who had been receiving welfare payments in at least eight quarters 
continuously prior to quarter t.
Employment rates of welfare leavers is the number of individuals leaving 
welfare in quarter t and receiving earnings during quarter t + 1 divided by the 
number of individuals leaving welfare in t.
Welfare exit rates for employed recipients is the number of individuals 
leaving welfare in quarter t and receiving earnings in quarter t + 1 divided by 
the number receiving welfare in quarter t and receiving earnings in quarter
t + 1.
Proportion with support gap is the proportion not employed in t among 
those employed in t + 1 who exited welfare in t.
Notes
 1.  For example, program ofﬁcials estimate that UI coverage exceeds 98 percent 
of state wage and salary employment in Texas (King and Schexnayder 1998). 
Kornfeld and Bloom (1999) ﬁnd that using wage record data rather than survey 
information does not impose serious biases on estimates of program effects.
 2.  This labeling convention implies that those entries indexed by t ﬁrst appear in the 
caseload at t + 1, whereas exits indexed by t last appear in the caseload at t. 
Table A.1  Summary of Measures of Welfare Dynamics
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